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ABSTRACT 
COMMERCIAL R)LICY AND ITS EFFECTS ON MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY IN 
LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES sA CASE STUDY OF SUDAN 1966 - 1976. 
by 
Siddig Umbadda Rabih. 
This thesis attempts to examine the effects of the trade 
and payments regime prevalent in the Sudan between 1966 - 1976 on her 
domestic manufacturing industry. For this purpose, we employ two wid- 
ely used methods, namely, the Effective Rate of Protection (ERP), and 
the Domestic Resource Cost (MC). Literature on both methods is revi- 
ewed and uses, implications, and empirical findings are discussed. 
A brief description of the structure of Sudanese economy 
is provided and the objectives and components of commercial policy 
are set out. Particular emphasis is laid on the effects of these pol- 
icies on exports and imports. Export composition and performance are 
analysed and it is shown that the policy pursued harboured a strong 
anti-export bias which adversly affected export performance. As rega- 
rds imports, considerable attention is paid to the. description and 
evaluation of the complex system operated. It is suggested that while 
the system might have helped to reduce immediate pressure on the bal- 
ance of payments, this achievement was not without cost. 
Before effective rates of protection are computed and 
their results evaluated, industrial policy, objectives and instruments 
are spelt out and assessed. Computed ERPs are then shown to have wide 
inter-sectoral and inter-industrial variations. It is suggested that 
this might indicate a lack of consistent criteria in tariff setting. 
Furthermore, both nominal and effective rates of protection are shown 
to be associated with resource shifts through time. The results, how- 
ever, did not lend support to the claim (of ERP theory) that ERPs are 
better predictors of resource movements than nominal rates. 
Finally, DRCs are estimated. Results reveal that they 
vary between industries and between firms, in the same industry. Hypo- 
theses to help explain such variations are then formulated and tested. 
It is suggested that although inefficiency in factor use and underuti- 
lization of capacity go far in explaining observed variations, other 
factors e. g. poor infrastructural services and foreign exchange alloc- 
ation methods may also be important. 
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INTRODUCT33ON 
Although trade theory advocates free trade policy as 
a means of optimizing resource allocation, it is the norm rather 
than the exception for trade and payments policies in less deve- 
loped countries (LDCs) to be restrictive. There seems to be a 
certain logic or tendency for such (apparently) non-optimal pol- 
icies to develop in these countries. This has to do with both 
industrialization and foreign exchange conservation. 
During the great depression, prices of primary exports 
fell by half and so did their proceeds, thereby reducing foreign 
exchange earnings of LDCs. This happened at a time when the debt 
service ratio of LDCs was on the increase, and to make things wor- 
se, capital inflow from advanced countries to LDCs ceased as a re- 
sult of the depression (Little, Scitovsky and Scott 1970). The le- 
sson to be learnt from the 1930's by LDCs was therefore, to reduce 
their dependence on the developed countries to avoid repetition of 
the consequences of the depression on their economies. 
The Second World War brought different lessons. Demand 
for primary products was high, and foreign exchange was (for most 
LDCs) abundant, but imports (both capital and consumer goods) were 
unavailable, pointing again to the necessity of self-sufficiency and 
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the hazards of relying on world trade and international special- 
ization. This time growth in LDCs was seen as checked by unavail- 
able necessary imports, rather than by shortage of foreign excha- 
nge. Post-war economic policies of LDCs, therefore have to reflect 
these experiences (and those of the depression) hence the call for 
industrialization for self-sufficiency (import substitution) and 
economic independence. Industrialization (perhaps at any cost) 
became a vital part of development strategies. 
With regard to foreign exchange, most LDCs are charac- 
terized by high export concentration where one or two export prod- 
ucts (primary in nature) would constitute the bulk of the country's 
foreign exchange earnings. With growing economies, more imports are 
required, be they capital goods (much needed in the process of dev- 
elopment) or consumer goods ( of more variety and sophistication to 
satisfy the growing needs of a population moving away from subsist- 
ence conditions). In order to avoid balance of payments difficulties, 
exports have to grow at a faster rate than imports. But assuming that 
supply conditions permit (natural hazards), this depends on demand 
conditions in the international markets, for primary products. These 
markets, however, are known to be characterized by an elastic supply, 
due to the presence of synthetic substitutes, and an income elasti- 
city of demand of less than unity above high income levels. The ind- 
ication is that in all probability, exports will grow at a lower rate 
than imports, and a chronic deficit in the balance of payments will 
develop and become a major constraint on the development process. 
This situation then, makes foreign exchange a highly val- 
ued resource which is then put under direct control - on the assumpt- 
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ion that market forces (in the circumstances) if left to themselves, 
will result in an irresponsible allocation. 
Restrictive commercial policy (in the form of tariffs, 
quotas, bans, etc. ), is seen, in the circumstances, as a policy that 
will help both to encourage the development of domestic manufacturing 
industry and to economize on the use of foreign exchange. The effects 
of such a policy on the industrial pattern that emerges are consider- 
able, especially since the manufacturing industry may, owe its very 
existence to this policy. In particular, if policy measures are prom- 
pted by more than one objective and/or undertaken in an unco-ordinated 
manner (such that effects of one are cancelled or increased by another) 
it will be difficult to predict the magnitude of the resultant protec- 
tive effect, and hence its effect on resource movements (which might 
differ from the original intentions). Moreover, if industries protec- 
ted in this manner are not those in which comparative advantage is 
highest, the country may incur losses. 
Sudan is a typical LDC which pursued more or less similar 
policies to those observed above (although reasons might have differ- 
ed slightly). The effects of such policies have not been analysed, 
however. In view of the importance of the resource allocation effects 
of these policies, such an attempt seems necessary. Indeed, similar 
studies have been carried out for a number of countries, both devel- 
oped and less developed e. g. Turkey, Krueger 1966; 1974; Ghana, 
Steel 1972; Leith 1974; India, Bahawati and Desai, 1970; Pakistan, 
Lewis and Guisinger 1970; Germany, Rabenau 1976; U. K., Oulton 1976. 
Therefore there seems to be a need to continue work on similar lines 
for other individual countries like Sudan. With regard to studies 
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using ERP, Grubel (1971) contends that s- 
"... The results of such work are awaited by 
national and international tariff authorit- 
ies and economic development planners who: 
expect to use these as further tools in de- 
signing tariff structures which serve nati- 
onal development purposes and encourage ef- 
ficient international specialization within 
the constraints of other policies. " 
(Grubel 1971, P. 14) 
To analyse. the effects of commercial policy on domestic 
manufacturing industry in the Sudan, we make use of two major tools 
of analysis developed in the literature for this purpose. These are 
the effective rate of protection (ERP) which captures the effects 
of tariffs (and their equivalents) on both final products and their 
inputs, and the domestic resource costs (DRCs) of foreign exchange 
saved (in import substitution) or earned (in exports). In Chapters 
One and Two, the two measures are developed and their uses and the 
conceptual and empirical difficulties are discussed. 
Chapter Three gives a brief description of the Sudanese 
economy, which, it is hoped, will be useful as a background for the 
analysis in subsequent Chapters. Chapter Four discusses the object- 
ives and instruments of commercial policy (e. g. tariffs, import li- 
cencing, foreign exchange rationing). 
In Chapter Five, export policy objectives as they appear 
in official documents are stated and export performance is analysed 
in the light of the above objectives, and commercial policy instru- 
ments. Chapter Six describes and evaluates the import regime. Much 
of the Chapter is devoted to the work of the regime with particular 
- 17 - 
emphasis on the " New Systems " (nil-value, suppliers credits, town 
barter) i. e. imports effected outside the official foreign exchange 
earnings. 
Chapter Seven analyses closely, the policy pursued by 
the State to develop the domestic manufacturing industry. Such a 
policy involves government priorities as to which industries are 
preferred, and how these are to be helped. In Chapter Eight, ERP 
are computed and their results and their implications are assessed. 
Chapter Nine gives estimates of DRC and attempts to explain why they 
vary between firms and between industries. Finally, Chapter Ten out- 
lines the main findings of the study and points out some policy imp- 
lications. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE EFFECTIVE RATE OF PROTECTION (ERP) sA THEORETICAL STATEMENT. 
I. I. Nominal Tariffs sA Summary. 
Our concern here is with tariffs (and subsidies) on final 
products. The direction of the movements of all the variables concer- 
ned, consequent upon the imposition of a tariff, could be inferred, or 
approximated by using ordinary supply and demand schedules (i. e. par- 
tial equilibrium analysis). Under the small country assumption, a ta- 
riff on an importable commodity (subsidy on an exportable), would in- 
crease the domestic price of the commodity, thereby inducing more of 
it to be produced locally (production effect), less of it to be cons- 
umed in general (consumption effect), imports will fall by the sum of 
the above two effects, and a tariff revenue equal to after-tariff im- 
ports times the tariff rate would be realized (its magnitude will de- 
pend upon the initial position of demand and supply curves and their 
elasticities). 
When the small country assumption is removed such that the 
tariff-imposing country is able to affect world prices, imposition of 
a tariff will have a terms of trade effect. The rise in domestic pri- 
ces resulting from a tariff, reduces home demand for imports which cau- 
- 19 - 
ses a fall in the foreign price, and together with the assumption of 
constant export and other import prices, this will normally repres - 
ent an improvement in the home (tariff-imposing) country's ' terms 
of trade. ' An export subsidy would have a less definite effect on the 
terms of trade because of the opposite movement, in the volume of ex- 
ports (up) and their prices (down). The final result will depend on 
the elasticity of foreign demand for exports, with the terms of trade 
improving only if its elasticity is greater than unity. Finally, tar- 
iffs, by increasing the domestic price of the importable, induce its 
domestic supply to increase, this increase (protective effect) depends 
both on the tariff rate and the elasticity of domestic' supply over the 
relevant range. 
I 
1.2. ERP - Partial Equilibrium Analysis. 
1.2.1. Rationale and some Historical Evidence. 
The above partial equilibrium analysis summary of nomin- 
al tariffs, shows that the imposition of nominal tariffs has implic- 
ations for both consumers and producers. On the production side, the 
suggestion is that for the protected industry, the results (amongst 
others) would be (a) a rise in gross output; (b) a rise in the 
use of each primary factor (Stolper - Samuelson theorem) and (c) 
a rise in the value added (VAD). These implications are drawn (of 
course) on the assumption that products require only primary factors 
to be produced. In the real world, however, final products require 
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both primary factors, 'and intermediate inputs. Thus nominal tariff 
theory, by assuming away intermediate inputs, tended to over simp- 
lify the analysis. The proposition that the direction of change of 
output may be directly inferred from the tariff (subsidy) effect 
on the price of output involves the implicit assumption that prot- 
ection afforded to the final output is automatically (and in equal 
proportion) conferred on primary factors, such that as a result 
(of the increase in their rewards) more of them are attracted (there), 
and hence output is increased. 
Intermediate inputs are, in fact, required for final pro- 
ducts, and are not excluded from tariffs in the protective structure. 
If tariffs are levied on intermediate goods, the prices of final go- 
ods will be raised, and hence part of the protection afforded to fi- 
nal goods will be absorbed by the higher prices of inputs. The obvious 
thing, then, is that in the presence of intermediate inputs, the pro- 
tective structure both taxes and subsidizes economic activities. That 
this is so, and recognized, is manifest in tariff structures the world 
over, where tariffs escalate in ascending order, according to stages 
of processing from zero or low rates on raw materials, to higher rates 
on final goods. But the clearest statement of the implications of tar- 
iffs on intermediate goods came from Clarence Barber (195.5), who is 
generally considered to be the first to draw attention to the import- 
ance of the concept of effective protection :- 
"... in general it may be said that, where the tariff 
on the raw material is lower than the tariff on the 
final product, the effective level of protection will 
exceed the apparent rate of protection, where the two 
are equal, the effective and the apparent rate of pr- 
otection will be the same, and where the tariff on raw 
materials is higher than the tariffs on final product, 
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the ERP received by the manufacturer will be less 
than the rate applied to his final product... " 
(Barber 1955; P"524) 
Despite such a clear statement, theoretical interest in the concept 
of ERP, and the possibility of developing it into a major empirical 
tool to analysise resource allocation effects of protective struct- 
-ures of different countries, appeared considerably later than would 
perhaps be expected. 
In the first half of the Sixties, both theoretical and 
empirical interest was revived in the concept, through the works of 
Corden (1963; 1966), Johnson (1965), Basevi (1966), and Balassa 
(196.5). The most comprehensive theoretical statement'of the concept 
being that of Corden (1966). From then on, the literature on both 
theoretical and empirical aspects grew rapidly, and a positive int- 
eraction between theory and empirical work took place. Empirical 
work was stimulated by theory (e. g. evidence on the importance of 
substitution between primary factors and material inputs); and the- 
oretical contributions were made as a by-product of empirical work 
(e. g. a theoretical rationale of the phenomenon of negative VAD at 
world price observed in empirical studies). 
This led to the recognition that in the presence of in- 
termediate inputs, ranking industries by nominal tariffs levied on 
their final products does not give the actual strength of resource 
pulls and pushes conferred by the protective structure (as a whole) 
on those industries. This should be indicated by the scale of effe- 
ctive protection rates which are not expected to coincide with nom- 
inal rates since they take into consideration not only tariffs on 
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final output, but also tariffs on material inputs and material input 
co-efficients. Therefore, unlike nominal tariffs, ERP are concerned 
with the net effect of the protective structure on the activity con- 
cerned i. e. protection to value added. 
2 Activities accorded such 
protection will be able to pay more for the factors they use and co- 
uld, therefore attract them (if their output is to increase). This 
is what actually matters from the producers point of view, i. e. they 
are concerned with the actual amount that could be spent to bid for 
primary factors. Therefore, on the production side, the relevant in- 
dicator of resource movement is the ERP. On the consumption side, 
however, nominal tariffs continue to provide correct signals. 
Before the ERP is formally developed, it should be ment- 
ioned that the great attraction of the concept is due to the fact that 
it allows a single figure to sum up the net results of various trade 
and other taxes and subsidies affecting any particular activity. The 
calculation of such a figure(s) is facilitated through the existence 
of input-output tables. It could be said that ERP has established it- 
self as a major empirical tool, by capturing the essence of the nat- 
ure of production relations (as exhibited by the input-output table), 
that basically all economic processes are closely linked, both hori- 
zontally and vertically, and that most products flow from one indus- 
try to another as inputs, and only a proportion of total output rea- 
ches final demand. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that a 
basic assumption around which the concept is developed is that input 
co-efficients are fixed. 
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1.2.2. ERP :A Formal Statement. 
Define the ERP accorded to industry as, the maximum pro- 
portion by which the tariff system allows domestic value added (VAD) 
of the factors used in the jth. production process to exceed their 
value at world market prices. ERP therefore, relates the domestic ta- 
riff-inclusive price of VAD to the price of value added at world mar- 
ket prices, thus it defines the relationship between nominal tariffs 
on output and its material inputs, and the shares of those material 
inputs, in the cost of production. In order to spell out the relatio- 
nship clearly, the following assumptions are useful s- 
(I) Production functions have fixed input co-efficients. 
(2) Foreign elasticities of supply and demand for both 
importables and exportables are infinite. 
(3) No non-traded goods. 
(4) General equilibrium repercussions are negligible. 
The restrictive nature of the assumptions (especially (I) fixed in- 
put co-efficients), is clear, since standard production theory ass- 
umes substitution amongst inputs both material and primary in the 
production function as a result of price changes, and interest should 
focus therefore, on the resultant production pattern due to that cha- 
nge. 
The following conventional notation is adopted throughout; 
let :- 
- 24 - 
gj a effective rate of protection accorded to industry j 
through the tariff system. 
P 
price of VAD per unit of output j in world markets. 
Pv domestic price of VAD per unit of j (in industry j), 
i. e. after-tariff price. 
Pj 
= Free Trade price of unit of J. 
Pi 
s Free Trade price of a unit of material input (ii). 
P; 'pi = domestic (tariff-inclusive) prices per unit of j and i. 
tj 
a nominal ad valorem tariff per unit of j. 
ti- 
ad valorem tariff on material input i. 
aij - value input co-efficient of material input i per unit 
of J. at world prices. 
aij domestic input co-efficient value in j. 
(I + ti) 
aij 
(I+tý) 
vj 
- value added per unit of j at world prices. 
Vj 
= domestic value added per unit of J. 
In general, let primes denote domestic values. Assume that industry 
j produces one unit of j (an importable), by combining a unit of va- 
lue added and a unit of material inputs (see footnote 2). For conv- 
-enience, assume that V is produced by one primary factor represen- 
-ting a bundle V and only one material input i, (assumed importable 
for the time being), which is combined with it to produce j. 
-25- 
ERP, then, defined as the percentage increase of domestic 
value added over world VAD made possible by the tariff structure iss- 
PPv 
vv gj s_m-I (I) 
Pv Pv 
v-vv 
so-I 
vv 
Select units so that world prices are normalized to unity 
(Pý _ (I + t) ) then s- 
Pva1a- i3 ý2ý 
(I + tj) - 
ai3 (I + ti) (3)) 
ý PV-PV (I + tý) ai3 (I + ti) - (I - aid) 
si a 
Pv I -, ai3 
t3 - ai3 ti 
I- ai3 ýký 
The derivation of the ERP is usually conducted using world market 
values, because they simplify the derivation. The analysis, howe- 
ver could also be carried out using domestic data (tariff-inclusive) 
which is the available and the relevant data. 
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and deflating by the appropriate tariff to arrive at world prices. 
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Formula (4) can also be readily extended to the n-input case. The 
formula is now :- 
tj -Eai j ti 
gj 
I-£ ai3 
i 
(9) 
E ai3 ti 
where 
t 
Eai3 
i. e. weighted average of 
input tariff rates. 
The ERP is affected, as mentioned earlier, by all price distorting 
measures. Thus, the above formula (4) could also accommodate indi- 
rect taxes levied on the product and its inputs, bearing in mind 
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that to the extent that such taxes raise the costs of inputs, domestic 
producers are put at a comparative disadvantage, i. e. ERP is lowered 
by consumption taxes on inputs used. 
A__scale of effective rates calculated according to the ab- 
ove formula is useful in many ways. Such a scale will not actually 
tell us the magnitude of resource shifts (because that depends both on 
ERP and supply elasticities), but will indicate the direction-of res- 
ource pulls of the protective structure, which might well be underes- 
timated by nominal tariffs (ERP are much greater than corresponding 
nominal tariffs if input tariffs are low or zero (gý >t> ti). This 
aspect of ERP being higher than nominal rates sheds light on the act- 
ual heights of tariffs in different countries. Of particular import - 
ance, is the effect of the apparently low tariff structures of advan- 
ced countries on potential exports of LDCs to their markets. 
3 It is 
found that the structure of tariff systems in these countries biases 
trade and industrial location against LDCs and pins them to the prod- 
uction of raw materials by positively discouraging what seems s- 
"... an apparently easy and logical step in economic 
development ......... the establishment of factories for the initial processing of their raw materials 
e. g. roasting the coffee and producing powdered 
coffee and making cocoa butter. " 
(Grubel 1971; P"5) 
Evidence of such disguised discrimination against proces- 
sed exports from LDCs may be found in empirical studies using ERP te- 
chnique ; thus (Balassa If65) finds that s- 
"... ERP are more than double nominal rates in the case 
of textile fabrics and hosiery, leather, chemical ma- 
terials, steel ingots and non-ferrous metals. Being 
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semi-finished products that require little tech- 
nological sophistication for their manufacture, 
these commodities are actual or potential exports 
of LDCs, hence the results provide evidence of the 
validity of complaints recently voiced by these 
countries regarding the protective effect of "gra- 
duated" tariffs in industrial areas. " 
(Balassa 1965; P"579) 
The theory of the ERP has direct implications for bargaining to re- 
duce tariffs i. e. bargaining should be to lower effective rather 
than nominal tariffs. Moreover, effort should be put for across the 
board tariff reductions, because this will result in equiproportio- 
nal cuts in both nominal and effective rates, whereas, if selective 
reductions are proposed, average effective tariffs might actually 
go up. This will be the case if the country reduces tariffs more on 
intermediate products, than on final goods, (g3 < tj < ti). 
On the national level ERP when calculated will show the 
direction of the effects of protective structures on resource allo- 
cation, the inter- and intra- industry biases which might not be 
intended (or at least not to the extent shown by ERP) by policy ma- 
kers. This is most apparent when performances of LDCs pursuing imp- 
ort-substitution policies are examined. Generally, it is found that 
protective structures actually provided much more incentives to fi- 
nal (consumer) goods industries, such that more resources are drawn 
there, than to intermediate and capital goods industries. The resu- 
lting effect is that the industrial base established is quite arti- 
ficial, (and it) can not sustain production without importing int - 
ermediate and capital goods. 
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1.2.3. ERP Under Factor Substitution. 
Removal of the fixed inputs co-efficients assumption 
received considerable attention in the literature on ERP, (Leith 
1968; Anderson and Naya 1969; Finger 1969; Grubel and Lloydd 1971; 
Corden 1966,1971). While keeping the other assumptions, we now 
assume that substitution could take place between primary factors 
and material inputs, amongst material inputs, only, or among pri- 
mary factors only. How does the possibility of substitution affect 
ERP ? Or, more precisely, how does it affect VAD ? 
The purpose of ERP is to indicate the direction of mo- 
vements of primary resources, and the consequent changes in output 
that follow as a result of imposition of tariffs. That is, resour- 
ces are attracted to activities that pay the highest rewards (where 
the price of VAD is highest). Protection through the imposition of 
tariffs confers a rent (ERP > 0) which then enables the protected 
industry to offer the highest price for VAD, thereby attracting re- 
sources and expanding its output. Under fixed input co-efficients 
VAD is a residual between unit price of the final output and the 
cost of its inputs. A 50 % increase in the amount spent on VAD per 
unit of output, also implies a S0 % increase in average earnings 
of units contributing the VAD. The total amount spent on primary 
resources (VAD) per unit of output and the average price per unit 
of primary factors contributing VAD move in the same direction. In 
complete analogy with the effect of a nominal tariff on a commodity 
output, if the price of VAD increases, the quantity of VAD used in 
the activity also increases. When substitution is allowed, this is 
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no longer the case. 
Protection may cause the price of VAD to go up, and, 
as a result, the now cheaper material inputs will be subsituted 
for primary factors so that the total amount spent on primary fa- 
ctors per unit of output could fall, while in fact, average price 
per unit of primary factors had risen. ERP are calculated either 
from protected or free trade data, assuming fixed input co-effic- 
ients. Under such an assumption both formulae render identical re- 
suits (aij - ai3). The question now"is, what is the direction of 
the "bias" from calculating ERP from either set of data (i. e. the 
bias from assuming the elasticity of substitution between inputs 
to be zero, while in fact it is positive). There is a consensus of 
opinion about the answer. 
4 
It is shown that on the one hand, the use of free-trade 
(pre-substitution) input co-effiecients entail an understatement of 
the true rate, since it takes no account of the gains obtainable 
through substitution where producers substitute cheaper inputs for 
dearer ones, thereby reducing average input prices than would oth- 
erwise be possible. On the other hand, the use of protection (post- 
substitution) co-efficients will overstate the true rate because of 
the higher weight now given'to the cheaper (substituted) input"tar- 
iff than would be under free trade. 
The significance of this general result is that while 
the direction of the bias is now specified from whichever data one 
is working, the bias is not uniform with all industries. The magn- 
itude of the bias in each individual case, depends on the differe- 
nce between the tariffs on outputs and inputs and the elasticities 
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of substitution in the different industries. The net result of a 
tariff change when substitution is allowed, will be different from 
the non-substitution situation. Hence the rankings of industries 
according to their ERP would differ between the two situations, in 
which case resource movement can not be predicted with any certain- 
ity, except under very restrictive assumptions. ( see Note 7) 
1.2.4. Non-Traded Goods. 
ERP is defined as, " the percentage increase in the pr- 
ice of the VAD product made possible by the protective structure. " 
The implication of such a definition is that the whole of the-net 
increase in the price of the final product will be spent on primary 
factors - thereby allowing their prices to rise proportionately. If 
non-traded inputs are now introduced. the resultant ERP computed 
will differ according to the way such inputs are treated. In the 
case of tradeables, one could readily compute their nominal or imp- 
licit tariffs and use such tariffs in the calculation of ERP. But 
for non-tradeables for which no quoted international prices exist, 
such computation is not feasible and accordingly, assumptions have 
to be made as to the most appropriate way of treating such goods. 
The two main methods are the following :- 
(a) The Corden Method. 
The crude version of this method (Corden 1966) suggests 
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that non-traded inputs like primary factors are available only at 
increasing costs, and therefore part of the increase in the price 
of the final output will be absorbed by these inputs in the form 
of higher prices. This will stimulate production in the non-trad- 
ed goods sector, implying that they had received indirect protect- 
ion. Since the protection conferred on value added is shared by 
non-traded inputs, then the appropriate way should be to group them 
with value added (i. e. these are completely identical to VAD) - 
just like the assumption made about primary factors being grouped 
to produce definable units of VAD products. 
But since non-tradeables are themselves produced by a 
combination of tradeables and non-tradeable inputs, failure to take 
indirect traded inputs into account may lead to a measurement error. 
The sophisticated version (Corden 1971) takes this into account. %to- 
cordingly, the value of non-traded inputs is decomposed into direct 
and indirect VAD (i. e. going down the stages further), which is then 
grouped with the VAD of the product in question, and direct and ind- 
irect material inputs which are grouped with the material inputs used 
in the production process. Since tariffs on indirect traded inputs 
are assumed to make non-tradeables dearer to the users, they are ta- 
ken into consideration. 
(b) The Balassa Method. 
This method assumes that non-tradeables are available to 
the using industries at constant costs (i. e. they (like tradeables) 
have infinite supply elasticities). Accordingly, non-traded inputs 
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will have zero ERP and should appropriately be grouped with trade- 
ables, rather than VAD. Such treatment, however, will clearly result 
in the ERP being overstated, since the presence of non-tradeables 
which increase the denominator in the conventional ERP formula is 
overlooked. Its advantage will be clearer the more it is difficult 
to separate the tradeable elements in the non-tradeables for the 
Corden method. Both methods are used in empirical studies, and it 
is found that in almost all cases, the Balassa method results are 
higher than those of the Corden method. 
1.2.5. Negative Value Added. (NVAD) 
One proposition of the ERP formula is that. in the ext- 
reme case, when the tax element of, the protective structure exceeds 
the subsidy element (E ai3 ti > t3 and E aid < 1) ERP will be nega- 
tive. This situation, however, could be thought of only as a short 
term phenomenon and the industry concerned should soon apply for a 
compensating tariff on competing imports. If such an industry (un- 
der negative protection) manages to produce and compete, then this 
clearly indicates its comparative advantage, and hence should be 
encouraged, as this is the limiting case of operating under no pro- 
tection (perfect competition). 
Negative effective rates are also obtainable if value 
added at world prices is negative (E aij >1 and E ai3 ti < t3). if 
this is the case, it implies squandering of resources, since the fi- 
nal product is better imported than produced at home (the value of 
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its imported inputs being greater than its world price). Under such 
a situation, and assuming rational economic behaviour, there will be 
no production. Thus, from a theoretical point of view, the possibi- 
lity of VAD at world prices being negative, should not arise in the 
first place, because if it does, production should discontinue; and 
if positive production is observed, the obtained result could be bl- 
amed on observational errors and data irregularities, or dismissed 
as absurd (Ellsworth 1966; Leith 1968; Grubel and Johnson 1967; Ba- 
sevi 1966). 
5 
Dismissal of negative ERP as a result of computed NVAD 
at world prices as being absurd, is not, however, a tenable position 
in the face of empirical evidence that there indeed existed some in- 
dustries with NVAD - when computation is carried by deflation from 
protected data. The obvious question to be faced, is whether any ec- 
onomic justification or theoretical rationale could be given to the 
phenomena of NVAD. 
One obvious explanation would be the infant industry 
case. A country accords protection to an industry in which it has 
no comparative advantage (in the short run), and such an industry 
would not exist under free trade. Thus, under protection, computed 
world VAD could be negative. Needless to say, it is quite plausible 
to adopt such a policy if it could be shown that future gains would 
outweigh past losses. A plausible theoretical explanation (Tanl970), 
makes use of the " material input equivalent " concept, first intr- 
oduced by David (1962). 
6 
David considers the phenomena of NVAD at 
constant prices when current prices (or other years) are employed 
to deflate historical data. He contends that an index number prob- 
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lem is involved; that the phenomena arises because we are assuming 
that the industry is using the same techniques, even in the presence 
of a different set of prices. In the case of ERP, Tan (1970) in a 
similar fashion, contends that NVAD results because the computation 
of ERP assuming fixed input-output co-efficients fails to handle the 
possibility of substitution. 
NVAD obtained from empirical studies could, however, be 
explained by reasons other than neglect of substitution; gross ine- 
fficiency or errors in deflators etc. Some possible explanations es- 
pecially for LDCs include :- 
(1) Failure of domestic industries to use wastes, scrap and 
other by-products to the same extent as foreign producers. 
(2) Higher domestic incidence of theft, breakage (due to less 
skilled labour) and other losses. 
(3) Higher relative costs of non-traded inputs e. g. elect- 
ricity and domestic transport (disruption in electric- 
ity supplies to industry is one of the major complaints 
by Sudanese manufacturers as contributing to low prod- 
uctivity). 
(4) Transportation and packing costs of inputs could be much 
higher than those for final output; this may be due to 
higher cost of packing for inputs, and bigger volume and 
therefore higher freight, especially if the home industry 
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is of the assembly type. 
(5) Inputs may be cheaper for foreign supplies of final 
output, either because of export taxes there (i. e. 
discriminating against foreign buyers) or due to a 
monopolistic situation where a monopolistic producer 
of both inputs and final output sets higher prices 
for inputs to discourage foreign manufacturing of 
the final product. 
1.3. ERP Under General Equilibrium. 
Partial equilibrium analysis is useful only when general 
equilibrium repercussions can safely be ignored. With regard to the 
effects of changes in protective structures, this might not always 
be the case, since tariff changes may sometimes be considerably lar- 
ge and wide ranging. As a result, a number of attempts have been ma- 
de to investigate the meanings and predictions of effective protec- 
tion theory under general equilibrium. In general, the investigation 
is carried in a context of a two-sector general equilibrium model 
under both fixed input co-efficients or allowing for substitution. 
Under fixed input co-efficients, Ruffin (1969) has shown 
that resources do move according to the predictions of the ERP the- 
ory i. e. from lower to higher protected industries. When substitution 
was allowed, however, (Khang 1973), the prediction did not hold in all 
cases. Indeed, it was found that under certain assumptions the prot- 
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ected industry contracted in size and employed less of all factors, 
thus leading to a'perverse result', whereby resource movements did 
not follow the ERP signal (Jones 1971; Ramaswami and Srinivasan 
1971). This uncertainity about the predictions of ERP under gener- 
al equilibrium conditions also obtained in the multi-product case. 
In the Corden (1971) three commodity model, the direction of res- 
ource movement could only be determined for the lowest and the 
highest protected commodities, but not for the one in-between, 
which might decline in production. A result which was further co- 
rroborated by Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1973) who in the multi-pr- 
oduct case, could only confirm the predictions of the ERP in the 
case of separable production functions.? 
Thus while the conclusions of the general equilibrium 
studies provide some paradoxes that contradict the predictions of 
ERP under partial equilibrium conditions, it must be remembered 
that the real world is far more complicated than the two-sector 
case. In the circumstances, such results should be taken into con- 
sideration when interpreting ERP calculated on partial equilibrium 
assumptions and when drawing policy recommendations from such sca- 
les. It is doubtful, however, whether before advanced models are 
developed, that the above 'perverse results' should lead to total 
rejection of the predictions of the partial equilibrium analysis. 
1.4. Appraisal. 
The outcome of the heated discussion in the learned 
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journals and conferences on ERP was neither one of outright rejec- 
tion nor of unqualified acceptance. Rather, as a result of both 
theoretical and empirical work on ERP, more insight has been gain- 
ed into the whole area of protection. There are both conceptual and 
empirical difficulties which pose serious problems to the theory of 
ERP. These have led some critics to contend that under certain ass- 
umptions, (or if certain assumptions are removed); 
"... there can not exist any definition of an ERP... 
..... that can be used to predict the resource mov- 
ement resulting from a tariff. " 
(Ramaswami and Srinivasan 1971 P. 293) 
Such an extreme position was taken mainly due to the problem posed by 
the possibility of substitution between material inputs and primary 
factors. 
Allowance for factor substitution changes the meaning 
attached to the concept of VAD (under fixed input co-efficients), 
because VAD no longer represents only a change in price, but also 
a change in the quantity of primary factors used per unit of output. 
This difficulty could be resolved by assuming that substitution ta- 
kes place between individual primary factors and material inputs in 
an 'unbiased' manner. Under such an assumption, production functions 
would be separable, the VAD product concept holds, and the ERP con- 
tinues to indicate resource allocation. There is no reason, however, 
to assume that substitution always takes the above mentioned form, 
so that production functions are separable. The nature of the prod- 
uction process may be that the material input is a closer substitute 
for one primary input, than another. In such a case, Ramaswami and 
Srinivasan (1971) have shown that resources and output could move in 
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a direction different from that indicated by the ERP. But how im- 
portant is substitution in real life ? 
Travis (1968) was of the opinion that neglection of su- 
bstitution possibilities renders ERP so uncertain an indicator, that 
it should be rejected altogether. But from Travis's own data, Bal- 
assa, Guisinger, and Schydlowvsky (1970) found that the elasticity 
of substitution between primary factors and material inputs was 
only 0.09 (i. e. not significantly different from zero). Another 
study (Theil and Tilanus 1964) also found little evidence of subs- 
titution in Australian Industry, and concluded that, " observability 
of factor price influences on factor demand is still a matter of do- 
ubt. " The same result was confirmed by Humphrey and Wolkowitz (1971) 
and Humphrey (1973), when they examined data on the U. S. manufactu- 
ring industry between 1947 - 1958. 
Such evidence does not warrant total rejection of the ERP. 
Still, however, the indication might be that more attention should be 
paid to the interpretation of ERP estimates. The scale of ERP by it- 
self, might not be enough tA show resource movements. Information on 
factor intensities and supply elasticities is also important (if the 
elasticity of supply is zero, there will be no resource movement, how- 
ever high the ERP). 
Apart from such conceptual difficulties as substitution, 
there are also empirical difficulties. The most important among these 
are the following : - 
(a) tariff-averaging; 
In order to reach a representative tariff both for inputs and outputs, 
tariffs have to be averaged over a wide range of products, and there 
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are many ways to do this. 
8 
Tumlir and Till (1971) have calculated 
ERP for a number of activities (industrial) in different OECD co- 
untries, on the basis of different averaging formulae, and found 
that using different averaging methods affected their results si- 
gnificantly. 
(b) input-output co-efficients; 
Input-output tables are not available for all countries. When they 
are available, they give information on the post-protection situa- 
tion. The hypothetical free trade data is either obtained by defl- 
ating protected data by the appropriate tariffs, or by the use of 
an existing table of a low-tariff country (proxy for free trade), 
such as Belgium or the Netherlands, as suggested by Balassa (1971). 
In both cases, bias in the calculated ERP is likely to occur. On 
the one hand, due to expected differences in production functions 
in countries at different stages of development, the use of a ta- 
ble of a country such as Belgium for calculation of ERP in a LDC 
might be most inappropriate. On the other hand, use of a LDC input- 
output table, is itself not immune from bias, since the latter's 
statistical systems are known to be far from perfect. 
(c) non-traded inputs; 
These could either be added to domestic VAD (Corden Method), or 
assumed to be available at constant costs, and hence treated as 
ordinary material inputs with zero nominal rates (Balassa Method). 
Since it is theoretically suggested that the Balassa Method would 
overstate, and the Corden Method understate the real ERP, most em- 
pirical studies calculated ERP on both methods. The evidence from 
such studies suggests that while the Balassa method leads to ERP 
-41- 
being higher by 15 - 25 % than the Corden method, the ranking of 
industries is not substantially affected. 
(d) quantative restrictions and differences in quality; 
Domestic prices may not always (as assumed) differ from world pr- 
ices only by the amount of tariff. Domestic prices could be higher 
or lower than CIF import prices plus tariffs. If the protective 
structure of a particular country (this is specially relevant for 
LDCs) is dominated by quantative restrictions, then quotas will be 
the binding constraint on the prevailing prices and imports. In 
such a case, differences between domestic and foreign prices exc- 
eed the amount of'the tariff, and an implicit tariff equivalent 
has to be calculated by comparing actual domestic prices and bor- 
der prices. Direct price comparisons are also necessiated when the 
tariff exceeds the difference between domestic and foreign prices. 
(i. e. the tariff is partially redundant). An instance of this, is 
where tariffs are prohibitive and prices"have to be lowered to ob- 
tain maximum profits. Price comparisons are necessary because it is 
the utilized part of the tariff (realized protection) which is re- 
levant for resource allocation. 
The problem with price comparisons is that it is not 
possible to conclude that whenever the domestic price is less than 
the tariff inclusive price, that tariff is redundant. The difference 
may be due to a poor quality domestic product, which has to demand 
a lower price if it is to sell. 
All of the above are problems frequently encountered in 
empirical research, and are dealt with differently according to da- 
to constraints. In general, however, they tend to reduce the accur- 
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acy with which scales of ERP are calculated. To arrive at the most 
representative heights of protection, many studies computed ERP us- 
ing different sets of input-output co-efficients, or different met- 
hods of treating non-tradeables. In the circumstances, ERP schedules 
are at best, good approximations. Nevertheless, the evidence from 
empirical research carried out so far, suggests that despite such 
difficulties, and whether there is substitution in the production 
functions or not, ERP schedules do predict resource movements. 
Such evidence, however, could not be reached from stu- 
dies carried out in a general equilibrium framework. The few gen- 
eral equilibrium studies conducted so far, provided considerably 
different results. Thus, while Evans's study of the Australian ec- 
onomy (1970) show that, in the 'medium' range of protective rates, 
the general equilibrium approach yields opposite resource pull pre- 
dictions as compared to the partial equilibrium approach; Staelin's 
(1976) study of the Ivory Coast show that in this group (medium pr- 
otection), both approaches yield similar results. Taylor and Black 
(1974), also confirm Staelin's results, in their studies of the 
Chilean economy, but only in the Cobb-Douglas case. If other subs- 
titution possibilities are allowed, their results tend to support 
the Evans conclusions. 
The effects of protectionism are well known, but the 
quantification of the heights of protection levels has provided 
much insight into the protective structures of different countries, 
and the possible costs and effects of alternative commercial poli- 
cies. Thus in advanced countries, the true heights of tariffs and 
their effects on world trade in general, and exports from LDCs in 
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particular, were shown together with the implications for tariff 
negotiations. 
With regard to LDCs, the costs of protection are indi- 
cated together with the profound adverse effects they might have 
on their economies. For instance, high ERP indicate that domestic 
VAD exceed world market VAD. If this excess is absorbed by above 
average profits, then income is redistributed in favour of prod- 
ucers, and if the consumption habits of this group are of a con- 
spicuous type, then this will not lead to more saving and invest- 
ment. If the excess is absorbed by high manufacturing costs, then 
that involves an economic cost to the whole economy, since avail- 
able resources are not employed to obtain maximum contributions 
to the economy, (an extreme situation of this will be for VAD to 
be negative). The chances forgone from such misallocation to in- 
crease productivity and improve production methods affects the ov- 
erall growth of the economy. 
Perhaps the final aspect of the ERP should be the cost 
involved in the computation, and whether in practice, schedules of 
ERP yield significantly different predictions from those obtained 
by looking at nominal tariffs only, to warrant the attempts. At 
least one study suggests that that might not at all be necessary. 
Cohen (1971), compared results from studies on twenty-six countries 
and found that the rank correalation co-efficient between the height 
of its average nominal tariff, to be very high (0.95). He was then 
led to the conclusion that : - 
"... One learns a lot - but not everything - by looking 
at the ranking by nominal tariffs. " 
(Cohen (1971) P. 139. ) 
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His contention was, therefore, that it may be sufficient - on such 
evidence - to know only nominal rates since they give similar ran- 
kings. 
This contention, however, did not go unchallenged, as 
Guisinger and Schydlöwsky (1971) reached a diametrically opposite 
conclusion (importance of calculating ERP) from a similar study. 
In general, it could be said that while the costs involved were 
considerable, empirical studies employing ERP have provided much 
insight into the overall protective structure, and contributed to 
the understanding of the working of the economies studied. 
NOTES. 
1A significant result of such an effect on income distribution 
and factor rewards, is the Stolper-Samuelson theorem (1941); 
which shows that levying of tariffs, favours'- unambiguously - 
the country's scarce factor of Production. 
2 One could think of VAD as a product in itself (Corden 1971; 
Jones 1971; Khang 1973): a product for which there is a price, 
and this price is altered by protective measures, and accord- 
ingly primary factors producing the value added product will 
move. Let X be a final good which is produced by primary 
factors K, 2L, and material input X X. One can think of L 
and K separately as producing a product V( Value Added pro- 
duct), which is then combined with input X to produce final 
output X. In such an instance V (the sum3 of contributions 
of K anR L) will be s- 
V- P2 -. A2 P3 
where P2, P are the prices of X2, X and A2 is physical 
requirement fX per unit of X; theýefore the contribution 
of each factor toi V is irrelevant. As long as V is combined 
with a fixed amount of X to produce X2 (assumption (1) be- 
low) a unit of V could b4 defined in terms of a unit of X2. 
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It is then clear that V could easily be interpreted as a 
factor price, v or as a product (quantity of VAD per unit). 
3 If the U. K. imposes a3% tariff on yarn and a zero tariff on 
raw cotton (from Sudan), and the VAD in turning raw cotton into 
yarn is only ,5%, 
then this small nominal tariff will give (U. K. ) 
textile factories a 100 % (apply formula 4 or 9) ERP. Yarn pro- 
ducers in Sudan will have to pay capital and labour less than 
half the amount available for their U. K. competitors, in order 
to compete successfully in the U. K. market. 
4 Some of the relevant quotations are : - 
(i) "... while substitution reduces ERP when one is working 
from the protected situation, substitution increases 
ERP when working from a Free Trade situation.... " 
(Leith 1968; P. 600) 
(ii) "... neglect of factor substitution biases upwards the 
estimate of ERP......... if calc illations are made from 
........ protected data. " 
(Grubel and Lloydd 1971; P. 100) 
S Some of the relevant quotations are =- 
(a) "... at a critical point when the denominator. (of the 
ERP Formula from protected data) becomes zero the (ERP) function vanishes asymptotically and switches to negative values. This is clearly an absurd result. " 
(Basevi 1966; P. 150) 
(b) "... the equation does not make the ERP a smoothly 
increasing function of the nominal rate on final 
output, for when t becomes large enough the den- 
ominator becomes negative, This is a nonsense re- 
sult since it implies NVAD at free market prices. " 
(Grubel and Johnson 1967; P. 764) 
6 David (1962) writes :- 
"... Conceive of a situation in which in year two the price 
of a unit of raw material is the same as that of a unit of 
output, and with the help of factors the industry can trans- 
form a unit of the former into two units of the latter. In 
year one, on the other hand, a unit of output exchanged in 
the market for three units of raw materials, but the prod- 
uction process in use required two units of material per 
unit of output. Hypothetically, forcing year two prices 
upon the industry in its year one state, would result in its 
sales revenue being able to cover but half of its material 
bill. " 
(P. A. David 1962; P. 150) 
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7A production function Qa Q(D ,.... Dn= Ml,.... M) is separ- 
able if it could be written asls- 
@°Q (( f(Dl, D2...... Dn); Mr...... Mn)) 
where Dý.... D_ are domestic factors, I-11..... P1 are tradeable 
inputs And f is a function only of D ...... D . Thus each do- 
mestic factor affect Q only through 
lits 
effect on f. In such 
an eventuality, the cross partials Q. -0 for ijj there- 
fore the Pareto optimum conditions ar not affected, if substi- 
tution occurs. 
8 Standard tariff averaging methods include :- 
(i) Simple averaging of all rates over the relevant range 
of products. 
(ii) Averaging of tariff rates weighted by value of imports 
for each product in the group. 
(iii) Averaging of tariff rates weighted by value of domestic 
production or domestic demand for each product in the 
group. 
(iv) Average of rates weighted by values of world trade for 
each product. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
DOMESTIC RESOURCE COST sA THEORETICAL DISCUSSION. 
2.1 Introduction. a 
Trade restrictions are now widely used in both developed 
and LDCs. The implications of the standard trade model suggest that 
the imposition of such restrictions are detrimental to the welfare 
of at least one or more of the countries concerned. Under perfect 
market conditions, prevailing prices are the correct market signals, 
and resources moving in accordance to such signals will generally be 
optimally allocated. The imposition of trade restrictions distorts 
such prices, and hence renders them irrelevant. Resource movements 
will then differ from those expected under perfect market conditions 
and the countries concerned will incur losses (both static and dynamic). 
If domestic resources are optimally allocated then acc- 
-ording to the trade model, this implies that it would be impossible 
to increase net international value added in the production of trade- 
-ables, since all the relevant marginal rates of substitution (MRS) 
and transformation (MRT) (both domestic and international) will be 
equal. By contrast, in a non-optimal situation there is room to in- 
-crease international value added through resource shifts. Thus if 
one observed two activities in which new investment had taken place 
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and found that DMRT j IMRT (domestic and international MRT respect- 
-ively)., one could safely1say that the community would be better off 
if it invested more in the low cost activity (DMRT < IMRT) and less 
in the high cost activity (DMRT > INRT) exported some output from 
the former and imported more of the latter and thus made more of the 
two goods available to the community. Such are the effects of trade 
(or other) distortions on the domestic economy. To help evaluate 
these effects (of commercial policies), theoretically sound and em- 
-pirically measurable concepts are called for. One such measure is 
the ERP which was developed - at some length - in Chapter One. In 
this Chapter we will discuss another measure, a minor partner to ERP, 
the Domestic Resource Cost (DRC) measure. 
In the above paragraph it was implicitly assumed that 
foreign prices reflect international marginal rates of transformation 
(opportunity costs). In the absence of monopoly power in international 
trade (and trade distortions), one could safely make such an assumption 
(small country assumption).. in the absence of distortions in the domes- 
-tic market, domestic prices (ratios) would represent domestic marg- 
-inal rates of transformation. But if the relevant domestic markets 
are not perfect due to the presence of trade and/or factor market 
distortions then market prices would no more reflect domestic marg- 
-anal rates of transformation. The latter would therefore have to be 
estimated by adjusting domestic prices to reflect opportunity costs 
in producing various commodities. The DRC measure is designed to 
provide this empirical estimate. In this sense the DRC in the jth. 
activity estimates the unit opportunity cost- of the domestically 
owned factors of production employed directly in the jth. industry 
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and indirectly-in the home goods industries (that are used) as a 
ratio of the difference between the foreign price of the product 
'j' and the foreign exchange cost of direct and indirect imported 
inputs. For instance, if the sum of direct and indirect domestic 
resources (domestic VAD) required to produce a unit of an. import- 
able is five Sudanese pounds (£S5. ), the CIF price of the importable 
is %iO per unit and the value of direct and indirect imported in- 
puts is /6, the DRC of one dollar saved will be £1.25 per dollar 
(O1 = £S 1.25). If the exchange rate (assuming that it is not over- 
valued) is e. g. ý1 - £S0.75. the cost of a dollar saved through im- 
port substitution in this particular activity will be (67 %) more 
than to import a unit of the same commodity and pay for it accord- 
ing to the exchange rate. Thus the DRC indicates ex ante the comp- 
arative disadvantage (in this particular case) of Sudan in producing 
this commodity. Alternatively, the DRC could also be used to measure 
ex post the real social cost of protection if such a commodity is al- 
ready allowed to be manufactured locally. Moreover, in the ex post 
situation, the DRC scale could be used to show the degree of efficiency 
(or inefficiency) of the domestic industry in earning or saving foreign 
exchange (i. e. how varied are DRCs between themselves and how they dif- 
fer from a cut-off exchange rate (see 2.4. below)). 
2.2 Formula. 
From the above discussion, we can now say that the DRC 
measures the cost of a unit of foreign exchange earned or saved and 
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this is taken to equal the costs of direct and indirect domestic 
resources where the market prices of those resources are adjusted 
for market distortions. For a formal statement of the DRC1of acti- 
-vities let :- 
Fij 
- the amount of the ith. domestic factor of production used 
in the jth. value adding activity. 
Pi 
s the shadow price of the ith. factor. 
Nhj 
- amount of the hth. non-tradeable good employed in the 
production of j. 
Mij 
6 amount of the ith. imported input valued at international 
prices (which are all normalized at unity). 
Fkj 
a amount of the kth. foreign owned factor employed per unit 
of j. 
Rk 
a the expatriated return to the kth. foreign owned factor 
of production. 
then; 
EFi3 Pi +E ENhj Fih pi 
DRCý 
aihi 
I- F'! i3 - 17 kj Rk 
ik 
The two terms in the numerator are respectively the direct and indirect 
opportunity costs of factors employed in producing a unit of J. The 
denominators two last terms are respectively the direct import content 
in producing a unit of j, and the repatriated returns (indirect 
foreign cost) to foreign factors per unit of J. The denominator is 
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thus the net foreign exchange saving in the production of j (i. e. 
value added at international prices), and the DRC expressed in this 
ratio form could be viewed as representing the rate at which domestic 
resources can be transformed into foreign exchange through activity J. 
2.3. The Relationship between DRC and ERP. 
There are two main aspects to the analysis of the effects 
of commercial policies. First, there is the positive aspect concerning 
resource movements, and second there is the normative aspect concerning 
the costs to the domestic economy from these policies. DRCs and ERP are 
the two measures that are developed to analysise such effects. The 
ERP as defined in Chapter One is concerned with incentives accorded to 
different industries, thus it is devised with the intention of enabling 
one to predict resource movements as a result of the tariff structure 
(Corden 1966; 1971; Johnson 1965). On the other hand, the DRC is re- 
-lated more to costs of production and the question of efficiency re- 
-lated to it. 
Although the two measures have been developed independantly 
with the DRC preceding ERP in use (Bruno 1967), the two turn out to be 
closely related; and under four strong assumptions, Krueger (1972) 
shows that the two give identical rankingsZ In particular, if we can 
assume that (a) all goods under consideration are tradeable; (b) tra- 
-nsportation costs are absent or negligible; (c) domestic markets are 
perfectly competitive; and (d) factors are allowed free movement 
within the home country but not internationally, equality between DRC 
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and ERP obtains. The implications of the above assumptions on formula 
(2-I) above are obvious. The second term of the numerator will disappear 
due to absence of non-tradeables from assumptions (a) and (b) and so 
does the last term of denominator since assumption (d) implies that 
the home economy does not employ foreign factors. Under the circum - 
-stances, equality of the two could easily be shown. 
3 Define ERP as 
in (I. I) above :- 
ERPi 
a v- vQ v_ Iat 
Eai i ti 
2-2 
vI- 
Zij 
() 
and from assumptions (a) to (d); 
PJ I+ tJ a 
/EFjJ Pi + x'13 (I + t. ) (2-3) 
DYAD (v) EFij Pi + tj - 
Eaij (I + ti) (2-4) 
DRC =I+ 
ti 
- 
EEL ii (I + ti) (2-5) 
I- Ea ij 
ti 
- 
Eaiiti (2-6) 
I- E`ij 
I+ ERP (2-7) 
Thus if we exclude the special case where foreign invest- 
ment is allowed, the difference between the two measures is essent- 
-ially the use (or otherwise) of shadow prices. If market prices 
correctly reflect opportunity costs and no need for estimating or 
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using shadow prices arises, the two measures are equal. Perfect 
market conditions, however, do not obtain in practice and accordingly 
when shadow prices are used to evaluate domestic resources, the DRC 
reflects more correctly the real costs to the economy from protection. 
But when it comes to predicting resource movements ERPs are the 
appropriate measures, since investment decisions are affected by 
actual (market) rather than accounting prices. 
2.4. Uses and Empirical Findings. 
The DRC was in use since the early 1950's (Bruno 2962; 1967) 
in Israel where it has been used as a criterion for project selection. 
In this sense it could be viewed as a foreign exchange test which the 
project must pass before it can be implemented. The Project's DRC of 
a dollar earned or saved is computed and compared to the shadow 
exchange rate and the project is accepted if its DRC is less than this 
rate. In the absence of such a rate (which itself is difficult to 
compute),, the normal practice is to approximate it by a cut-off ex- 
-change rate consisting of the official exchange rate plus a factor 
for overvaluation (Bruno 1972; Steel 1972), and those projects whose 
DRC exceeds this proxy rate are considered inefficient and rejected 
since the rate at which they transform domestic resources into inter- 
-national values is much higher than what would have been produced by 
those resources in alternative uses. 
The use of DRC to measure economic costs of protection 
was first applied to Turkey (Krueger 1966). In a sample of the Turkish 
- , 
SLR. - 
manufactiring industry, Krueger found that the average DRC in saving 
a dollar in import substituting industries was (TL 34.1) (Turkish lira), 
while that of earning a dollar in export industries was (TL IO. I/dollar). 
The indication is that if the sample were representative of the sit- 
-uation of misallocation in the economy and reallocation is allowed to 
take place, Turkey would have been able to pay for 3.4 times as much 
imports as she could produce with the same resources. -5 
Moreover, if private foreign investment is allowed, its 
real cost to the host country is shown better by the DRC than by 
other measures. Assume that a country is not suitably endowed to 
produce a product 'x'; domestic production now could only take place 
if protection is extended to the activity producing 'x', since orig- 
-inally its DMRT > IMRT. In the absence of protection foreign factors 
will seek employment else-where because the rewards are higher, but 
the situation is reversed under protection where in the home country 
now the domestic value of their marginal product exceeds its inter- 
-national value. When foreign investment is allowed expatriation of 
profits is unavoidable, and is effected at the official (often over- 
-valued) exchange rate. In such a situation the cost to the domestic 
economy is not only the lost savings which would have been made 
through reallocation, but also the expatriated rental to foreign 
factors. 6 
The ability to estimate the costs of the protective 
system depends on the assumption that the output produced by low 
DRC industries after re-allocation could be sold without the need to 
lower prices. If this assumption fails to hold, or appropriate shadow 
prices are difficult to come by, DRC scales could be used to perform 
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the rather broad (and modest) aspect of misallocation resulting 
from protection. Scales of DRCs both adjusted and at market prices 
have been used for such a purpose. Thus in Ghana, Steel (1972) 
reports that the cost of saving foreign exchange (DRC) was extremely 
high, and that a fifth of the firms surveyed " used more foreign 
exchange than would have been required to import the finished products. "7 
Similar results also obtained for other countries. DRCs are frequently 
found to vary not only between sectors, but also between industries 
(for Chile the range of DRCs in 1968 was 339 % and the standard 
deviation was 60 5). 
8 
In fact, there is evidence that within the same 
industry DRCs differ from one firm to another (Bhagwati 1978) and 
when such variations occur, the only meaningful explanation is that 
some degree of inefficiency exists in the system, and most likely it 
is a by-product of the multitude of instruments used rather than 
intentional. 
2.5. Appraisal. 
The rationale behind adopting such a measure as the DRC 
seems simple enough. In most LDCs balance of payments problems exist; 
foreign exchange is scarce and industrialization is pursued as a 
development plan objective to be achieved. Under such circumstances, 
it is useful to estimate how much it costs in real terms to earn or 
save a unit of foreign exchange. In this way, an idea about the cost 
is formed, and judgement is easily passed about whether that cost is 
too high or not. This is all the more natural in the face of observed 
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failures of import substituting programmes in many LDCs to improve 
the foreign exchange situation or to foster higher rates of growth. 
Some questions may now be posed. Does the DRC measure, 
in its capacity as an ex post measure of costs of protection, reflect 
correctly costs incurred in the process of manufacturing ? Does it 
face conceptual and/or empirical difficulties that render it unoper- 
-ational or less useful than it is claimed ? 
As seen in (2.3) above, what basically differentiates 
between the DRC and the ERP is the use of shadow prices. To the DRC 
that is adjusted for market distortions, shadow prices are of central 
importance. In a way, shadow prices are synthetic substitutes for 
the (Imperfect) market prices, and synthetic substitutes could be 
manufactured in a number of different ways, and their quality and 
usefulness could be sensitive to the process used. If the comparison 
is correct, the ability of adjusted DRCs to reflect correctly the 
real costs involved in earning or saving foreign exchange depends 
crucially on the way shadow prices are estimated and in practice 
this is not easily done (Bhagwati 1978). 9 If, however, this problem 
is resolved DRCs, because they take into consideration the opportunity 
costs of domestic primary factors, correctly reflect the real costs 
incurred in saving or earning foreign exchange. This real cost as 
mentioned above, equals the increase in international value added 
made possible through reallocating the same amounts of domestic 
resources (i. e. by expanding the relatively efficient export indus- 
tries and contracting the relatively inefficient ones (import subs- 
-tituting)). 
One assumption that underlies the above cost of protection 
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computation is that exports could always be expanded at constant 
prices. Where this assumption of infinite demand elasticity does 
not hold, the DRC will overstate the real cost of protection. For 
practical purposes, however, the small country assumption holds 
for most LDCs, in particular with regard to manufacturers, and 
therefore the empirical relevance of DRC may go unchallenged for 
a long time. 
To recapitulate,, if shadow prices are altogether un- 
available, and unadjusted DRCs are computed, they will give ide- 
ntical results to those of ERP (2.3 above), and will be subject 
to criticisms levelled at it (Chapter One). Unadjusted DRCs, how- 
ever, (i. e. market price DRCs) could be computed with the sole ob- 
jective of investigating the pattern of past investment. As such, 
inferences about costs of protection could not be drawn from a 
scale of market based (unadjusted) DRCs, although-such a scale is 
highly indicative of the broad pattern of misallocation of respurces 
among different activities (Srinivasan and Bhagwati 1978). 
10 
Apart from the above reservations, the DRC (adjusted) 
may neglect benefits other than foreign exchange. Ventures for which 
the DRC is calculated may have indirect effects, e. g. training of 
labour or regional employment. To the extent that these indirect 
effects are considered important but unquantifiable, their omission 
will bias the DRC upwards. If the DRC is to be used as an invest- 
ment criteria, such benefits would have to be given appropriate 
weights through other cost benefit measures. 
But even without such considerations, there are substan- 
tial empirical difficulties encountered in the calculation of DRC. 
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These pertain to the reliability of data from which computations 
are made. On the one hand, there is the problem of shadow prices 
and the way they are estimated. In particular, the shadow wage 
rate is always subject to strong differences of opinion. In sur- 
plus labour economies like those of many LDCs, the temptation is 
to accord labour a zero wage rate, especially when it is known 
that there is union power or government intervention involved in 
wage determination. But this does not take into consideration the 
specific case of some countries where the willingness to work for 
wages may be'lacking among some tribes (e. g. the Kenaf factory in 
Sudan). 11 In such a case, and similar cases, a wage premium needs 
to be paid to attract people to work, or to keep them from going 
back (after being trained), and accordingly, instead of a surplus 
labour, one has a de facto scarce labour. To surmount this diffi- 
culty, many studies used the market wage rates and in almost all 
of the studies carried, alternative DRC are computed with a sha- 
dow wage rate of 25 % or . 
50 % less than the market wage (e. g. Steel 
1972) to test for the sensitivity of the DRCs to alternative ass- 
umptions about tte wage rate. With regard to capital, also, alter- 
native shadow rates of returns were used and in at least one case 
(Chile) where sub-sectoral returns on capital (extracted from in- 
put-output data) were used instead of a 20 ö shadow rate, the ef- 
fects on DRC were " quite substantial. " 
12 
With regard to foreign prices used to evaluate trade- 
ablest although these are obtainable through interviews or direct 
from customs returns, they could also be subject to faking and thus 
be less than they may seem. Such difficulties may render DRCs less 
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reliable as measures for costs from protection and may suggest that 
they might best be used to indicate whether the economy harbours 
any obvious inefficiencies and hence the direction of any corre- 
ctive measures. 
NOTES. 
1 DRC may be used (hereafter) interchangeably with DRCs. 
2 Balassa and Schydlowsky (1972) observe that all assumptions 
are not necessary since, " in the absence of transportation 
costs all goods will be traded. " P. 64. 
3 For a similar proof, see Balassa, B. and Schydlowsky, D. 
" Effective Tariffs; Domestic Cost of Foreign Exchange 
and the: Equilibrium Exchange Rate. " JPE 1968; pp. 349 - 60. 
4 Srinivasan, T. and Bhagwati, J. " Shadow Prices for Project 
Selection in the Presence of Distortions s Effective Rates of 
Protection and Domestic Resource Costs. " JPE 1978; P. 107. 
5 KRUEGER, A. O. " Some Economic Costs of Exchange Controls The 
Turkish Case. " JPE 1966; P. 475" 
6 If the country in question levies taxes on foreign investment, 
revenue from such taxes may reduce the extent of the costs in- 
volved. 
7 STEEL, W. F. " Import Substitution and Capacity Utilization in 
Ghana. " OEP 1972; P. 235. 
8 BEHRMAN, J. " Foreign Exchange Regimes and Economic Development; 
Chile. " N. Y. NBER 1975; P. 140. 
9 BHAGWATI, J. " Anatomy and Consequences of Exchange Control 
Regimes. " N. Y. NBER 1978; P. 89. 
10 SRINIVAAN, T. and BHAGWATI, J. (1978) Op. cit. P. 108. 
11 A Kenaf (vegetable fibre) factory (for producing sacks) is est- 
ablished in the White Nile Province in a particularly depressed 
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area, but the main problem facing the factory when it started 
production, was the shortage of unskilled labour to harvest 
the Kenaf and prepare it for use by the factory. The local 
population considered factory work inferior to traditional 
occupations and were reluctant to respond to recruitment ef- 
forts by the factory management. 
12 BEHRMAN, J. (1975) Op. cit. P. 367. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
SUDAN ECONOMY s AN INTRODUcTr]DN. 
3.1 Basic Information. 
Sudan is the largest country in Africa (one million 
square miles in area). Apart from its area, the other main phy- 
sical feature is the presence of the river Nile, which runs thr- 
ough the country for two and a half thousand miles. It is around 
the Nile or in the area between the White and the Blue Niles 
(which merge at ]Khartoum to form the Nile) that most economic ac- 
tivity takes place. Thus, at the time of independance, there were 
more than 2,200 private pump schemes along the Nile, irrigating 
more than 770,000 feddans 
1 
and there was also the Gezira scheme, 
renowned to be one of the largest farms in the world - which pro- 
duces most of Sudan's cotton and supports more than 100,000 ten- 
ants, apart from half a million casual workers during the cotton 
picking season. To the east of the Gezira Scheme, across the Blue 
Nile, lies the Gedaref area, where the rainfall ranges between 
8ins. (200mm. ) and 30ins. (800mm. ). During the late fifties, large 
tracts of this area (nearly one million feddans) were brought un- 
der mechanized farming (now 3.5 million feddans), producing Dura 
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(Sorgham) and Sesame which were previously produced by traditiondl 
methods. 
Sudan is not only potentially well-endowed with arable 
land (200 million feddans), but also rich in livestock. Thus in 
197677, the livestock population was as follows s- 
(in million's of 'heads') 
cattle 15.89 million head 
sheep 14.25 
goats 11.59 
camels 2.81 
TOTAL 45.5-5 
Economic Survey 1976/77 P. 45 
Despite this large livestock population, the contribution of the 
livestock sector to both GDP (9 %) and exports (4.3 %) is very 
low. This low performance may be due to the fact that nearly all 
livestock is grazed outside the modern organized sector (i. e. no- 
madic). As such livestock owners are interested less in commercial 
potential than in the tribal pride and satisfaction that they der- 
ive from their livestock holdings. Moreover, poor veterinery serv- 
ices and lack of transport and education in the nomadic sector add 
a further dimension. In fact, despite such wealth, the greater part 
of dairy products consumed in Sudan are imported (for the response 
of the cattle owners to a milk factory, see Chapter Eight). 
Unlike most LDCs, Sudan is sparsely populated. The 1973 
census shows that the population density in Sudan is 5.9 person 
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square km. which is well below the African average of 9 person/ 
square km. Table (3.1) below shows the distribution of populat- 
ion between the two main regions (North and South) and the over- 
all and urban growth rates. As can be seen the rate of growth of 
urbanization is higher (more than three times) than that of pop- 
ulation and most probably higher than the rate at which employm- 
ent can be created in the manufacturing and construction indust- 
TABLE 3.1 SUDAN POPULATION BY REGION 1955/56 & 1973. (in '000's). 
Annual 
Region 1955/56 1973 Growth % 
South 2783 3025 "5 
North 7479 32733 2.7 
Total Population 10263 14758 2.5 
of which; Urban 737 2479 7.4 
Rural 9525 12271 1,5 
Source; El Hassan, A. M. (1976) P. 4 
ries. Needless to say, like many other LDCs, this has led to severe 
urban unemployment, stresses in the services at urban centres (main- 
ly the three towns (the Capital)) and shortages in foodstuffs which 
did not grow at a similar or higher rate. 
The relatively small population coupled with the huge 
arable land/water resources makes Sudan considerably different from 
many LDCs, which are characterized by large populations, together 
with inadequacy of land and/or water. Thus, the high fertile land 
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TABLE 3.2 DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLDS ACCORDING TO ANNUAL INCOME. 
Percentage of Households in : - 
ANNUAL INCOME Urban Semi- Rural 
Urban ALL Areas Areas AREAS 
Less than £S. 100 4 15 34 31 
Between £S. 100 & £S. 200 24 34 48 43 
Between £S. 200 & £5.300 25 22 11 13 
Between £S. 300 & £S. 400 15 12 4 6 
Between £5.400 & £S. 500 
More than £S. 500 
10 
22 
6 
11 
2 
1 
3 
4 
AVERAGE ANNUAL INCOME 411 270 148 189 
Source: II) (1976) II. 2. P. 12. 
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labour and livestock labour ratios point to the undoubted potent- 
ial of the country which is frequently referred to as a potential 
" granery " of the world. With regard to unemployment and income 
distribution, Sudan compares favourably with mazy LDCs. One int- 
ernational mission found that among the young, unemployment (at 
20 - 25 %) is below that found in most of tropical Africa and "in- 
come was more equally distributed in Sudan than in many other dev- 
eloping countries with'similar per capita levels. " 
2 (see Table 
3.2). Sudan is among the 25 " least developed " countries in the 
world, with a per capita income of $120.3 
3.2 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and its Components. 
The 1955/. 56 census estimated that 80 % of the popula- 
tion were engaged in the broad sector, agriculture, livestock, 
forestry and fishing. This sector then contributed 61 % to GDP 
and was the sector of origin for all exports. Nearly two decades 
later, agriculture was still the dominant sector. The 1973 census 
showed that, despite the high rate of growth of urban centres 
(7.4 %), 71 % of the population still lived in rural areas and 
engaged in agricultural and related activities, and the sector's 
contributed nearly two-fifths (38.4 %) of GDP. 
Table (3.3) gives the sectoral distribution of Sudan's 
GDP. As the Table shows, Sudan, like many other LDCs depends hea- 
vily on agriculture. The economy, however, is not only character- 
ized by the dominance of agriculture, but also by the low product- 
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ivity of this sector. The economy could be conceived of as being 
comprised of two parts, traditional and modern. The differentiat- 
ing characteristic being the use (or otherwise) of modern produc- 
tion techniques as opposed to traditional (locally developed) me- 
thods. With regard to agriculture, there is (on the one hand), the 
traditional part where production takes place strictly for self 
consumption using primitive techniques and locally made tools, (and 
on the other hand), there is the modern part. Modern agriculture 
under gravity irrigation (Gezira) or mechanized farming(Gedaref) is 
undertaken not for self-sufficiency in foodstuffs, like traditional 
agriculture, but for profits, be they from the sale of crops dom- 
estically or from exports. Thus while there is scope and incentive 
for expansion and productivity increases in the modern sector, this 
is lacking with regard to the traditional sector. Therefore, unless 
a deliberate effort is made to transform such a sector and integrate 
it with the modern part, an overall satisfactory rate of growth is 
difficult to attain. This did not occur. It is estimated that 
4 
while the modern sector has been growing annually by 6% the rest 
of the economy's growth rate was only 3 %. 
Another feature of the economy exhibited in the Table is 
the low contribution of the industrial sector. Manufacturing indus- 
try is of recent origin in Sudan and until independence (1956) its 
share in GDP was less than that of many African countries. 
5 (for 
growth and structure of the Industrial Sector, see Chapter Seven). 
Also significant in the Table is the low contribution 
of the transport sector(less than 5 %). The importance of this 
sector in a large country like Sudan can not be overstated. Apart 
-68- 
from the importance of a well developed transport system to imp- 
orts, exports and the manufacturing industry, the system is also 
important in linking and helping transform and integrate the tra- 
ditional and modern sectors of the economy. The harmful effects 
on some parts of the country (Northern Province), where lack of 
transport facilities have positively-discouraged production of 
cash crops like vegetables and fruits, have long been known. 
3.3 Foreign Trade and the Balance of Payments. 
The foreign trade sector is important for the Sudan 
economy and will continue to be so for the foreseeable future. 
Apart from the fact that export enclaves like the Gezira scheme 
played a leading role in developing the economy during colonial 
rule, the export sector continues to provide the main employment 
opportunities in agriculture and the chance of industrial devel- 
opment through its foreign exchange earnings. The average share 
of the trade sector in the GDP over the period 1966 - 1976 was 
34.5 %. Over the same pe±iod, government revenue was also consid- 
erably dependent on this sector. Thus the share of trade taxes in 
central government revenue increased from 38 % in 1966/67 to 45.5 % 
in 1975/76.6 
Sudan exports are concentrated on a small number of pri- 
wary products. Over a long period, the picture has hardly changed. 
In 1976/77 three commodities (cotton, sesame and groundnuts) acc- 
ounted for $2 %. A decade and a half earlier (1962/63) the share 
-69- 
TABLE 3.4 IA RTS - END-USE CLASSIFICATION (£Sm. &ö 
Consum- Inter- 
Capital 
ption mediate TOTAL 
Goods. Goods. Goods. 
1960 :. Sm. 33.4 12.4 17.2 63. o- 
% 53 20 27 100 
1965 "sm. 37.5 17.8 16.4 72,2 
0 52 35 13 100 
1970 £sm. 51.3 27.6 29.3 108.2 
% 44 38 18 100 
1975 £srn. 159.8 122 78.1 359.9 
% 44 34 22 - 100 
Sources; Foreign Trade Analysis 1960 - 69, P. 26; Economic Survey 1975/76, P. 103; National 
Income and Supporting Tables 1972 - 7$, 
P. 74. 
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of the same commodities was 77.1 0, while that of cotton alone was 
66.6 %. 7 The volume of individual exports fluctuated considerably, 
but overall export proceeds grew steadily thanks to an upward trend 
in export prices (see Chapter 5 ). The deterioration in the Sudan 
" terms of trade ", however, has averaged 6.4 % per year over the 
same period. 
8 
With regard to imports, their end-use classification 
shows a dominant share of consumer goods which averaged nearly 50 % 
over the period. Imports of foodstuffs and drinks (e. g. 22 % in 
1973) seem to have contributed to such a large share. This happened 
despite the pronounced government policy of self-sufficiency in ma- 
jor agricultural commodities. The rising share of these above ment- 
ioned commodities in the import bill seems also to have neutralized 
the effects of import substitution (some imports were banned and oth- 
ers put on the quota list) on the bill (share of consumer goods down). 
As Table (3.5) shows, the balance of payments was in def- 
icit throughout the period (1966 - 1976) with the exception of 1969 
and 1973. The latter and the more sizeable of the two (£9m. ) was due 
to the general improvement of world primary commodity prices, and 
had it not been for the fact that the export volume was considerably 
lower than planned, a larger trade balance might have been possible. 
Although the deficits have frequently been the results of higher le- 
vels of imports (perhaps reflecting development efforts), a sizeable 
part of the deficit has always been due to the deficit on invisibles, 
especially after the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967. Up until 1972, 
balance of payments deficit, although persistent, were nevertheless, 
manageable. This situation, however, has changed drastically for the 
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worst since then. In 1975 the deficit in the current balance was 
c166.3m. which was more than the export proceeds for the same year. 
Short-term borrowings to finance such deficits have seriously aff- 
ected the structure of foreign debts. The external debt of the gov- 
ernment stood at £339"8m" in 1975 (against £69.2m. in 1966), of the- 
se 39.6 % were loans with interest rates of 6% and over, and 65.9 % 
with maturity of less than ten years. 
9 As a result, the debt ser- 
vice ratio reached a staggering 33.7 % in 1975 as against 12.2 % in 
1969. 
3.4 Government Finance. 
A dominant feature of Sudan's economy is the share of the 
public sector in economic activity. It embraces most of modern irri- 
gated agriculture, the railway network, banking, power and water 
supplies, and is actively involved in manufacturing industry. As will 
be seen (Chapter Seven) the public sector employs more than , 
50 % of 
the labour force in manufacturing and contributes a similar share to 
total production. In the foreign trade sector, the government share 
in imports has fluctuated from 22.4 % (1966) to 74 % (1971) and down 
to 31 % (1976), while in exports, figures for the same years were 
8 %% 87.6 %, and 65.3 % respectively. 
10 The high shares in the early 
seventies were due to the government policy of controlling most of 
the import-export transactions and the subsequent rise in the private 
sector shares were due to a partial reversal of policy. As the gover- 
nment commands more than a quarter of GDP much is expected from it by 
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way of public savings to finance development programmes. 
The revenue performance of the government during 1966 - 
1976 " was superior by any standard. " 
11 Thus during the second 
half of the period, which corresponds to the Five Year Plan (1970/ 
71 - 197475) central government revenue increased at a rate of 
9.4 % (see Table 3.6) per annum compared to the planned increase 
of 6.7 %. Despite this, however, central government has contribu- 
ted very little to total savings. In fact, government savings out 
of its receipts averaged only 5% between 1970 - 1975 against 15 % 
during 1960 - 1970. As a result, public sector surpluses financed 
only 25 % of the gross investment under the Five and Ten Year 
Plans, instead of 65 %, and the deficit had to be financed from 
external resources (50 %) and internal borrowing from the banking 
system (25 %). 
12 The reason for this rather disappointing savings 
performance lies in the rapid growth of government expenditure over 
the same period. 
While current revenue was increasing at 9.4 %, recurrent 
expenditure was increasing at 12.8 % annually as against a projected 
increase of 3.5 %. As a result, budgetary surpluses to finance dev- 
elopment had to decline to the levels observed above. The reasons 
for such high levels of expenditure can be found partially in its 
composition. The share of economic and social services has gradually 
declined from 39.5 % in 1967/68 to 17.5 % in 1976/77 (see Table 3.7)" 
At the same time, expenditure on defence, security and general admin- 
istration has been stepped up continuously. While it is true that the 
government acts as an employer of " last resort " for university gra- 
duates and secondary school leavers, which inevitably leads to more 
-75- 
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expenditure on general administration, the Civil War has ended 
(1972) and accordingly, the share of defence and security might 
have been expected to fall more. With such a pattern, no wonder 
that the ratio of development expenditure to recurrent expendi- 
ture has fallen from 35.6 % in 1955/56 to 22.8 % in 1976.13 
3.5 Development Planning. 
Prior to independence, whatever economic development 
took place in the Sudan was largely unplanned. The leading export 
enclave in the process was the Gezira Scheme which produced cott- 
on, and which continues to this day, to produce most of Sudan's 
cotton exports. Minor capital expenditure projects were undertaken, 
but these were mainly infrastructural in nature and financed stric- 
tly from budget surpluses. The share of productive schemes in the 
development programmes of the post-war period had rarely exceeded 
17 %. 14 The advent of the first national government (1954), how- 
ever, changed this considerably. "The sectoral distribution of pub- 
lie investment was as follows for the years (1956/57 - 1960/61) : - 
£m. % 
Productive Schemes 39.0 56.4 
Social Services -, 12.2 16.8 
Transport & Communication 6.9 9.9 
Public Utilities 3.0 - 4.6 
Others 8.3 12.3 
69.4 100 
Source; A/ Wahab (1976) P. 220. 
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These post-independence development programmes were the 
forerunners of the first " comprehensive " plan, the Ten Year Plan 
(TYP) 1961/62 - 1970/71). 
15 The TYP was set to achieve the foll- 
owing objectives : - 
(1) Broadening the structure of Sudanese economy. 
(2) Maintaining a stable price level. 
(3) Realizing a considerable increase in exports and import 
substitution. 
(4) Achieving an appreciable increase in real per capita 
income (2.4 % per annum). 
The Plan visualized the economy as being comprised of two main parts, 
traditional and modern (see 3.2 above). But although the majority of 
the population is engaged in the traditional agriculture and nomadic 
sector, the strategy of the plan was to concentrate its effort on 
developing the modern sector, rather than spreading its limited re- 
sources over the larger and less developed traditional sector. This, 
in effect, amounted to leaving the colonial structure (export encla- 
ves) of the economy intact, and accordingly the plan perhaps did not 
pay due attention to the vital issue of transforming the traditional 
sector which was holding up the speedy growth of the economy. 
With regard to the roles of public and private sectors, 
the plan envisaged a leading role for the public sector. Thus out of 
the plan's total investment of £565.4m., the public sector was ass- 
igned £337m., as against £228.4m. for the private sector. But these 
total sectoral shares are in practice, misleading. Despite the over- 
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all larger share of the public sector in total investment, private 
sector investment was projected to rise gradually from 26 % in 
1962/63 to about , 
50 % by the end of the plan (Table 3.8). Thus the 
smaller share of the private sector both at the begining of the 
plan and in the total planned investment, (over the plan period) 
seem to have been based more on the fact that the private sector 
was underdeveloped (and thus could not be expected to lead the ec- 
onomy) rather than on any preference or conviction that the public 
sector is more suited to assume this leading role. 
Committment to the role of the public sector in leading 
the economy was more apparent in the Five Year Plan (FYP) (1970/71- 
1974/75). 16 This (the FYP)q was formulated with the help of a team 
of Russian experts soon after a military takeover in May 1969, which 
pledged to follow a" socialist " policy in managing the economy. 
The objectives of this plan seem to be both more elaborate (qualit- 
itatively) and more ambitious (perhaps too ambitious). They include: - 
(1) Increasing GDP by 7.6 % annually. 
(2) Increasing the volume of agricultural production by 61 %. 
and that of marketable livestock by 75.5 % by the end of 
the plan period. 
(3) Increasing the volume of industrial production by $j %. 
(4) Securing a favourable balance of payments. 
The FYP projected a total investment of £1+26.7m. over the 
plan period. Out of this, the share of the public sector was £2$6.7m. 
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or more than 60 % of the total. The distribution of public invest- 
meat between the different sectors of the economy reveals some of 
the assumptions underlying the plan. 
TABLE 3.9 SECTORAL SHARES OF TOTAL PLANNED PUBLIC INVESTMENT. 
(%) 
TYP FYP 
Agriculture 32 38 
Industry & Public Utilities 13 20 
Transport & Communication 22 15 
Social Services & Administration 31 15 
Others 2 12 
100 100 
Source; FYP Vol. I P. 39. 
As the above Table shows, the share of transport in total public 
investment is relatively low in the Five Year Plan as compared to 
the TYP. This seems to stem not from failure on the part of the 
planners to appreciate the transport problem as an impediment to 
development in Sudan, but rather from the assumption that, under- 
developed as it is, the transport system was ruining far below ca- 
pacity. Accordingly, the FYP envisaged that little investment was 
needed to raise its capacity to cope with planned production inc- 
reases. As regards agriculture, its share was low, judging by what 
was expected from it by way of contribution to the targeted 7.6 % 
-81- 
growth rate. The assumptions underlying such low shares were that 
first the plan envisaged more agricultural produce to be obtained 
from land already in use, rather than new reclamations (i. e. thro- 
ugh intensification) and secondly, with more attention paid to tr- 
aditional rainfed agriculture, more produce was also expected for 
any given amount of investment. A further feature of the Table is 
the high share of industry reflecting the planners intention of 
processing more of Sudan's agricultural exports, and replacing more 
imports. 
Like the TYP whose implementation was disrupted in 1964 
65 (change of government), the FYP was also amended mid way (1972/ 
73). In January 1973, the government (after a change of heart about. 
socialism ") launched a" Phased Programme of Action " which con- 
siderably changed the previous priorities of the Plan. The Plan it- 
self was extended for a further two years to accomodate the Prog- 
ramme. The two major changes in plan priorities resulting from the 
Programme were achievement of self-sufficiency in certain consump- 
tion commodities (sugar, wheat) and the high place reserved for the 
transportation problem, now thought to be the main bottleneck facing 
the development of the economy. Accordingly, the share of tte tran- 
sport sector rose to 37.4 % of the budgetary allocation for 1974/75 
as against the average of less than 15 % before the Action Programme. 
Concurrent with the introduction of the Action Programme, more atten- 
tion was also paid to the private sector. Thus the increased share of 
private sector in total investment is now coupled with a series of 
Investment Acts in Industry and Agriculture. Moreover, most of the 
nationalization and confiscation measures taken in 1970 were reversed 
- 82 - 
to restore the confidence of private investors, foreign and local. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
COMMERCIAL POLICY s OBJECTIVES AND INSTRUMENTS. 
4.1 Objectives. 
Foreign trade occupies an important position in the 
Sudanese economy. The combined share of exports and imports averaged 
38 % of GDP during the last decade, and the share of government rev- 
enue originating from it directly and indirectly, was more than 42 %. 
The role assigned to the external sector in the plans (The Ten Years 
Plan (TYP) 1961/62 - 1970/71) and the Five Year Plan (FYP) (1970/71 - 
1974/75) reflected this dominant position. 
In particular, the Plan(s) targets were typically to; 
(I) diversify exports away from cotton, and to achieve an average 
growth rate in exports of 7.5 %- 
(2) to diversify imports away from consumer goods and towards invest- 
-ment goods. 
I 
The achievement of the two objectives was closely related to another 
objective, namely that of self-sufficiency. 
2 The latter became a 
central objective, especially after 1973 when imports of foodstuffs 
started to assume a larger share of the import bills. This was of 
special significance to a country that was expected to be one of the 
graneries of the world. Self-sufficiency was not contemplated in 
- 85- 
agricultural products alone, however. Domestic industry was also 
assigned the role of taking larger shares of the domestic market, 
firstly in certain basic commodities, and then in other consumer 
goods. The combined effort of increased foreign exchange receipts 
through expanding exports, and decreased foreign payments through 
less imports of consumer goods, was to provide for more foreign 
exchange for the major development projects that were designed to 
help achieve the same ends in the long run. 
The role assigned to foreign trade was complementary 
with other Plan targets like " diversification of the economic base", 
3 
and industrialization. The former was a deliberate attempt to rid 
the economy of dependance on one export commodity, and the latter's 
achievement was a result of the generally held view that industrial- 
-ization is synonymous to development. The Plans assigned the fbreign 
trade sector one main function, namely, to provide the necessary 
foreign exchange to enable the importation of capital goods and raw 
materials, needed for the growth of the industrial sector. Thus, in 
the framework of an overall development strategy as viewed by the 
planners, the role of the foreign trade sector was crucial. Through a 
change in the commodity composition of exports and improved export 
performance, export earnings were expected to grow to cover a rising 
import bill because, 
"..... a considerable increase in imports is to 
be expected as a result of development effort. " 
(TYP. P. 25) 
Moreover, the composition of imports was to shift gradually towards 
capital goods through the gradual import substitution of consumer 
goods by domestic production. As a result, the import bill will have 
- 86- 
more space for development imports. Growth in export earnings on 
the one hand, and vigorous import substitution on the other,, were 
seen as two effective methods to make more foreign exchange available, 
and thus lessen dependance on foreign borrowing to finance development 
projects. 
Apart from providing the greater part of the external 
resources needed for development projects, the government also depended 
on foreign trade for the greater part of its domestic resources. Tax- 
-ation in general accounted for 70 % of government revenue and the 
share of taxes on foreign trade (which is a function of its volume) 
averaged 42 % of all government revenue during the period. 
4 
No wonder 
then, when the FYP says, 
"..... The overriding target is to increase the 
volume of trade with the improvement of its 
pattern and the re-vitalization of its con- 
stituent components. " 
(FYP. P. 16) 
The forthcoming Six Year Plan also stressed this, as one of its major 
objectives; 
"..... The expansion of exports and the production 
of import substitution in order to improve the 
balance of payments. " 
(Economic Survey 1976/77 P. 2}4) 
It is in the light of these objectives that one should 
look at the commercial policy instruments used (4.2) below. Develop- 
-ment programmes need both foreign exchange and domestic currency 
components. If foreign borrowing is to be minimized, more foreign 
exchange has to be released by cutting down on imports (through import 
substitution), or more is to be made available through expanding 
exports. An exp ndi g"volume of exports will also help generate 
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more government revenue. But in order to encourage exports foreign 
markets must be made more attractive than home markets, through 
direct or indirect subsidies on exports. This, however, involves 
parting with some of the limited government revenue which is already 
stretched between development and current expenses. The policy meä- 
-sures to be chosen by the government therefore, clearly depend on 
how sympathetically the government views the resultant increase in 
exports due to its promotional policies. 
In the circumstances, the government resorted to subsidies, 
but only partially, (section 4.2.3). More effort was directed towards 
reorganization of the foreign trade sector, by bringing major exports 
under control, and by investing more to expand the areas under the 
main export commodities. Import duties and import licencing were used 
intensively during this period, both to protect domestic industry and 
to cut down on non-essentials. New importing methods were also int- 
-roduced (see Chapter Six) to release more of the official foreign 
exchange receipts to development imports and to cover the rising-value 
of petroleum and, foodstuffs imports. 
4.2. Instruments. 
4.2. I. Import Duties and Surcharges. 
Historically import duties were imposed by the Customs 
Ordinance 1939, to lessen the dependance of the colonial government 
on aid from London. Over the years, duty rates changed considerably 
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and so did the basic reasons for levying them. Thus although the 
revenue purpose of the central government remains the main reason, 
the 'protective' purpose of these duties is also important. In the 
latter years, however, quotas and foreign exchange restrictions 
were frequently applied on a wider range of commodities, so that 
the major purpose of import duties was perhaps again the share of 
the duty revenue to the central government. 
Altogether, duties are levied on over a thousand items, 
mostly on ad valorem basis (see Table I) with rates ranging from 
5 ,% to 600 %. But of the twenty-six different rates, eight rates 
occur more frequently than others, and cover more than 90 % of all 
imported items (see Table 2). A look at Table I reveals a pattern 
familiar to most countries. Thus nil or low duty rates are levied 
on foodstuffs, raw materials and capital goods, while higher rates 
are levied on luxuries and similar products. Some apparently semi- 
essential items are taxed as high as luxury ones e. g. canned food 
and tape-recorders, both at I$0 %, and refrigerators (150 %) which 
could hardly be considered as luxuries in a very hot country like 
Sudan. In these cases, and others similar to them, domestic produc- 
tion started and later satisfied the market so that the 'protective 
effect' of duties seems to be the reason, although even here bans 
occur which make the duties redundant for that purpose. 
For the purpose of protecting the domestic industry, 
import duty collections averaged 42.9 % of CIF value during the last 
decade, but the extent of protection is higher than this when it is 
known that the different Industrial Investment Acts (1956; 1967; 1972) 
provide concessions to industry in the form of reduced duties on their 
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TABLE 4.1. MOST FREQUENTLY APPLIED IMPORT DUTY RATES. 
Rate (%) % of item'on which it 
is applicable. 
40 43 
100 9 
10 9 
25 6 
70 6 
50 6 
150 5 
20 5 
Total Item 89 
Sources A. R. Al Wahab et al., "Budgetary 
Constraints and Pros ects " in 
El Hassan, A. M. (ed. 
) 
1977. 
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TABLE 4.2. RATES OF IMPORT DUTIES ON SOME SELECTED COMMODITIES 
FEBRUARY 1974. 
(a) Necessities Rate of Duty 
(ad valorem un- 
-less specified) 
Wheat, Millet & other cereals, 
Medicines, Prnted Books, Papers, NIL 
Insecticides 
Wheatflour 25 % 
(b) Raw Materials and Capital Goods 
Tractors NIL 
Fertilizers 5% 
Agricultural Tobls & Machinery, Gas, 
Oil, Coal, Industrial Chemicals 10 - 25 % 
Basic Building Materials, Industrial 
Machinery, Metallic & Non-Metallic Ores 25 - 40 % 
(c) Luxuries and Semi-Essentials 
Cameras 80 % 
Bicycles & Motor Cycles 
Coffee 
Butter, Fruit & Vegetables 
Refrigerators 
Radios 
Air Conditioning Systems 
Tape Recorders 
Perfumes & Cosmetics 
Clocks & Watches 
Champagne 
Whisky, Gin & Brandy 
IS-50% 
per kilo 80 m/m 
I00 % 
1.50 % 
40-80% 
120% 
150% 
40'- IN % 
80- 130% 
600 % 
£6 / litre 
Sources Customs Tariffs and Nimeiri 
(1974) P. 155. 
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imports from raw materials (duty not exceeding 10 %)5 and are 
altogether exempted from duties on machinery and spare-parts. The 
average duty collections mentioned above have declined steadily in 
the last five years to just above 30 %. Although this is partly due 
to the reduction of the surcharge on imports in operation since 1966, 
" to make up for the deficit in the current budget. " 
6, 
it is not 'a 
genuine move towards liberalizing trade. The explanation. lies with 
the change in the structure of imports when low-duty foodstuffs in- 
-creasingly began to take a higher proportion of overall imports. 
During this period, the 1972 Industrial Investment Act also came 
into effect, and provided for more duty concessions for domestic 
industry. 
To emphasize the revenue purpose of duties levied, the 
two following components of the levy on imports should be considered. 
First, consumption duties are levied on perfumes, beer, cigarettes, 
lubricating oils and matches. Like the imports surcharge which was 
imposed in 1966 and continued to date (albeit at different rates), 
consumption duties date back to 1924,7 when they were first intro- 
-duced as a form of additional import duty to raise revenue. In the 
latter years, they alone constituted around 8% of duty collections. 
It should be mentioned, however, that the considerable protection 
afforded to local industry through these taxes is partially elimin- 
-ated by production taxes on domestic produce. Secondly, a develop- 
-ment tax came into effect in 1974 (at 2 %). 
8 
The tax was levied on 
both international transactions and domestic production, with few 
exemptions (e. g. medical products). By i976/77P this rose. to_S % and 
shows no sign of being abolished. 
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4.2.2. Export Taxes and Royalties. 9 
Like all indirect taxes, export taxes are important to 
the revenue structure of LDCs. In Sudan in particular, there are 
strong reasons to levy export taxes. Apart from the fact that they 
are easily collected and administered (where there is lack of admin- 
-istrative efficiency in many departments), they also seem to provide 
the only means of taxing the traditional sector, which absorbs more 
than three-quarters of the population. Since it is not possible to 
impose income-tax on such a sector, export taxes seem to be a conven- 
ient and equitable alternative to use for revenue purposes. Moreover, 
in periods of high international prices they increase the share of 
central government in the form of forced savings from the windfall 
gains accruing to exporters (e. g. Korean war and 1973/74 commodity 
boom). When encouraging domestic industry and promoting traditional 
exports conflict as aims, export taxes help the domestic industry 
which competes with exporters by raising the prices of exportables, 
thus allowing them to be processed locally e. g. groundnuts and sesame 
for vegetable oils, oilcake and meal. 
For the purpose of promoting exports, and thus generating 
more foreign exchange receipts, indiscriminate export taxes have 
serious effects on the country's export performance. By raising the 
domestic price of exportables they discriminate against exporters, in 
favour of production for the home market. Moreover, and most import- 
-antly, they weaken the competitive position of exports in internat- 
-ional markets, and hence may result in less foreign exchange receipts. 
Although the share of export taxes in total government 
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TABLE 4.3. ACTUAL IMPORT DUTIES COLLECTED 1966/67 - 1975/76. 
Year Import Duties % 
(fm") (em" 
1966/67 75.9 29.9 39.5 
1967/68 82 32.7 39.8 
1968/69 91.1 42.9 47-1 
2969/70 93.4 47.7 51.1 
1970/71 109.9 56.9 51.8 
1971/72 116.9 59.2 50.6 
1972/73 120.9 60.5 50 
1973/74 271.8 60.9 35.4 
1974/75 322.3 99.8 30.9 
1975/76 369.7 120.2 32.5 
Sources Department of Customs Annual Reports 
and Bank of Sudan Foreign Trade 
Statistics Digests (Annual) 
Development Tax as from 1973/74 is 
not included above (2 % and then 5% 
in 1975/76). 
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revenue has declined considerably over the past few years, export 
tax rates have all been raised to a minimum of 5% and a maximum of 
20 % (e. g. meat in 1974). In fact the duty rates that appear in 
(Table 3) considerably underestimate total levies on exportable 
commodities which go up to 40 % (see Chapter Five on Export Policy) 
inclusive of local taxes (ushur) and royalties. ' The discrimination 
against exports is most apparent in the withdrawal of'the subsidy 
element of the tax-subsidy scheme, which came into effect in 1972 
from two major export commodities, cotton and-gum Arabic. The re- 
-organization of the export sector after 1970 which brought a number 
of commodities under Marketing Boards (monopolies), also added an 
element of taxation in the form of corporation profits deductable 
from gross profits before these reach the producer level. The effects 
of such taxes on producer responses may have a strong bearing on the 
observed high fluctuation in exported volumes of different commodities. 
Apart from export taxes and royalties exports are also 
subject to the development tax (now 5 %) which turns the overall 
incentive structure prevailing in the economy heavily against them. 
This is even more so with regard to manufactured exports, where only 
a drawback of duties paid on raw materials used in their manufacture 
is provided as an incentive. 
4.2.3. The Exchange Tax/Subsidy Scheme. 
Throughout the decade under consideration, the Sudanese 
pound kept its parity with the dollar at £ SI a U. S. $ 2.87136 (i. e. 
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twice devalued with the dollar). But as from the 9th. March 1972, 
all payments have been subject to a 15 % exchange tax, (with minor 
exemptions) and all receipts to a 15 % subsidy. There are two major 
exemptions from the subsidy element however, These are cotton and 
gum Arabic. This 15 % exchange tax/subsidy scheme would have amounted 
to a 15 % de facto devaluation had the scheme been applied without 
exceptions. But as cotton and gum Arabic account for around 65 % of 
all exports, the extent of devaluation is significantly reduced. On 
the one hand, Sudanese exports seem to have no problem of surpluses 
to benefit from a devaluation move, and for this reason the subsidy 
element has been withdrawn from gum Arabic and cotton. On the other 
hand, if the subsidy is being granted and used to raise producer 
prices, this would have had a positive effect on the incentive to 
invest in exports and increase production, which has a strong tend- 
ency to fluctuate from year to year. 
The underlying reason for launching the scheme is to gen- 
-erate more revenue for the central government rather than the pro- 
tective effect it will have on import substitutes or the promotion 
effect it will have on exports. Thus, in his 1970 budget speech the 
Finance Minister promised to consider not abolishing the scheme as 
a whole, but only that part which makes the central government pay 
rather than receive. He (the Minister) promised " The withdrawal of 
all or part of-the incentives in the case of commodities proved in 
high demand internationally or are able to compete. 11 
10 This promise 
however, has not been carried out, but taxes on all exports have been 
raised so that the subsidy effect is greatly-reduced., 
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4.2.4. Foreign Exchange Allocation. 
The high import duties observed above were levied partly 
to help domestic industry provide substitutes for some or most 
imports other than those for development. Nearly ten years ago it 
was thought better to plan for the small foreign exchange receipts 
for each fiscal year, and accordingly, the Foreign Exchange Budget 
Committee (FEBC) was formed. The functions of this committee (see 
Chapter Six on Import Policy) were to present reliable estimates of 
foreign exchange receipts and payments and plan the allocation of the 
limited foreign exchange resources among competing claims. Among 
these, the debt service which in 1976/77 stood at 27 % of export 
earnings,, gradually became a major payment item to be netted out 
even before the most necessary import items could be considered. 
The FEBC determines the share of major components of 
payments; government imports, private sector imports and imports for 
the domestic manufacturing industry. With fluctuating export earnings 
and increased pressure from items such as debt service, more of a 
squeeze is put on the latter items and new import methods (suppliers 
credits and nil-value licences) were being adopted to allow the flow 
of imports in the country. The Committee as an exchange control 
vehicle makes binding decisions on Ministries that licence foreign 
exchange payments (e. g. the Ministry of Industry and Mining and the 
Ministry of Commerce), and despite the rigidly restrictive nature 
it brought to foreign exchange payments, it helped a great deal to 
point the way for future commitments involving foreign exchange. 
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4.2.5. Import Licencing. 
With the establishment of the FEBC a more detailed form 
of control was brought to imports of both the government and the 
private sector. The amount alloted to each broad category was to 
be strictly kept and the available foreign exchange was to be phased 
throughout the fiscal year by the Ministries concerned, with the 
Bank of Sudan acting as a watchdog so that ceilings would not be 
exceeded. 
All imports were brought under licence including those of 
the government, to ascertain the exact amount of claims on foreign 
exchange receipts and to help plan their allocation more accurately. 
With regard to private sector imports a detailed commodity breakdown 
was drawn up by the Ministry of Commerce according to which ceilings 
were placed on the amounts of foreign exchange to be spent in each 
category. The commodity breakdown and the estimated ceilings were 
gauged by surveys conducted by the Supply section of the Ministry of 
Commerce with regard to the projected demand and the available supply 
from domestic production. For-those commodities where the market was 
to a great extent satisfied by domestic production, quotas were placed 
on the extra amounts needed from imports. Complete bans on some com- 
-modities were also in operation, according to advice from the Ministry 
of Industry. Some important commodities e. g. medicine and medical 
equipment, were allowed under the Open General Licence, where no 
ceilings were imposed. For more detail on the mechanism of the'import 
regime and licencing see Chapter Six. 
In the circumstances, import licencing is compatable with 
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the general need to make the best use of foreign exchange receipts, 
but needless to say, it places a premium on imports and where quotas 
are in operation it is the effective protective tool rather than import 
duties which serve revenue purposes only. 
4.2.6. Marketing Boards. 
At the begining of the period (mid-sixties) both imports 
and exports were controlled by the private sector. With regard to 
exports there were 27 commercial companies (mainly foreign owned) 
engaged in exporting oilseeds and oilcake, and another 14 specialized 
cotton exporting companies. Marketing for most exports was conducted 
through the auction system.,, Producers bring their produce to the 
main centres, where it is divided into lots and is sold to the highest 
bidder. With some minor differences this was the prevalent system. A 
general feeling was voiced, through the Press and government circles 
that bidding was not as competitive as the number of exporting com- 
-parries, or their agents up-country might suggest, and there was a 
suspicion that some collusion was being practiced, which resulted in 
low producer prices and high profits for the companies. 
Even when the government decided to intervene in the auction 
markets by fixing a minimum auction price it was believed that minimum 
companies 
prices were seldom exceeded, and in some cases, when/agents abstained 
from buying at the minimum price the producers would have to'settle 
for much lower prices outside the auction, rather than stay in town 
until the next auction was held. It was also suspected that Sudan 
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export prices were lower than average international prices, because 
not all companies had the necessary experience and financial capab- 
-ilities, such that they sold in advance at considerably lower prices. 
This claim might be difficult to support in view of the fact that 
future markets in most of these commodities are fairly competitive, 
but looked at from a different angle, if the financial position of 
the company is not sound, it might be compelled to sell cheaper. 
Moreover, there was a possibility that foreign companies might under- 
-invoice their exports to repatriate or smuggle some of their capital 
outside the country. 
In 1970 all export and import trade was brought under 
government control through nationalization (and confiscation) of 
companies dealing in foreign trade. For the major export commodities, 
three government owned corporations were formed for cotton, oilseeds 
and gum Arabic (the private sector was later, in 1974, allowed just 
under 50 % of their shares). There are a number of advantages in this 
reorganization. According to the new arrangements the domestic market 
was left to local traders, who buy from the auction at prices at or 
above the minimum prices fixed by the Ministry of Commerce. When 
market prices fall below minimum prices, companie's agents intervene 
to clear the market at the minimum prices, from a reserve fund kept 
for such purposes. This introduced an element of stabilization in 
auction prices, and hence provided the producers with some incentive, 
since they know well in advance the minimum price at which they can 
sell their produce. But the more important function of such a marketing 
method is that it may help to fetch higher prices for exports through 
the stronger bargaining positions of these monopolies in international 
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markets. In this way it was also possible to improve the grading 
system, thereby obtaining higher prices, and honouring all contracts 
more certainly, thus restoring the reputation of Sudanese exports. 
For both the major export commodities and other exports, 
an export licencing system has been in operation since 1973. The 
purpose of export licencing is to combat the frequent shortages in 
the quantities of exportables available for domestic consumption. 
When such shortages are anticipated or actually obtain, -the 
Ministry 
of Commerce places a ban on exports of commodities in short supply, 
and accordingly, no licences are issued until the ban is. lifted. 
Moreover, some minor exports which are sold to neighbouring countries 
e. g. meat to Arab countries, are believed to be sold below the com- 
-parable world prices (alternatively underinvoicing may be in practice),, 
and to counter such practices contracted export prices are required. 
Licences are issued only when prices quoted in the export contract 
are at least equal to or above the minimum export price set by the 
Export Price Committee which operates within the Ministry of Commerce. 
The Committee in setting minimum export prices is guided by the pre- 
-wailing commodity markets prices among other considerations (e. g. 
the country of destination) and the popularity of the commodity in 
international markets. 
This reorganization of the export sector although providing 
some indirect subsidy (when prices fall below the minimum) to producers, 
also involves an element of taxation. In return for their (compulsory) 
services, the companies take between 34 %- 10 % of FOB prices-which 
goes to the central government revenue pool in. part or whole. ,. 
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4.3 Conclusions. 
The above mentioned measures and regulations comprised 
the trade and payments regime during the last decade. The overri- 
ding objective of the policy was to make more foreign exchange 
available for essential imports and development purposes. But al- 
though such an objective could be achieved by saving as well as 
earning foreign exchange, the balance of the policy seems to be 
rather on the foreign exchange saving side. 
Thus while the re-organization of the export sector and 
the selective subsidy element of the tax/subsidy scheme may have 
had a positive effect on exports, it remains to be seen (Chapter 
Five) whether this has been outweighed by the overall levy on ex- 
ports (taxes, royalties, development tax etc. ). On the import side 
measures included(among others) import duties and foreign exchange 
rationing. The latter, which is effected both through the FEBC and 
the various ministerial import licencing authorities, put a premium 
on import licences, both commercial and industrial (foreign exchange 
below its scarcity value) and introduced an element of anti-export 
bias into the system, since exporters were legally required to sur- 
render their foreign exchange earnings at the official (overvalued) 
exchange rate. The effect of this on domestic manufacturing is that 
investment opportunities become more attractive in manufacturing 
than in exporting. As more resources move into manufacturing, more 
imports will be substituted, and more foreign exchange for develop- 
ment purposes will become available (competing imports will be put 
under quota and banned lists). At the same time, domestic manufact- 
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uring is also helped by the protection provided. The structure of 
protection that results from a multiplicity of measures such as 
those pursued, however, may provide differential incentives not in 
accordance with planners preferences or the country's comparative 
advantage. 
NOTES. 
1 NIMEIRI, S. " Planning in the Sudan " Khartoum University 
Press Khartoum 1978. (in Arabic) 
2 One of the aims of the Six Year Plan (1976/77 - 1981/82) is to 
achieve, " self-sufficiency in foodstuffs and other agricult- 
ural commodities. " Economic Survey 1976/77; pp" 253 - 4. 
3 TYP. Op cit. P. 2. 
4 Other sources of government revenue include profits of public 
corporations, nationalized banks and companies, and fees and 
charges(5 % of the 1973/74 government revenue), (e. g. a new 
passport costs between £12 (2 year validity) to £25 (5 year 
validity)). 
5 Organization and Promotion of Industrial Investment Act 1967. 
Ministry of Industry and Mining, P. 10. 
6 Budget Speech 1966/67. Ministry of Economics and Finance, P. 22. 
The surcharge started at 5% but has risen to 15 % by 1972/73 
when it was reduced again to 5% contempraneous with the int- 
roduction of the exchange tax/subsidy scheme (see 4.2.3). 
7 ALI, A. A. H. " Structure of Indirect Taxation in the Sudan 
Institute of Public Administration Khartoum April 1969; Occa- 
sional Paper Number 18. P. 4 
8 Receipts from this tax are supposed to help finance development 
projects, but in fact it is another way of raising taxes, rates (other names given to similar tax increases are emergency tax, 
defence tax or import surcharge). 
- 103 - 
9 The word " royalty " goes back to colonial times when the 
ruling body used to own all the land and produce, thereof. 
Now the government of Sudan owns all the land, and royalties 
(as before) are levied on selected products (e. g. gum Arabic) 
which are collected by individuals or groups from this land, 
which is owned temporarily by the people. 
10 Budget Speech, June 1974 Ministry of Finance and Economics. P. 16. 
11 For an excellent description for Auction Systems, see Beshai 
1976; Chapter Four. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
EXPORT POLICY 
5. -1. Introduction. 
Although Sudan is potentially richly endowed with arable 
land (some 200 million square acres), foodstuffs have always had a 
substantial share in its import bill (22 % in 1973 and 17.8 % in 1975 
i. e. more than capital goods imports). It is perhaps this fact that led 
successive governments to adopt measures to ensure availability of 
exportables for the satisfaction of domestic consumption, before any 
surpluses could be released for export purposes. Thus the Commodities 
Control Act of 1955 and its amendment in 1966, replaced the 1945 War 
Supplies Ordinance, but continued to serve the same function. The Act 
gave complete authority to the Minister of Commerce and Supply to ban 
any commodity (see Table 5.1. ) from being exported if (he) thought that 
exports would result in domestic shortages. Even in 1973 when all exports 
became subject to licencing, the main reason given was that this would 
enable the Ministry of Commerce to licence only production surpluses 
in excess of expected domestic consumption. 
As will be seen in section (5.4. ) below, Sudan exports 
during the past ten years (and before) were mainly agricultural and 
due to the share of foreign trade in general in the economy, fluctuations 
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TABLE 5"I. FLUENCY OF EXPORT BANS (I974). 
Date Banned Ban Lifted 
February 4 Maize, Durra, oil- 
-cakes. edible oils. 
March II Groundnut oil 
& oilcake in 
Port Sudan. 
June 2$ Sesame oil, 
groundnut oil, 
& cotton seed 
already in Port 
Sudan. 
October 31 Cotton seed, Durra 
& Karkadeh. 
November 5 Livestock & Meat. 
November 18 Livestock & Meat. 
December 15 Livestock & Meat. 
Sources The Ministry of Commerce & 
Supply. 
-io6- 
in export proceeds deeply affect all activities in the economy. In 
particular, the capacity to import has long been seriously dependant 
on only one export commodity, cotton, whose share averaged more than 
50 % of total export earnings during this period. Any effort to plan 
the economy must therefore take particular notice of this fact. Two 
development plans were in operation during this period and both had 
something to say about exports. 
5.2. Export Policy Objectives. 
Despite the importance of the foreign trade sector in 
the economy, both the Ten Year Plan (196162 - 1970/71) (TYP) 
I 
and 
the Five Year Plan (1970/71 - 1974/75) (FYP) 
2 
gave less than due 
emphasis to this sector. The TYP was to achieve, among other things, 
a considerable increase in exports and import-substitution. 3 The 
plan further took note of the economic structure and its dependance 
on cotton and aimed at broadening-it through 'diversification'. 
According to the plan, " as a consequence of diversification of output 
the pattern of exports should become more varied and export earnings 
less vulnerable to fluctuations in the price of cotton. .. 
4 
The FYP put a value target for the foreign trade sector. 
The plan intended to s- 
"...:.... expand exports and imports so that total 
foreign trade volume reaches the target of £340m. 
and secures a favourable balance of trade and 
payments. " 
(FYP P. 13) 
Although the plan did not mention diversification, it did emphasize 
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the role of agriculture by increasing its share in total investment 
allocation from 23 % of total investment in 1964/65 - 1969/70 to 
27.6 % in the plan. The stated aim of investment in agriculture was 
" the promotion of cotton, cereal, vegetable crop production and the 
development of new crops such as coffee and tobacco. "5 
As for the plan targets for individual exports, these 
were not ambitious as Table (5.2. ) shows. However, none were achieved 
in terms of exported quantities. In. fact, the actual favourable export 
performance as compared with the plan projections was -largely due 
to rising export prices. Thus, while actual exports of the four major 
export commodities were between 62 % and 76 % of their plan targets 
(see Table 5.3. ), their respective prices were between 143 % and 223 % 
above projected world prices. 
The lack of emphasis given to exports in the previous 
plans were remedied in the Six Year Plan (1977/78 - 1982/83). The 
draft reports of this Plan's preparation Committee envisaged both 
short and long term objectives for exports. Under the plan, exports 
were to increase by 7% per annum. The short term objectives were to 
(a) reduce the dependance of the economy on one export commodity, 
cotton, by increasing other traditional exports (gum Arabic, sesame 
and groundnuts), and (b) to improve and increase export prices in 
world markets. 
The first objective was to be achieved on the one hand, 
by manufacturing raw cotton into yarn and cloth for export, and on 
the other, by exporting more of the traditional exports to traditional 
markets, and by opening up new markets to avoid concentration, and 
hence dependance on particular markets. The second objective was to 
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be achieved mainly through better quality, stricter grading and 
packing to meet the requirements of world markets. This objective 
was emphasized, mainly in response to complaints from importers 
(and claims for compensation due to low grading and quality), and 
the observed differences in prices between Sudanese and similar 
exports, which were thought to be due to quality differences. The 
long term objective was not only to diversify exports by increasing 
the shares of other traditional exports relative to cotton, but also 
by changing the commodity composition of exports in a more structural 
manner. Accordingly, new agricultural commodoties (e. g. fruit and 
vegetables) were to be introduced, together with manufactured exports 
such as yarn, canned meat, sugar, and skins and hides. 
The plan for the export sector in the SYP (Six Year Plan) 
was a considerable improvement over previous plans. Under this plan, 
however, as in previous plans, efforts to increase exports proceeds 
through diversification and the opening up of new markets for tradit- 
-ional exports, paid no attention to the differential incentives between 
agriculture and industry in general, or between crops within the 
agricultural sector itself. As section (5.6. ) shows, major export 
commodities were heavily taxed (at different rates) during the past 
few years, and in many cases, due to such taxes, the domestic market 
was made extremely profitable, relative to export markets. Moreover, 
the different levies at both local and central government levels have 
led producers to abandon production for export altogether (gum Arabic) 
or to sell their produce illegally to smugglers (oil seeds and gum 
Arabic) thus directly affecting potential foreign exchange earnings. 
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5.3. Export Policy in Practice. 
As noted in the introduction (5. I. above), the different 
Acts passed by the government concerning the export sector, were all 
restrictive in their nature. Rather than help promote exports-through 
incentives, the emphasis was upon satisfying domestic consumption by 
restricting instead of increasing the supply of exportables. Government 
efforts directed at increasing the production of exportables were 
mainly concentrated on the reclamation of new lands, rather than more 
efficient use of the existing area under cultivation. The FYP notes 
that s- 
..... The growth of production has been achieved 
mainly through the expansion of cultivated areas 
and the increase in the planned volume of capital 
expenditure by II. 5 %. " 
(nP P. 2) 
Increase in capital expenditure was made necessary due to the in- 
-efficient use of land. The plan goes on to say that 
"..... Actual yield levels were low, -considerably 
lower than other countries under the same soil 
and climatic conditions......... The developed 
lands were used only up to 61 % as against 7.5 % 
of the adopted rotation system in the Sudan, 
while in other countries with a more refined 
rotation system, the land use is as high as 
9o%-95%. " 
(FYP P. 2) 
The evidence is that actual government policies to increase. production 
and hence make available exportable surpluses were costly judging by 
the above statements, and unsucessful judging by the frequent bans on 
exportables and the low ratio (62 %) of achieving plan targets. (see 
Tables 5.1" and 5.3") 
The Plan documents did not prescribe measures to be taken 
to increase exports, except for the explicit statements concerning 
-112- 
T_ 5.3 RATIO OF ACTUAL (A) PERFURMANCE TO PLANNED (P) EXPORTS, _ 
COTTON GUM ARABIC GROUNDNUTS SESAME 
% A/P % A/P % A/P % A/P 
Q FOB Q FOB Q FOB Q FOB 
1970 105 103 92 116 60 III 71' 96 
1971 96 105 78 130 81 io6 70 123 
1972 95 107 79 138 72 II4 64 135 
1973 80 135 62 145, 79 134 66, 137 
1974 29 218 33 477 65 269 68 261 
1975 38 192 26 331 98 240 64 280 
average 74 143 62 223 76 162 67 172 
Sources Table 5.2 above. 
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diversification in general and the attainment of an increase in 
commodity production by 60.8. %, in particular. The FYP, however, 
noted that the public sector has virtually no share in the foreign 
trade sector, with 0.2 % in exports and 20.5 % in imports. The con- 
viction of the people responsible for the plan was that :- 
"..... the lack of a properly sound and systematically 
organized mechanism of exporting raw materials and 
commodities has profoundly limited the scope and 
possibilities of international trade, despite the 
existance of demand from the rest of the world. " 
(FYP P. 9) 
As a result and concurrent with the launching of the FYP (June 1970) 
the government took control of the foreign trade sector by national- 
-izing and confiscating export and import companies. With regard to 
exports, and after a series of organizational adjustments, three 
Marketing Boards were established for cotton, oil seeds, and gum Arabic, 
(l+. 2.6. above). The functions of these corporations (as they are called 
in Sudan) were to stabilize producer prices by stepping into the auction 
market to buy whenever prices fell short of the minimum producer price 
ional 
set by the Ministry of Commerce (according to internal price movements). 
The Boards were also to observe the grading and qualities of exports 
(subject of much complaint then) and to co-operate with similar bodies 
in other exporting countries to attain the highest possible prices 
for Sudanese exports. 
Re-organization of the export sector was therefore the 
heart of export policy and the authorities thought, according to the 
FYP, that a better performance of exports was attainable in this manner, 
rather than in any other way. This was supplemented by the introduction 
of the subsidy scheme in March 1972. According to this scheme, exporters 
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were to be paid a subsidy of I5 % of the value of their exports. The 
effect of this subsidy, however, was limited because it excluded two 
major export commodities, cotton and gum Arabic (whose joint share 
in export proceeds was between - 65 % during this period). More- 
-over, levies on these and other exports had increased considerably 
during the same period (see section 5.6. ) thus effectively elimin- 
-ating the positive effects of the subsidy scheme on exports. 
The other main promotional measure was the introduction 
of barter trade. Legal border trade had existed for a long time to 
help reduce the level of smuggling activities which could not be 
totally stopped in a country which has borders with eight other countries. 
The main policy change here was the introduction of town barter (see 
Chapter Six). According to this system of exporting, commodities are 
licenced for barter trade in order to allow them to find and establish 
themselves in foreign markets. An exporter of a barter commodity is 
under no obligation to surrender his foreign exchange earnings. The 
exporter is free to import any commodity eligible for importation 
under the system (certain commodities were prohibited if local produce 
was fully protected). Barter products which prove to be a sucess on 
foreign markets move from full barter, where the exporter does not 
surrender any foreign exchange, to a 70 %- 30 % or 30/50 barter, 
whereby the exporter becomes legally liable to surrender part of his 
foreign earnings (30 %- 50 %) in convertible currencies. When the 
authorities are satisfied that a commodity no longer needs promotion 
through barter, it is removed from the barter list to the convertible 
currencies export list, (For lists see Chapter Six, Footnote 2I). 
On the credit side it is difficult to evaluate the barter 
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system. Although it certainly helped the flow of more imports into 
the country at a time when these became increasingly difficult to 
meet from official foreign exchange receipts, there was no guarantee 
that barter imports covered all receipts from barter exports. Thus on 
the debit side, there is suspicion that it resulted in the smuggling 
of part of the receipts of barter exports and helped to create a black 
market in foreign exchange, which was used to finance "nil-value" 
imports which were sold at inflated prices to cover the cost of finance. 
As for barter exports themselves, the system seemed a reasonable method 
to encourage such exports to find new markets, although there is no 
proof that many exports have become foreign exchange earners, and 
joined the main export list as a result of their transitional period 
in the town barter list. 
5.4. Export Composition. 
Commodity concentration in the exports of LDCs is very 
high. Pearson (1969) observed that s- 
"..... nearly half of these(LDCs) earn more than 
50 % of their export receipts from a single 
primary product. " 
(Pearson L. "Partners in Development. ") 
Pall mall 1969 P. 93. 
In this respect, Sudan is no exception. Throughout the period under 
consideration, dependence of exports on one commodity - cotton - 
continued to the tune of 50 % (on average). Moreover, only four 
commodities accounted for 88 % of overall export proceeds (see Table 5.4. ). 
Classified by the nature of commodity, between 96 %- 99 % 
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of Sudanese exports in this period were primary products. The economy 
was thus vulnerable to fluctuations in their international prices, 
and fluctuations in their internal exportable surpluses since their 
production is affected to a great extent by climatic conditions. The 
worst problems arising from such a structure were avoided, however, 
due to rising export prices during this period. Despite the pronounced 
intentions of the authorities, and the plans to diversify and broaden 
the economic base and the commodity composition of exports, little 
sucess was achieved. Exports from manufacturers accounted for only I% 
in 1973 and the share of cotton in overall export proceeds was seldom 
below 50 %. Export prices, however, did not fluctuate or fall as 
anticipated by the FYP and as a result exports, with little change in 
their composition, did rather well compared with plan projections. 
5.5. Export Performance. 
As Table (5.4. ) shows, Sudan export proceeds grew from 
£70m. to nearly £200m. at an average rate of 10.4 % in the last decade. 
This is an impressive performance with regard to both developed and 
LDCs. There were, however, considerable fluctuations, both in aggregate 
export proceeds and in individual commodity components. Indeed with 
regard to export instability, Sudan is found to rank highest in African 
and Arab countries, and the fourth highest in thirty-seven LDCs (Erb 
and Schiavo-Campo 1969). This phenomenon is generally blamed on falling 
export prices, but in the Sudan's case, quantity variations seem to 
account for the major cause of export instability. This instability 
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aside, the high average growth rate in export earnings necessitates 
a further look at export performance. 
In order to identify the factors responsible for the 
observed performance of export earnings we can use the "shift and 
share" analysis suggested by Richardson (1971). According to this 
technique, export earnings are partioned into structural and comp- 
etitive components. The structural component is computed on the 
assumption that the country under consideration keeps its base-year 
shares in world trade. The residual between total change and the 
structural component is (i. e. export growth due to changes in 
export shares) then said to be due to relative competitiveness. Thus 
if Vi is the value of exports of the ith. commodity, ai is the 
Sudanese share of world exports of the ith. commodity, Wi is the 
value of world exports of the ith. commodity, and I and t are the 
base. and terminal years, then we can form the identity :- 
E (vit - viI) i all wit + (ait - aiI) it (iý 
There is no causal relationship involved; the identity merely says 
that total change in export earnings (LHS) could be partitioned into 
one part which is due to shares being kept constant and another part 
due to changes in such shares. 
Table (5.5. ) estimates the above identity for the Sudan. 
Four export commodities were considered, which between them accounted 
between 70 %- 90 % of export proceeds during this period. According 
to the Table, if Sudan maintained its 2966 export shares in the world 
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TABLE 5.5. EXPORTS WITH 1966 SHARES (IN WORLD MARKETS). 
£m. 
COTTON GUM G"NDNUT SESAME Total Total 
Hypo- Actual Ratio, 
theti 
cal 
(A) (B) A/B 
1966 34.8 7.2 7.3 5.6 54.9 54.9 1.00 
1967 37.1 8.8 14.4 6.4 66.7 62.2 1.07- 
1968 36.2 8.1 6.9 5.9 57"1 66.5 . 86 
1969 28.9 10.2 6 6.7 51.8 72.4 . 72 
1970 33.6 9.8 5.4 7.7 56.5 85.6 . 66 
1971 37.9 10.7 11.7 7.5 67.8 94.7 . 72 
1972 42.4 IL I 12.1 9.5 75-1 IOI .. 74 
1973 55.6 11.4 28.4 11.5 107.3 111.4 . 96 
1974 66.5 34.9 22.5 19.5 143.3 118 1.21 
1975 63.7 20.6 23.9 17 125.2 124 1.01 
1976 48.3 22.9 26.3 16.1 136.6 165.2 . 68 
Sources; UN Year Book of International Trade 
Statistics, various issues and Ec. 
Survey 1974; P. 224. 
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markets of its major export commodities, the total increase in its 
export proceeds would have been $0 % less than it actually was. Alt- 
ernatively, nearly S0 % of the increase was due to increased shares 
in world markets. Although two of the minor commodities also regis- 
-tered increased shares, it was the share of cotton, the dominant 
export, which contributed most to that performance, (from 4.3 % to 
6.9 %). In terms of the identity above, the total change in exports 
earnings could be decomposed as follows :- 
Total increase = constant share component + share increase component 
(£III. 3m. ) (£58.7m. ) + (32.6m. ) 
Growth in export earnings could also be analysed by de- 
-composing these into three different components; (a) Terms of trade 
effect (b) volume effect and (c) the change in export earnings 
due to changes in both prices and quantities (i. e. interaction effect). 
Thus if Pi, Qi are the price and quantity of the ith. export commodity 
and Vi, t and I are as above, we can form the identity i. 
E vit -E vii -E Pit - PiI) QiI +E Nit - QiI) piI 
iiii 
+E (pit - Pii) Nit - Qii) (II) 
i 
where the LHS is the total change in export earnings and the three 
terms of theZ1HS are respectively the changes due to international 
prices, exported quantities and interaction between the. two. The est- 
-imation of this identity thus aims at showing the relative importance 
of the price and volume changes over the period 1966 - 1976. 
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In Tables (5.6. and 5.7. ) we carry the computation for 
, 
the above identity, using the four major export commodities, (gum 
Arabic, cotton, groundnuts and sesame) as a proxy for all exports. 
Table (5.6. ) is computed to give hypothetical export earnings on the 
assumption that the volume of each of the commodities under consider- 
ation remained at its 1966 level (i. e. constant) while prices assume 
their actual (annual) levels. If this was the case. Sudan export 
earnings would have declined' steadily throughout the period, with 
the exception of 1974 and 1975 (a boom year for Sudanese exports) 
and their value would have been less than that of 1966. This is shown 
in the column before last, which gives hypothetical earnings as a 
ratio of actual earnings. Thus increased volumes of traditional exports 
have contributed considerably to the rate of growth in export earnings. 
Table (5.7. ) gives hypothetical export earnings with con- 
-stant (1966) prices but with actual export volumes. Table (5.7") 
addresses itself to the following question; Assuming that unit prices 
had remained at their base year (1966) level, what would the value of 
exports be, given actual exported quantities ? The answer to this 
question provided by Table *(5.7. ) would be; had export prices been 
kept constant, export earnings would have declined even more than the 
previous case (volume constant). More specifically, in every year 
exports earnings would have been below their realized value by up to 
50 % and the average growth rate would have fallen to 3.. 5 *% instead 
of the actual rate of 10.4 %. 
Tables (5.6. and 5.7. ) together clearly show that both 
export volumes and prices affected positively the rate of growth of 
export earnings. The magnitude of these effects and their interaction 
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could be shown by decomposing the total increase in export earnings 
into the components suggested by the above identity (II). 
Total charge - Price effect + quantity effect + interaction effect 
(zrz. 3ý. ) a (£78. zzn. ) + (£ .)+ (£z4. im. ) 
which shows the dominant effect of price change (accounting for 70 %), 
a rather surprising result, considering the general conviction that 
prices of primary products tend to fall over time. Thus, despite the 
failure to achieve plan targets in export volumes (actual exports 
were 62 % of targets), movements in international prices have more 
than compensated for that, with the result of an unexpectedly good 
export performance. If however, the plan targets were achieved and 
assuming that international prices did not respond to this (an unlikely 
assumption with regrd to gum Arabic and sesame), the value of Sudanese 
exports between 1970 - 1975 would have been continuously greater than 
actual earnings and would have more than doubled in 1974 and 1975 
(see Table 5.8. ). 
5.6. Behaviour of Major Export Commodities. 
5.6. I. Cotton. 
As Table (5.4. ) shows, the share of cotton in export 
proceeds was on average more than 50 % throughout. Earnings from 
cotton grew at an average annuä. l rate of I2.2 %, while quantity exports 
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grew by 8.3 %. These rates however, conceal considerable fluctations 
from year to year. It was the instability of cotton exports and ear- 
nings which - through its large share - affected the overall instability 
observed about Sudanese exports and placed Sudan as one of the top 
countries whose exports were most unstable. 
6 
This instability could 
be explained by factors related to the domestic supply rather than the 
foreign demand facing Sudanese cotton exports. 
The world cotton market responds most to production and 
exports of the U. S. A. which controls 36 % of the market. Sudan, however, 
together with Egypt and Peru export the Extra-Long-Staple (ELS) variety 
of cotton and command a dominant position in its market, with Egypt 
alone controlling more than S0 %. Although cotton generally is facing 
stiff competition from synthetic fibres whose prices dropped sharply 
over the last few years, and its overall share of the textile market 
was rising less than others, the EIS variety was relatively unaffected. 
What helped more than the relatively expanding demand for the EIS 
cotton, were the declining exports from Egypt, who started to consume 
more of her produce, thereby allowing Sudan to increase her share in 
the market. 
Cotton instability indices as computed by Beshai (1976) 
were as follows7: - 
Proceeds 22.7 % 
Quantity 20.7 % 
Price 13.4% 
Clearly, instability is very high, with the Quantity index accounting 
for the major part of the high index for proceeds. Although part of 
the observed fluctuations in quantity could be attributed to natural 
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hazards e. g. white ants, locusts and rainfall, part of it-at least, 
could be explained by the production and income distribution arrange- 
-ments. 
In Sudan, 90 % of the cotton is grown in public schemes, 
under gravity irrigation (ID % is rainfed. cotton in Nuba and Tokar) 
under a tripartite sharing system. In the Gezira scheme which produces 
most of the Sudanese cotton, this partnership is between (a) the 
tenant who provides his labour (b) the government which provides and 
owns the land, the dam, and the canals used for irrigation and (c) 
the Gezira Board which provides management and supervizes the rotation 
system. According to the arrangement, gross profits from cotton sales, 
after all costs have been deducted and charged to the " joint account, " 
are divided between the three partners, 1+7 % to the tenant, 43 % to 
the government (central and local including a reserve fund) and 10 % 
to the Gezira Board. Because the government is a partner its share 
could be considered as a return on its capital investment, but such 
a high share in proceeds strongly suggests an element of taxation, 
especially if it is remembered that the system is inherited (and 
retained) from the previous foreign owners of the Scheme (The Cotton 
Plantation Syndicate). But even without this tax element, levies on 
cotton exports were often more than 20 % during the last decade as 
Table (5.9. ) shows. For 1976/77 the details were as followss- 
Export Tax 
Export Company 
Development Tax 
Marketing Board 
Commission 
10% 
Profit I% 
5% 
2% 
Source: Cotton Marketing Board. 
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TABLE 5.9 IMPLICIT TAXATION OF COTTON. 
1972/73 1973/74 
(1) Export FOB value of cotton 67.6 71.8 
(Port Sudan) (£Sm. ) 
less (2) Export Duties (Om. ) 6.5 3.7 
less (3) Profits of Agricultural 
Schemes (£Sm. ) 11.0 8.2 
(4) Producers Income (£Sm. ) 50.1 S7.9 
(5) Producers income as a% of 
Export Value 74 % 81 % 
(6) Implicit Tax Rate 26 % 19 % 
Source; ILO/UNDP (1976) T. P. 17 P. $1. 
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The above 22 %% are deductable from the'FOB price before the sharing 
between the three partners is effected. But this high rate of effect- 
ive export taxation does not affect cotton production directly, be- 
cause cotton is grown on a strict rotation basis which all tenants 
must follow (by law). The main effect, however, comes from the only 
factor of production still under the control of the tenant, and that 
and 
is his labour. Due to the sharing system . 'export taxes, cotton has 
low profitability as can be seen from the following tables- 
Profitability/Feddan 
Cotton £ 3.19 
Groundnuts 5.1+2 
Dura 1.79 
Wheat -1.02 
Gardening 20.00 
(Beshai 1976; P. 72) 
Due to the clear profitability of other crops in the rotation whose 
revenue is not shared, the evidence suggests that tenants put more 
labour into them than into cotton, with the result of lower yields 
feddan than is feasible. It is instructive to observe that the exchange 
subsidy of 15 % which applies to most exports, does not apply to cotton. 
Another factor which reduced the quantity of cotton exports 
was the growth of domestic consumption by the textile factories. Because 
of Sudan's small share in the world'cotton market in general, it could 
have been envisaged that larger exports at increasing revenues would 
have been possible had it not been for incentive policies which were 
biased against exports in general, among them cotton, the most important 
of all. 
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5.6.2. Oil Seeds : Groundnuts and Sesame. 
The share of groundnuts and sesame in the value of Sudanese 
exports nearly doubled during 1966/67 - 1976/77, from I8.2 % to 30 % 
(see Table 5.4. ). Together they helped to diversify export composition 
to a considerable extent, thus lessening the complete dependance on 
cotton production and exports, and making the economy less vulnerable 
to fluctuations in export volumes and prices of one product. In an 
expanding market of oil seeds, this was brought about both through 
higher-international prices and larger shares in the world markets. 
In particular, Sudan increased its share in the groundnuts market from 
14 % to 2I % by the end of the period. 
may have 
A number of factors contributed to this performance. Most 
significant among them was perhaps the considerable increase of the 
area under cultivation for these two crops. As Table (5. I0. ) shows, 
between 1966/67 - 1976/77 the area under groundnuts increased by 85 % 
and that of sesame, more than doubled, by 133 %. At the same time, 
groundnuts production increased more than proportionally to the in- 
-crease in area by 180 0, and the production of Sesame less than 
proportionally by IIO %. Quantities exported reflected local cons- 
-umption which traditionally preferred sesame rather than groundnuts 
for edible oil, and accordingly, while sesame exports increased by 
only 20 %, exports from groundnuts nearly trebled from I08m. t. (metric 
tons) to 283m. t. by the end of the period. 
In ordinary circumstances, it might not have been possible 
for Sudan to increase her shares considerably without adverse terms of 
trade effects, bearing in mind that it commanded more than 40 % of the 
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TABLE 5.10 AREA AND PRODUCTION UNDER GROUNDNUTS AND SESAME. 
(1966/67 - 1976/77). 
one feddan 6 1.04 acre. 
GROUNDNUTS SESAME 
area in product area product 
'000feddan '00° 
of m. t. 
'009eddan '000'm. t., 
1966/67 925.5 313.7 &+2.5 133.9 
1967/68 846.9 297.4 1234.4 186.7 
1968/69 719.5 163.6 1320.5 15+. 4 
1969/70 1072.8 384.7 1359.5 137.5 
1970/71 914.5 338.6 1856.9 297 
1971/72 1555 394 1812 278 
1972/73 1585 487 2801 338 
1973/74 1725 635 2073 232 
1974/75 1717 875 2199 282 
1975/76 2066 931 2291 238 
1976/77 1830 827 2200 235 
Sources; Department of Agricultural Economics 
Ministry of Agriculture & Bank e -c., 
Sudan Annual Report (1976) P. 14. 
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sesame market and between 10 %-1.5 % of the groundnut market. But 
during this period production conditions in competing countries helped 
Sudan considerably. The main producers of oil seeds (groundnuts) were 
Nigeria and Senegal which were seriously affected by the drought of 
the early 1970's, which struck the whole of West Africa. Increased 
exports from Sudan therefore appeared to have just compensated the 
world market for the loss resulting from the drought. Moreover, these 
exports, instead of affecting world prices downwards, seem to have 
modified the sharp increase in prices that would have otherwise 
occured. 
A minor, but important factor, was perhaps the re-organ- 
-ization of the export sector. The positive effect of state monopolies 
established since 1970 was felt most in two areas, producer pricing 
and the quality of exported commodities. Producer prices in the first 
two years after the re-organization were 32 % and 49 % for groundnuts, 
and 37 % and . 
57 % for sesame, above the immediate year before re-org- 
-anization. In fact, actual producer prices paid were above those 
envisaged by the FYP - based on the previous experience - by an average 
of 13 %. On this evidence the re-organization had provided some incen- 
tive to the producers in the form of higher and more certain prices, 
through the minimum auction prices method. With regard to quality, it 
was noted some years earlier, that on average Sudanese export prices 
were considerably below prices for the same commodities from competing 
countries. 
8 
The cause was generally known to be the lack of attention 
paid to grading and quality specifications demanded by importers, 
which frequently led to compensation claims from users due to non- 
compliance with quality contracted. The relatively low FOB prices 
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were reflected in producer prices, which in turn, led producers to 
shift to the production of other crops were returns were higher. 
The state monopolies, by centralizing exports in their hands, were 
able to impose more stringent quality measures upon their agents, 
thus raising the standard of Sudanese exports to market specifications, 
and attaining comparable prices with other countries. 
Despite the increased share of oilseeds in export proceeds 
and their relatively satisfactory export performance throughout the 
period, it could be shown that the picture could have been far better 
considering the favourable supply and demand conditions then prevailing. 
On the supply side, it was mentioned earlier, that the drought drast- 
-ically affected the west African produce and opened the possibility 
of considerable gains from quantity increases without fear of price 
decreases. On the demand side, both the FAO and the World Bank pre- 
-dicted that during the 1970's demand for soft oilseeds would outstrip 
supply. 
9 There were a number of government-induced factors which con- 
-tributed to non-realization of such potential gains. 
First and foremost was the dis-incentive resulting from 
export taxes. Tables (5.11. and 5. I2. ) show that total levies on 
exports from groundnuts and sesame had reached 30 % in some years. 
Total levies included local taxes, export taxes, and Marketing Boards 
profits. These have escalated rapidly (from 20 % in 196.5) 
10 during 
the period and have cancelled the subsidy element provided by the 
exchange tax/subsidy scheme introduced in March 1972. In so far as 
their incidence could not be shifted to importers, they were bound 
to affect the volume of exports adversly. Production of oilseeds 
was not insensitive to effective producer prices. In fact, since these 
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TABLE 5.11 IMPLICIT TAXATION OF GROUNDNUTS. 
1971/72 72/73 73/74 
1 FOB Price Port Sudan (£/m. t. ) 78.4 87.7 117.8 
2 Export Parity Equivalent (£S/m. t. ) 42.1 46.6 67.1 
3 Producer Price (El Obeid)(£S/m. t. ) 36.3 40.3 47.3 
4 Producer Price as a% of the Export 
Parity Equivalent. 86% 86% 70.4 % 
S Implicit Tax Rate 14% 14% 29.6 % 
Source; See Table (5.9) 
The Export Parity Equivalent equals the FOB price 
minus the real costs (handling, storage transport), 
while the producer price = Auction Price. The difference 
between the two (the implicit tax rate) is due to export 
taxes, local taxes, corporation profits etc. For similar 
details, see Appendix Table ( ). 
TABLE 5.12 IMPLICIT TAXATION OF SESAME. 
1972/73 73/74 
1 FOB Port Sudan (£/m. t. ) 132.2 175 
2 Export Parity Equivalent (£/m. t. ) 86.8 100.8 
3 Producer Price (£/m. t. ) 71.2 83.4 
4 (3) as a% of (2) 82% 
83 % 
5 Implicit Tax Rate 18 % 17 % 
Source; See Table (5.9) 
Export Parity Equivalent as in (5.9) above. 
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were annual crops, where the acreage area could easily be shifted 
from year to year, their price elasticity of supply was potentially 
high. The evidence, therefore, suggests that the re-organization of 
the export sector, which on the one hand helped. ": production and ex- 
-ports of oil seeds through relatively higher producer prices, had 
adverse effects on those variable through its higher effective tax- 
-ation on producers of these crops. 
Export taxation not only kept production at lower levels 
than was potentially feasible, but also affected exports considerably, 
through smuggling. Thus the Oil Seeds Corporation reported that; 
" 25 % of the 1973/74 production of groundnuts and sesame was neither 
domestically used nor exported. " 
II In 1975 a National Anti - Smuggling 
Conference was held to discuss the 'smuggling problem'. 
12 Implicit 
in its recommendations was the recognition that, " smuggling in Sudan 
has assumed alarming proportions because of the huge price differen- 
-tials that exist between domestic and border prices. " 
13 
Export taxes also reduced exports through diversion of 
the produce to the local market which was made more profitable through 
the distorting effect of such taxes. The distortion introduced by 
export taxes into the structure of incentives was in fact, more serious, 
if looked at in the context of rural-urban migration already present. 
The structure of incentives should be such as to encourage peasants 
to stay and produce more agricultural commodities, both to feed the 
urban centres, and to export. Export taxes, especially on agricultural 
products, although there is a strong case for them, tend to achieve 
undesirable results, namely, reducing agricultural output and encour- 
-aging migration to the urban centres, which increases unemployment 
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and strains the already stretched social services. 
5.6.3. Gum Arabic. 
Between 1966 and 1976, gum Arabic exports fell drastically 
in absolute terms. Exported quantities fell to 30 % of their 1966 
level and the percentage share of gum in value of exports, fell from 
I0.3 % to 5.3 % in 1975" In the world market, although demand and 
prices were rising, the Sudanese share fell by 50 % in ten years. 
Of the major export commodities considered here, gum Arabic had the 
worst performance. Indeed, it is the only one which registered an 
average decline of 4% annually during the period, with regard to 
quantity exports. One question may now be posed, namely, whether 
the Sudanese authorities had control over factors which contributed 
to such a dismal performance, or whether such variables were beyond 
government control because they were either foreign induced, or due 
to climatic conditions. 
On the demand side, gum Arabic is used mainly in the 
food industry (confectionery), and to a minor extent (2. ) in cosmetic 
and pharmaceutical industries. As an industrial raw material constit- 
-uting only a small proportion of total costs, its price elasticity 
is bound to be lour. But the steady increase in incomes and the stan- 
-dard of living in advanced countries (main customers), that resulted 
in an expanded market for confectionery, ensured an expanding market 
for gum Arabic as well. The Sudan, with its dominant share in the 
world market, could be expected to exercise some monopoly power, 
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without pushing prices too high to make it possible for high cost 
producers to enter the market, or for industrial substitutes to be 
developed. The evidence, however, suggests that this did not happen. 
Sudanese FOB prices were stagnant, increasing at a rate of 2% to 
7% between 1960 - 1970 and only when Sudanese exports (and production) 
fell sharply in 1973 - 1975, did prices respond as expected. But this 
sharp rise was not to be maintained. Sudan, with a smaller share, but 
still a price leader, fixed prices at 30 % below their 1974 levels. 
This decision was taken by the Gum Arabic Corporation on the evidence 
that international demand had actually fallen in the face of a price 
increase of more than 220 % in 1974 over 1973. It was also feared 
that the expensive natural gum might give rise to synthetic substi- 
tutes which although lacking some of the natural characteristics, 
are expected to be 30 % cheaper, and more importantly, nearer to 
main users. Proximity gives them (synthetic substitutes) an important 
advantage over natural gum, because the latter is costly in trans- 
-portation (bulky and heavy), and the manufacturers contracted deli- 
-very dates are less certain, in view of the internal transportation 
difficulties. In any case, the fall in quantities of gum exports was 
unplanned, because this did not result in any price increases for 
Sudanese gum in world markets. Moreover, the fall in the Sudanese 
share of the market was picked up by other countries like Nigeria, 
and previously marginal exporters like Ethiopia. 
On the supply side, the undisputed fact was that both 
exports and production fell sharply. In the five years between 1967/68 
- 1972/73 production fell by 53 % and exports by 30 %. The factor 
cited as a cause for this drop was the weather conditions. While it 
9 
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was true that there were severe droughts during some of these years 
which would have affected production, they could hardly have accoun- 
ted for the continuous decline (. 50 %) -in both production and exports 
during this period; after all, the natural climatic conditions have 
always been present. Other more controllable factors may also have 
been responsible for the decline in production and exports. 
Gum Arabic is a tree product whose production is affect- 
ed by drought, locusts and other natural hazards. In Sudan; the sup- 
ply of gum seems to be affected by the particularly difficult condi- 
tions under which production takes place. Gum is grown on wild (un- 
cultivated) trees in the Savanna zone. The trees are thorny, and di- 
fficult to tap, and the journey to the forest itself is long and ri- 
sky, considering the chronic shortage of drinking water, which some- 
times has to be stored in tree trunks and; 
... In many cases, gum collectors spend much of their money income in buying water which is 
transported from long distanees. " 
(Beshai 1976; P. 115). 
In view of this, an effective promotional measure might have been 
government investment in ways to alleviate the drinking water prob- 
lem, transportation from production areas to main markets and the 
cultivation of gum trees. Attempts at the latter in the form of 
trial gum plantations have been started by the Gum Research Divis- 
ion of the Forestry Department, but otherwise; 
"... since the Second World War there has hardly 
been any government investment in the gum ind- 
ustry. " 
(Awooda 1974; P. 18) 
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Another equally important policy pertains to prices 
received by gum producers. A look at Table (5.13) reveals that the 
average export levy on gum during the last decade was'over 35 %. 
Moreover, domestic producer prices which were observed by Beshai 
(1976) to be fluctuating at a rate of nearly twice that of export 
prices in an earlier period have shown little change e. g. Appendix 
Table (A) shows that producer prices in 1974/75 were nearly 
three times those of 1973/74, while 197.5/76 prices were less than 
half those of 1974/75. The combined, effects of these policy induced 
factors on gum production and exports seems not altogether neglig- 
ible. 
Between 1960 - 1970, the area under cotton in Gezira 
increased by 28 gib, and casual workers doubled. Traditionally, these 
workers were recruited from the Western Provinces, Kordofan and 
Darfur which together account for more than half ofýthe gum prod- 
uction. Results of a Survey conducted in the area in 1972 
14 
showed 
that 35 % of gum producers migrated to the Gezira area, and to other 
urban centres, where the pay and living conditions seemed better. 
This seems to have directly contributed to the sharp fall in overall 
production (in Kordofan, the largest production area, the production 
in 1972/73 fell to 25 % of its 1967/68 level (Awooda 1974)). 
In addition to the physical movement of producers to al- 
ternative opportunities, the high levy (Table 5.13) may have also(as 
expected) affected both production (lower produce) and exports (less 
quantities in the auction markets). It was pointed out that (Ali(1978) 
First National Anti-Smuggling Conference 1975) the high differential 
between domestic and border prices, have encouraged smuggling to 
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neighbouring countries. Indeed, it was strongly suggested that the 
increased share of Ethiopia in the world market is die mainly to 
the smuggling of Sudanese gum across the border to Ethiopia. 
Thus despite the effect of climatic conditions on gum 
production (and exports) other factors (more controllable) may also 
have contributed to the unsatisfactory performance of gum exports. 
5.7 Conclusions. 
As was shown in the previous sections, export earnings 
grew at a satisfactory rate throughout the period, despite the fact 
that the FYP targets were not achieved, thanks (mainly) to rising 
export prices in world markets. The question still remains, whether 
earnings could have grown even higher had plan targets been met (see 
Table 5.2), 'depending on how markets, where Sudan holds a sizeable 
share, would react. One thing seems certain, however, and that is 
the relatively good export performance was only partially policy in- 
duced. 
There were two areas of action open to the government, 
with regard to export promotion activities =- 
(a) to eliminate the obvious bias against agriculture in' 
general, and exports in particular (see Chapter Eight 
on ERP) through subsidies or reduction-in export taxes. 
(b) to tackle the difficulties which slow down the growth 
of the export sector. 
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With regard to the first, the government did introduce the subsidy 
scheme (15 %) in March 1972, (but excluded two major export commo- 
dities from the scheme) and soon after, introduced, other levies 
(e. g. the development tax) and raised the rail charge by 30 %, so 
that in the end the subsidy did little to change prices received 
by producers and exporters. The result was that either less was 
produced (e. g. gum Arabic) or the produce was smuggled to neighb- 
ouring countries (oil-seeds and gum). In both cases, this affected 
export earnings adversly. 
With regard to the difficulties facing the export sec- 
tor, the authorities were successful in solving some of them. Thus 
after the re-organization of the trade sector (1970) the Marketing 
Boards, together with the Ministry of Commerce, succeeded in impr- 
oving the quality and grading of Sudanese exports considerably. A 
more effective producer price policy was also achieved (oil-seeds), 
by intervention in the auction markets, when prices fell below the 
minimum price. Regarding the chronic transport problem, although 
serious attention had been devoted to this in the amended FYP, the 
fruits of such efforts have yet to appear.. The authorities might 
have helped exports considerably, had they coupled this welcome 
step (investing in transport) by more direct incentives for the 
export sector e. g. increasing and extending the subsidy element of 
the exchange tax/subsidy scheme or reducing levies on exports. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
IMPORT POLICY 
r 
6.1. Introduction. 
Although ad hoc controls over imports existed since 1966, 
an elaborate licencing system for both public and private imports 
came into being only in 1972.1 This system now determines both vol- 
ume and composition of imports. Detailed formulations of import plans 
rest with various bodies depending on end - users. Thus, government 
imports are formulated by the budget section in the Ministry of Fina- 
nce and National Economy; import requirements of domestic manufactur- 
ing industry are estimated by the Department of Industry ( Ministry 
of Industry and Mining), and private sector commercial imports are 
estimated by the Import Administration, Ministry of Commerce and Sup- 
ply. All three send in their estimates to the Foreign Exchange Budget 
Committee (FEBC), for final approval and it is the function of the 
Committee to match foreign exchange earnings and expenditures planned 
for the coming fiscal year. 
Like most less developed countries (LDCs), Sudan has expe- 
rienced balance of payments difficulties for a long time. The balance 
of payments was in deficit for more than fifteen consecutive years, 
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(with the exception of small surpluses of £1.6m. in 1969, and £9m. 
in 1973), and by 1976/77, the deficit was £85.5m. which was nearly 
half of the export proceeds for the same year. Again, like most 
LDCs, foreign exchange earnings depend on a few primary commodities. 
These are, namely, cotton, sesame, groundnuts and gum Arabic, as we 
have seen in Chapter Five. 
2 
It is known that primary exports have at least three fa- 
ctors which considerably affect their international prices and gro- 
wth. First, they are affected by climatic conditions (sesame, grou- 
ndnuts and gum Arabic are rainfed products, and therefore these are 
particularly affected in Sudan), and secondly, if exportable surplus 
is sizeable, international demand is characterized by being income 
inelastic above certain levels for most primary commodities. Thirdly, 
synthetic substitutes are effectively competing with, and successfully 
displacing primary products in their traditional markets. 
While this is the case with primary exports, and hence flu- 
ctuations in their foreign exchange proceeds, imports in LDCs conti- 
nue to grow at an ever increasing rate. Among other things, this hap- 
pens as the economy grows and patterns of expenditure change (towards 
goods of a non-subsistence level nature), and as people move from a 
nomadic non-monetized economy to modern economic modes of production, 
and from rural to urban areas. Thus, the tendency towards the chronic 
deficit in the balance'of payments develops to give evidence of a dom- 
inant foreign exchange " gap " in the economy. 
Many countries which found themselves in such circumstances 
resorted to quantative restrictions. In such a situation, foreign exc- 
hange earnings are so valuable that it was found to be " unjustifiable" 
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for market forces to be left to squander it. Governments consider 
their judgement as to economic priorities to represent the "soci- 
al welfare function" of the country as a whole, and hence the all- 
ocation of the available foreign exchange is put under the direct 
supervision of a governmental body. Such a responsibility in Sudan, 
rests with the FEBC, whose function is to dispose of expected for- 
eign exchange earnings in the optimal manner. The Committee, betw- 
een March and June every year, prepares estimates of both foreign 
exchange earnings and expenditures. In performing this job, it re- 
quires the co-operation of all units involved in the import and ex- 
port trade, be they government or private. 
As soon as the Committee was formed, it became clear that 
export proceeds could not satisfy current imports and debt service. 
Different foreign exchange budgets submitted to the Committee for 
approval, for both public and private sector had to be substantially 
reduced to match available foreign exchange. Many of the cuts, how- 
ever, were borne by private sector imports. To satisfy the demand 
for such commodities for which no foreign exchange was earmarked, un- 
der the original scheme, the Import Administration at the Ministry 
of Commerce, whose function is to make available different commodi- 
ties at reasonable prices, introduced " new systems " of importing 
such commodities. These were; (1) Suppliers credits; (2) Barter 
trade and (3) Nil-value. 
In what follows, we will first give a detailed descript- 
ion of the working of the import regime. This will be rather lengthy, 
but since no other previous work has provided a description, it is 
thought worthwhile to do so. After that, an analysis of the system 
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and its effects and implications will be attempted. 
6.2 The Foreign Exchange Budget Committee and Foreign Exchange 
Allocations. 
With foreign exchange in short supply, it became incre- 
asingly necessary to closely supervise foreign exchange expenditures. 
In an informal way, such supervision was carried out since 1967 by 
the exchange control section of the Bank of Sudan. On the earnings 
side, regulations required that all export earnings be surrendered 
to the Bank of Sudan (the central bank) at the official exchange 
rate. 
2 On the imports side, directives were sent by the exchange 
control section, and meetings were held between the Bank officials 
and units directly involved in imports, to set the import levels, 
government and private, according to available foreign exchange. 
In January 1972, however, the Foreign Exchange Budget 
Committee (FEBC) was officially formed, and stationed in the Min- 
istry of Finance and National Economy. 
3 The main objectives of the 
Committee were (a) to make available basic essential commodities= 
(b). to achieve control over all expenditure items to ensure exter- 
nal balance and (c) to allocate foreign exchange over priorities 
set by overall economic policy. 
To achieve its objectives, the secretariat of the Comm- 
ittee prepares, between March and June every year, the foreign ex- 
change budget. This is a top secret document that shows an up to 
date account of the country's foreign exchange position. In prepa- 
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ring the foreign exchange budget, the Committee carefully estimates 
foreign exchange earnings and receipts for the year ahead. 
In allocating residual foreign exchange between the three 
budgets (government imports, private sector commercial imports and 
private sector industrial requirements), the Committee inevitably 
makes cuts in all three provisional budgets to match them with avai- 
lable foreign exchange. First, government imports are considered. 
These include among other things, commodities such as wheat and su- 
gar (government monopolies), together with spare parts, current unit 
imports (replacement of cars) and development projects needs. Less 
cuts are expected here, due to the nature of the goods, and because 
before they are submitted to the Committee, they are supposed to have 
been scaled down by the budget section of the Ministry of Finance, in 
its bilateral discussions with different government departments bef- 
ore the inclusion of the unit's requirements in the foreign exchange 
budget. Both industrial sector requirements and private sector comm- 
ercial imports are subject to considerable reductions. It is not un- 
common for such budgets to be cut by as much as half or two thirds, 
as the files of the FEBC show. 
Industrial sector requirements are discussed bilateraly 
between the FEBC and officials of the Ministry of Industry and Min- 
ing. Cuts are made on the basis of unreasonableness of the estimates 
of the Ministry of Industry, which includes movements of world pri- 
ces and newly licenced factories. In any case, the previous year's 
actual imports are taken as a basis, with the major determining fa- 
ctor being how much foreign exchange could be made available to man- 
ufacturing industry. For commercial private sector imports, provis- 
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tonal estimates submitted by the Import Administration are made on 
an item basis (altogether there are 87 commodity groups). Commero- 
ial imports themselves, are divided into three categories (see 6. $ 
below); Open General Licence imports, Quota System Commodities and 
the Consultation Group of Commodities. The first two categories, 
which include some important commodities (e. g. spare parts, medic- 
ine) or seasonal goods (agricultural machinery, insecticides and 
fertilizers) bear fewer cuts, while commodities falling in the th- 
ird category (generally considered less vital) are reduced more, 
and in some cases no foreign exchange at all is allocated to them. 
Irrespective of the effort put into the foreign exchange 
budget preparation, there are certain factors which contribute to 
making the document less reliable as a guide to earnings of foreign 
exchange, and the way it is spent. Such factors are found with re- 
gard to both sides of the budget (receipts and payments). Consider 
first the receipts side. Sudan exports consist mainly of cotton and 
other primary commodities. Exports other than cotton are rainfed, 
and thus their production tends to fluctuate from one year to ano- 
ther, according to climatic conditions. When production is low, do- 
mestic consumption accounts for a large proportion, thereby reducing 
the exportable surplus considerably. If the rainfall is good, and 
high crops are predicted, the Committee then makes contacts with the 
Sudan railways for the possibility of transporting-: the produce from 
production centres to Port Sudan. This is not always possible. 
4 
In 
the circumstances, the Committee sometimes has to scale down estim- 
ates made by the Marketing Boards of export commodities by as much 
as 40 %, 
5 
and at other times it only has to take into account exports 
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already contracted. 
Next, consider foreign exchange payments. Imports in 
both the government and the private sector have elements which ca- 
use considerable uncertainity as to the exact amount of projected 
payments. Imports by government units could be financed either from 
loans already contracted (by the unit concerned, or the government), 
through importing under (a) bilateral trade agreements 
6 
or (b) di- 
rectly from foreign exchange earnings. More often than not, however, 
government units do not specify the financial source of their import 
requirements, so to be on the safe side, the Committee may either 
consider all such imports as claims against current foreign exchange 
earnings, or enter into long correspondance with the different units 
involved. When time is of the essence, the former is taken. 
For private sector imports the situation is much worse. 
Licences for private sector imports are issued at the Import Admini- 
stration, the Ministry of Commerce. Licences must be franked (valida- 
ted) by the exchange control section in the Bank of Sudan, before 
commercial banks can open letters of credit for them. Even after the 
licences have been franked, commercial banks may not guarrantee imm- 
ediate action (due to the lack of foreign exchange). The situation, 
is such that at any point in time, the Ministry of Commerce does not 
know the exact supply situation in the country, and the Bank of Sud- 
an does not know its foreign exchange obligations. Let us trace the 
reasons for this. 
Licences issued by the Ministry of Commerce, may not all 
be handed in for franking. This happens because of the presence of 
many " brief-case " importers. The objective of this category is to 
-1$1- 
sell their import licences at a premium (i. e. they are not the final' 
licence users). Other licence holders may be genuine importers, but 
the licence value is so small that it renders importing uneconomic, 
(in which case they may also be looking to sell). However, problems 
remain for the remainder of the issued licences which pass to the 
exchange control authority, for franking. Licences are franked only 
if the monetary ceilings stipulated for them by the foreign exchange 
budget are not yet exhausted (the exception being commodities under 
the Open General Licence). Licences for commodities where stipulated 
amounts have been exhausted, are retained by the exchange control au- 
thorities. 
Franked licences are then returned to different commercial 
banks for final processing. But opening letters of credit for franked 
licences depends on the foreign exchange situation in the commercial 
bank concerned. 
8 
Commercial banks in turn set their own priorities 
with regard to whom and to which commodities letters of credit are to 
be opened. Such priorities are similar in both the Ministry of Comm- 
erce and the Bank of Sudan. The former issues immediatly, licences 
for the Open General Licence imports for any eligible importer, and 
for any amount, as such imports (spare parts, medical and-pharmaeceu- 
tical equipment, powdered milk, etc. ) are considered essential. The 
latter usually franks such licences, even if the stipulated amounts 
are exceeded. However, commercial banks do not always abide by such 
priorities. 
9 Evidence strongly suggests that commercial banks give 
preference to at least two categories of importers; (a) those who 
have long been customers and (b) those importers who also happen to 
be exporters, (i. e. foreign exchange earners) lest they move to ano- 
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ther bank which would give them preferential treatment. In-such a 
situation, new importers, however serious they are, and however 
important the commodities for which they have licences, are doomed 
to wait longer in the queue, before accounts are opened for them. 
Thus, while more than one body is involved in deciding 
the level and composition of imports on paper, the most influential 
body in determining the final composition of private sector imports 
seems to be the commercial banks. The net result of this is that 
the time-lags between the dates of licence issue, and the final ar- 
rival date of imported commodity can not be determined with any ce- 
rtainity, and consequently it is impossible to estimate the foreign 
exchange that is needed to cover already contracted imports. 
6.3 Government Imports. 
Imports of different government departments and parast- 
atal organizations are determined within the budgeting process it- 
self (i. e. import allotments are explicitly stated within finit bu- 
dgets). Import requests are submitted to the budget section (Mini- 
stry of Finance) which, before forwarding them for final approval 
to the FEBC, scrutinizes them and scales them down, if necessary, 
through joint meetings with representatives of different units. The 
foreign exchange Committee, in its desire to reach a balance betw- 
een foreign exchange expenditure and receipts has to scale down 
all imports. Government imports, however, are treated favourably, 
and are seldom drastically cut. 
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As from February 1971, all government imports were bro- 
ught under licence. The 1957 Import Act was amended for this purp- 
ose. This step was made necessary in order to prevent government 
units from unilateraly contracting loans that are not made known 
to the Bank of Sudan at the time. Indebtedness from such loans st- 
ood at £114m. in 1972/73.10 
Under the new arrangements, government imports are cla- 
ssified into; (a) current and (b) development imports. Before 
the Bank of Sudan approval is secured, an import licence must be 
issued by the Import Administration (Ministry of Commerce), and be 
presented. An application (by the department concerned) for a cur- 
rent import licence (e. g. office equipment, spare parts, new cars) 
must be accompanied by the initial approval of the Purchase section 
of the Ministry of Finance, together with the necessary pro forma 
invoices (to check quoted prices with prevailing ones). Imports for 
development projects must have, over and above, the written appro- 
val of the Ministry of Planning (which is in charge of development 
projects). 
6.4 Foreign Exchange Requirements of the Industrial Sector. 
Estimates of the manufacturing sector's foreign exchange 
requirements are the responsibility of the Council for Industrial 
Control in the Ministry of Industry. The department of Industry 
within the Ministry, on behalf of the Council, considers the needs 
of existing industrial establishments (each case separately), con- 
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cerning raw materials, replacements or new machinery and spare 
parts. In doing so, it is guided by the latest foreign prices of 
these materials and machinery, and their expected future price 
movements. Newly licenced projects are then considered and their 
requirements added. 
The Ministry of Industry (as all other units do in ca- 
ses of rationing) is thought to overestate the estimates, since it 
is known that the FEBC will scale down submitted estimates. After 
the first provisional estimate has been scaled down considerably, 
the department of Industry is then left with the task of re-allo- 
cating available funds between competing claimants. With less fo- 
reign exchange approved than is originally estimated, this is not 
an easy task. Officials, by a rule of thumb basis, in turn scale 
down their detailed estimates. The extent to which each establish- 
ment's requirements are reduced, depends on how essential its pro- 
ducts are. Essentiality is a vague term, but generally there are 
some sectors which are treated more favourably than others, e. g. 
cement, textiles and sugar, and the most favourably treated are 
the fully protected industries, because competing imports are ban- 
ned altogether. 
An industrialist whose establishment is already in prod- 
uction, or in the final stages of construction, can fill in an ap- 
lication form to import raw materials, machinery, or spare parts. 
The department of Industry (Industrial Licencing Section) before 
approving the application, scrutinizes the form w1iich has to comply 
with the specifications of the industrial establishment for which 
the application is made. It will be rejected if, for instance, mat- 
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erials required are not strictly appropriate for the establishment. 
If the form is for importing machinery, then checks would have to 
be made to see whether the necessary buildings have been completed 
or not, because machinery could not be erected in open spaces. The 
composition of required imports in the form is also subject to ch- 
ecks. A Manual showing input structures in the production process 
for different products, is available. If the Manual states that in 
e. g. the perfumery industry, the ratio of packing materials to ch- 
emicals should be 3: 2, then any composition that markedly diverges 
from the above ratio may be rejected. In any case, whenever grounds 
for suspicion exist, as to the performance of any establishment, a 
visit to the factory is made. This, however, tends to be an acade- 
mic exercise. Due to lack of transport cars for tte Ministry offi- 
cials, factory managers are requested to supply a car to take the 
Ministry official for an on-the-spot inspection of the factory. The 
basic reason for the visit (element of surprise) is thus nullified. 
Another method to check the mis-use of foreign exchange, is to lock 
some materials in stores with the keys remaining in the Ministry. 
This is the case with items which could be used both as inputs, and 
final products. A frequently quoted example, is cloth for ready made 
clothing factories, which could also be sold to retailers for made- 
to-measure purposes. Such items are released to their owners in re- 
corded amounts, -so that no fraudulent practices can occur. Generally 
speaking, foreign exchange is allocated with reference to installed 
capacity, irrespective of the efficiency of the firm concerned, qua- 
lity of its product, or contribution made to exports. 
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6.5 Private Sector Commercial Imports: Imports Against Payments. 
6.5.1 Introduction. 
Private sector imports are processed by the import admin- 
istration at the Ministry of Commerce. The function of the administ- 
ration, as seen by its officials, is to make available different co- 
mmodities in reasonable quantities and at appropriate times to sati- 
sfy expected domestic needs. In order to perform such a job, the ad- 
ministration makes an estimate of the foreign exchange required for 
the importation of different commodity groups. There are 87 groups 
altogether. For each individual commodity, a simple five-year average 
(last five years) of actual imports is computed, and subjected to ad- 
justments (upwards or downwards) according to special factors affec- 
ting it. The estimate of foreign exchange to be allocated is adjusted 
downwards if e. g. an increase in home supply is expected from a good 
harvest, or if new factories are coming into production. More freque- 
ntly, however, estimates are adjusted upwards, due to strong effects 
outside the control of the country, for example, inflation in the co- 
untries of origin. 
The Import Administration prepares provisional estimates 
of foreign exchange requirements of the private sector, according to 
the above criteria. It also plans and sets a time-table (schedule) 
of foreign exchange utilization. The schedule for each commodity de- 
pends on the nature of the commodity concerned. Thus special attent- 
ion is paid to seasonal commodities such as blankets and insecticides. 
The Muslim country - specific commodities such as those for Ramadan 
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(fasting month) also get the same treatment. In fact, authorities 
make sure that such commodities are imported at the right time by 
asking major importers (by telephone if necessary) to apply for 
licences if time is running short. This is all on the assumption 
that the main system of importing is " import against payments ". 
Under this system, commodities are classified into three categor- 
ies : - 
(a) The Open General Licence. 
(b) The Annual Quota System. 
(c) The Consultation Group of Commodities. (CGC) 
6.5.2 The Open General Licence. 
Commodities classified under this category are those 
which are considered essential, from the Import Administration 
point of view, and for which shortages cannot be tolerated. Any 
registered importer can apply for the importation of the OGL goods. 
Licences are issued throughout the year with the full amount appl- 
ied for, even if that exceeds the monetary limit specified for the 
goods by the foreign exchange budget.. The sole criteria for the co- 
mmodity to be on the OGL list is its importance ( or essentiality) 
as judged by the importing authorities, and very rarely do commod- 
ities change category towards the OGL. Rather, commodities enter 
the Quota list and the CGC list from OGL, if domestic' production 
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becomes available. 
The main commodity groups under this category are; sp- 
are parts, medicine and pharmaeceutical equipment, babies milk and 
food, industrial sector needs, (after Ministry of Industry approval) 
petroleum products and the needs of petroleum companies (also after 
Ministry of Industry approval). 
6.5.3 The Annual Quota System. 
Commodities are classified under this category, mostly 
on the merits of each separate commodity group. Commodities enter 
the quota list from OGL or CGC, if domestic production satisfies 
part of the market. The monetary ceiling is determined so that the 
shortage in the market is satisfied. Other commodities entering the 
Quota list are demanded seasonally. These include agricultural mach- 
inery, fertilizers and insecticides, sacks, blankets and sweaters 
for winter, fresh fruits to arrive after local produce disappears 
from the market, and in ample time, before the Fast begins, supplies 
for the religious festival of Ramadan. 
11 The foreign exchange lim- 
its suggested for these commodities are guided mainly by actual im- 
ports in the last five years. Generally, the Quota list commodities 
are considered to be essential, but not to the degree which woum 
put them under the OGL. In fact, some could indeed be placed under 
the OGL, had it not been for the refusal of the Bank of Sudan auth- 
orities, as it would increase the burden on the strained foreign 
exchange resources. 
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Having decided upon commodities to import under the 
Annual Quota system, the Import Administration is faced with the 
task of allocating the foreign exchange earmarked for each comm- 
odity, among eligible importers. Potential profits accruing to 
quota licence holders should not be underestimated. Thus, a large 
number of applicants are expected, and criteria in issuing licences 
have to be established. There are two things to be considered. Fi- 
rstly, in order to avoid the accruance of potential Quota profits 
to a limited number of importers, licences must be issued to the 
largest possible number of applicants. Secondly, the nature of Qu- 
ota commodities is such that they need to be imported at certain 
times (seasonably), and, therefore, sufficient evidence of intent 
to utilize issued licences must be shown to exist. 
Eligible importers are invited to apply through press 
notices, broadcast first on the radio, to allow equal chances for 
all (and not just to favour those importers in close proximity to 
the Ministry of Commerce). The press notices also appear in all 
daily newspapers, and are sent to the chambers of commerce in the 
different provincial capitals. Each commodity is offered only once 
a year, and interested importers are invited to apply. In most ca- 
ses the press notices are served at the same time each year. Crit- 
eria on which final decision on allocation between importers are 
made, are suggested by the sub-section within the Import Administ- 
ration, which deals with the commodity in question 
12 
and are alt- 
ered or approved, without alteration, as it passes through the hi- 
erachy (up to Ministerial level if necessary). 
In general, however, the basic criteria which govern 
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the allocation of foreign exchange between importers, are as foll- 
ows : - 
(a) Importers are divided (and ranked) into three categories 
(1,2, and 3) according to their previous actual import re- 
cord. for that particular commodity (usually the last five 
years). 
(b) For income distribution considerations, all-importers who 
apply end up with a share in the quota, but principal (gr- 
ade 1) importers are given larger shares to ensure adequate 
supplies. 
13 If the initial quota value is small, new app- 
licants are barred altogether, because otherwise only li- 
cences of little value would be issued to each importer, 
with the result that many would not be utilized. Public 
corporations or co-operative societies applying for a sh- 
are of the quota are given favourable treatment, and are 
ranked higher than estäblished importers. In any case, 
the total value of licences issued may not exceed the for- 
eign exchange limit for the commodity. 
(c) The number of applications is minimized in two ways (i) by 
omitting applications made before the press notices (i. e. 
in anticipation or due to a leak) or after the closing 
date and (ii) by omitting those which contravene current 
regulations concerning certain countries. 
The possible effects of the use of the above criteria will be dis- 
cussed below (section 6.7). 
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6.5.4 The Consultation Group of Commodities. 
Commodities falling into this category are all those 
which did not qualify to enter the other two lists. Generally, 
they are considered to be less important, also foreign exchange 
earmarked for each commodity group is smaller than that which 
could be allocated through a quota system. Like OGL commodities, 
applications for the CGC imports are made throughout the year, 
but unlike the OGL commodities, foreign exchange ceilings are 
not allowed to be exceeded. 
The criteria for allocating specified foreign exchange 
for each commodity among different importers, leaves much to be 
desired. This is what is supposed to happen. Applications are ac- 
cepted throughout the year, and are discussed at periodical meet- 
ings, with such people as senior inspectors, heads of sub-sections, 
and the Deputy Under-Secretary for imports. Decisions by the per- 
iodical meetings are guided by the latest market " intelligence " 
reports (conducted jointly with the supply administration), 
14 
as 
to the supply of the commodity(s) concerned. Special attention is 
also paid to the foreign exchange position in general, (such that 
smaller or larger amounts of initial allotment are issued) and to 
the source of origin of suggested imports, so that re-direction 
is made from hard currency sources to bi-lateral sources, if that 
were possible. 
However, periodical meetings rarely occur in practice. 
15 
Instead, a memorandum proceedure has been established. 'Head sect- 
ions (when they see fit) send memoranda up the hierarchy, to the 
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Deputy Under-Secretary for Imports, regarding their recommendat- 
ions as to which commodities (and to whom) licences should be is- 
sued, together with licence value specifications, for each impor- 
ter. Head sections decide on the timing of licence issue, depend- 
ant on market conditions. Due to the large number of commodities, 
it is not feasible, of course, to conduct market surveys for each 
separate commodity. This leaves it open to detect the market sit- 
uation, mainly by the frequency of inquiries, on behalf of import- 
ers, and their informed opinion. 
Licences are issued for any importer who applies, as 
these are not specialist imports, like most of the quota items. 
As foreign exchange earmarked for each commodity is not disposed 
of all in one memorandum (or meeting), a major criterion for the 
non-issue of a licence to a particular importer] is that of a re- 
peat application (an importer who has been issued with a licence 
in a previous shipment) is omitted. Previous record of imports al- 
so counts, because this indicates the genuineness of an importer, 
and his financial' capacity. 
16 
It is understood that a major objective of the Import 
Administration as a whole, and the responsibility of the head-sec- 
tions in particular, is to see that the commodities are available 
in the market at the right time, and at prices within the reach of 
the widest possible range of population. Accordingly, the inspect- 
ors and the Head sections rely heavily on the previous record and 
the inspector's personal knowledge of importers. Even though the 
CGC needs no particular experience of importing, even here it is 
known that there exists a category of " established " importers. 
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An ". established " importer normally gets a larger share than in 
his previous year. 
6.6 The'New-Systems'. 
6.6.1 Barter Trade. 
(i) Border Trade. 
Sudan borders eight countries, and traditionally, one 
or another form of barter trade has existed between tribes, who, 
in most cases are related, but living in two countries. Money is 
often not used by some of the tribes concerned. Thus, out of ne- 
cessity, and since it is difficult to stop such transactions, so- 
me form of legality needed to be introduced, so as to curb large 
scale smuggling. Such trade also served to supply remote areas 
with commodities which otherwise would have to be transported 
thousands of miles from the capital. 
The Ministry of Commerce thus laid down criteria as to 
the types of commodities to be exchanged through barter. Items to 
be exported should ;- 
(a) Be produce of Sudan. Re-exports are not allowed, so as 
not to increase claims on meagre foreign exchange res- 
ources. 
- i64 - 
(b) Items should also be surplus items. Thus it is illegal 
to export commodities in short supply at home. 
(c) Commodities allowed under the barter system should not 
include commodities that are established in internati- 
onal markets. (e. g. gum Arabic, sesame, cotton, ground- 
nuts) In such an eventuality, it is thought that the 
country loses foreign exchange to neighbouring countr- 
ies. 17 
With regard to Barter imports, rules are also laid do- 
wn. Imports should not, for example, include items from the tot- 
ally banned list. 
(ii) Town-Barter. 
This is a relatively new type of barter trade and is 
being increasingly encouraged by the authorities. According to 
this type, barter trade is now permitted with countries who have 
no borders with Sudan. Ad a result, the volume of barter trade 
increased nearly four times between 1972/73 and 1976/77. 
A major reason put forward in support of the new pol- 
icy, 18 was that it served as an export promotion policy. Commo- 
dities were allowed under " town barter " to be introduced in new 
markets, and, in time, it was hoped, they would establish thems- 
elves as exports. Depending on each commodity's position in the 
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convertible currency markets, the authorities decide whether a1 
commodity should be allowed the " status " of full barter, or if 
part of the proceeds be surrendered in convertible currencies. 
Generally, commodities move from being traded on full barter ba- 
sis, to partial barter, and not the other way round. Cases in 
point are honey and watermelons, for which the exporter must su- 
rrender 50 % of the proceeds at the official exchange rate, and 
is allowed the other 50 % for buying imports on tie barter import 
list; and ivory for which 70 % must be paid in convertible curr- 
encies. 
Imports allowed under town-barter are also restricted 
in that they should be the produce of the countries concerned. 
Pro forma invoices for both exports and imports should accompany 
application forms, to allow authorities price comparisons. The 
regulations laid down by the import Administration regarding ba- 
rter trade, reasonably cover possible abuses and side effects of 
the policy. Under these regulations, only surplus items are lic- 
enced for export under barter to avoid acute shortages at home, 
and only commodities originating from countries with which barter 
is carried out, are licenced for imports. These rules, however, 
have not been strictly kept. Two main reasons may be mentioned. 
The Bank of Sudan, whose responsibility it is to foll- 
ow up the dual operation of exporting and importing by any part- 
icular barter-licence holder, does not require that barter impor- 
ters must present documents, showing that they have actually ex- 
ported the licenced items. The result is that barter commodities 
are instead, financed by barter-licence hoders through nil-value, 
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after obtaining the necessary finance. This in itself, is less 
serious than the possibility of not repatriating barter export 
proceeds in the same year, or not reporting them at all, a po- 
ssibility which can not be ruled out, since there is no machinery 
to follow up the fate of issued licences. 
Another strong influence is the foreign exchange sit- 
uation. Throughout the period, it seemed that authorities encou- 
raged the satisfaction of domestic market needs by imports from 
sources other than current foreign exchange earnings. As is (will 
be) seen throughout this Chapter, no effort is spared to make the 
maximum possible foreign exchange available for development, ra- 
ther than current purposes. This prime objective found backing in 
the export diversification argument, according to which, town-ba- 
rter exports are hitherto exports in search of markets, either 
because they are unknown internationally, or because their use is 
of a limited nature. In both cases, this led to a loose applicat- 
ion of the rules governing barter trade. 
6.6.2 Suppliers Credits. 
This system was introduced in November 1971. According 
to the announcement of the Import Administration, importers stood 
a better chance of obtaining licences the longer the payment per- 
iod, and the lower the interest rate. Imports allowed under this 
system were, at first, mainly investment and related goods, and 
stringent conditions about periods of payment and interest rates 
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were required. Applications, before licences were issued, were 
reviewed by a Committee, mainly to check the prices and terms 
of credit. Before long, however, import authorities allowed the 
list of commodities to include essential consumer goods. Most 
of these were on the quota list, where the authorities made it 
clear that applicants who would finance their Quota shares in the 
form of credits or " nil-value ", would be given priority. Grad- 
ually, not only Quota items but also CGC were allowed to be imp- 
orted under this system, once it became clear that foreign exch- 
ange earmarked for some commodities was actually not available. 
19 
The balance of payments effects of this system were 
known to the Import Administration. Suppliers credits relieve the 
balance of payments only temporarily, and the worse their overall 
terms, the less is the relief. The situation is worse still, if 
credit facilities obtained in such a manner are used for consumer 
and not investment goods. Yet policy makers at the Import Admini- 
stration, caught between future payments, or shortages in basic 
commodities, were forced to extend the list to include consumer 
goods together with investment goods and other manufacturing se- 
ctor needs which failed to be met from foreign exchange budget all- 
ocations. 
6.6.3 Nil-Value Imports. 
The system began as an allowance of not more than £100 
worth of goods, to be imported by incoming travellers without any 
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need for an import licence. The only restriction being that they 
should hot include banned items (for protection purposes). In 
March 1972, it was proposed that the nil-value system be incorp- 
orated in the import regime on a wider, and more organized scale. 
There were two reasons for this, both of which related to the fo- 
reign exchange situation. The first was that the number of Sudan- 
ese emigrants to the oil-rich Arab countries has become quite su- 
bstantial. 20 More important still, was the tendency for this to 
become a permanent phenomenon, and an important one, as the numb- 
ers were on the increase. The potential savings of this emigrant 
labour force had to be attracted to Sudan, to serve as an additi- 
onal (and an important) source of foreign exchange. The nil-value 
system was proposed as one component of an 
incentive package to 
attract such savings. 
21 According to this system, an applicant 
is issued a licence (in value terms) to import certain commodities, 
provided he personally arranges the foreign exchange involved. Such 
amounts presumably come from the applicants own savings when he is 
working abroad. 
The other reason for introducing the system relates to 
the foreign exchange situation in general. The FEBC projected that 
foreign exchange earnings would not suffice to pay the import bill, 
with the ambitious FYP's Development Programme. New means of eas- 
ing pressure on the balance of payments needed to be found. It is 
with this general motive in mind, that the "new systems" were int- 
roduced (although not all at the same time). The latter reason see- 
med the more important. This was indicated by the fact that when 
the system was first introduced, any Sudanese could obtain a nil- 
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value licence, for any quantity and any type of commodity, and 
for any value, without the authorities inquiring into his fin- 
ancial means. The only restrictions on the system were that, like 
other imports they were not exempt from import duties, they sho- 
uld not include banned goods and should not violate general reg- 
ulations on imports, e. g. source must not be from boycott count- 
ries (Israel, South Africa). 
The uncontrolled inflow of nil-value commodities went 
on for less than eighteen months. The value of such commodities 
was £17.8m. in 1972/73 and £29.2m. in 1973/74, whim amounted to 
more than a third of private sector imports. It became obvious 
that such values were considerably larger than savings by Sudan- 
ese nationals abroad (i. e. Mugtaribeen), thus indicating that 
foreign currency used to finance nil-value imports, was obtained 
from other sources (and probably illegally). The system was ter- 
minated for an " in depth review ", 
22 for some time. 
In April 1974, a" new policy " concerning nil-value 
imports was announced. Its purpose was to regulate the system. 
Eligibility criteria for who was entitled to be issued a nil-value 
licence, and for which commodities to be imported were set. The 
New Policy restricted the category of importers to Sudanese work- 
ing abroad only. According to the definition of a" Mugtarib ", 
Sudanese diplomats and students studying abroad were excluded. 
Moreover, to qualify as a" Mugtarib " i. e. Sudanese working abr- 
oad, one required a certificate (Igtrab Certificate) from the app- 
ropriate Sudanese Embassy, to the effect that the person concerned 
was a Sudanese working with a non-Sudanese body in that country. To 
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be issued a nil-value licence for commercial purposes, the appli- 
cant needed to conform with standard regulations binding imports. 
Namely, pro forma invoices stating prices, type of commodity, and 
place of origin were required. Commodities should not be from the 
banned list, or from boycott countries. More specifically, commo- 
dities should come from the nil-value list, issued similtaneously 
with the new policy. Criteria for commodities to enter the nil- 
value list were as follows :- 
(i) Commodities must be essential e. g. lorries, pick-up 
cars, (used as mini-buses) for which little or no 
foreign exchange is earmarked. 
(ii) Commodities whose prices could be ascertained. The 
main restriction applying to all imports of " new 
systems " is that prices should not exceed prices 
of the same goods imported against payments. Thus 
such a list should not include textiles, spare pa- 
rts or fresh fruits, due to the wide ranges and di- 
fferent prices of such commodities. 
(iii) Commodities of high duty revenue e. g. cigarettes, al- 
coholic drinks. 
The above criteria clearly gave room for a wide range 
of commodities, to qualify for nil-value imports. In fact, very 
few examples could be found, which did not satisfy any of the 
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three criteria. The list was expanded even more when an " except- 
ion " clause was introduced, whereby petroleum companies, airlines, 
spraying companies (agricultural spraying) and domestic manufactu- 
ring industries were all allowed to import nil-value items, 'subject 
to the recommendations of the Ministry of Industry (which was read- 
ily available). The press notice announcing the " New Policy " went 
on to say that : - 
"... The list may be amended by addition or omission, 
without prior notice in accordance with economic, 
trading and supply conditions of the country. " 23 
By July 1977,67 out of 87 items were eligible to be 
imported under the nil-value system. They included, among others, 
spare parts, cement, steel, agricultural machinery, matches and 
textiles. Thus, the above criteria, loose as they were, were not 
kept. The expanded list included Quota items (agriculturdl, mach- 
inery and insecticides), commodities on the prohibited list but in 
short supply for some periods, (matches and cement) commodities 
whose prices were difficult to compare and control (textiles). One 
reason why the list was considerably expanded, other than short- 
ages of foreign exchange, was to take into consideration the " Mug- 
taribeen " preferences. Commodities that appeal to them and were 
within reach - considering their resources - were those which could 
be brought in for relatively small amounts (e. g. not cement) and 
which were expected to fetch high prices in a short time (less than 
a Mugtarib's annual holiday). Typical commodities were television 
sets, cassette recorders, radios, women's sandals and " toabs " 
(Sudanese National dress for women). 
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The " New Policy " itself, was again subject to abuse. 
It became apparent that although licences could be issued only to 
the Mugtaribeen, the actual beneficiaries were established impor- 
ters. Most Mugtaribeen have neither the experience in the import 
trade, nor could they find reliable agents at home. It was an easy 
job, therefore, for an importer to buy from a Mugtarib, his for- 
eign savings at a rate slightly higher than the encouragement ex- 
change rate offered by the government, which itself was 50 % above 
the official exchange rate. Thus, according to the Ministry of Co- 
mmerce (government) point of view, one main motive for the introd- 
uction of the nil-value system, as an incentive to repatriate sav- 
ings of the Mugtaribeen, was foiled. Looked at from a different 
point of view, the nil-value system actually repatriates savings 
(in commodity form), whether licences are issued to the Mugtarib- 
een or to registered importers (assuming that they finance such 
licences by collecting savings from the Mugtaribeen). What the go- 
vernment was hoping for, was that the system would help induce em- 
igrants to repatriate some of their foreign savings in monetary 
form (rather than commodities), so that it is spent according to 
national priorities. It is towards this end that the authorities 
continued to legislate for the system. 
Applications for nil-value licences were only considered 
if accompanied by the " Igtrab Certificate ". The central role of 
the certificate led to the development of a market for such docu- 
ments. Igtrab documents were sometimes sold while the Mugtarib him- 
self might have already been resident in Sudan, or he might have 
died. Document prices soared, as their usefulness was manifold. An 
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Igtrab Certificate allows the owner (supposedly, the person to 
whom it originally belonged), to import nil-value commodities, 
and gives him the go-ahead to finance such imports from illegal 
sources, (originally they were taken to be financed from own sa- 
vings abroad). Such sources include under-invoicing (exports), 
over-invoicing (imports), smuggling of Sudanese currency abroad, 
and the smuggling of Sudanese export products, (or other products 
in short-supply at home, to neighbouring countries). Moreover, 
Igtrab Certificates were even more useful. Holders of nil-value 
licences were automatically exempt from registration with the 
Importers Registrar (for a £100 fee), as they were not (as Mugta- 
ribeen), importers by profession. It is implied, therefore, that 
such a person also escapes payment of Business Profit Taxes, with 
the result of considerable losses to the treasury. 
In October 1976, the system was reviewed again, and 
proposals for terminating it altogether, were put forward. Other 
proposals were in favour of stricter criteria for commodities to 
be imported, and for eligible importers. The reviewing Committee 
(internal Ministry of Commerce Committee) advised by the supply 
situation of most commodities, and the foreign exchange allocat- 
ions to different commodity groups, stated explicitly that, it 
was only due to the foreign exchange situation that the nil-value 
system would be allowed to operate (continue to operate), 
24 
and 
that the Committee was in favour of more restrictions. The recom- 
mendations were that the " Igtrab Certificate " should now specify 
both annual income earned by the Mugtarib abroad, and the duration 
of his stay (together with the stamping of used certificates in 
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the Import Administration to render them unmarketable). Moreover, 
actual remittances should be taken as a measure of savings for the 
Mugtarib, and nil-value licences for him should not exceed a mul- 
tiple (perhaps only double) of the remittances. The Committee's' 
recommendations were largely in response to the experience of the 
Import Administration in the past years, and thus were directed to 
close the more obvious loopholes, like the market for ? gtrab cert- 
ificates, and the fact that with one certificate - which does not 
specify either annual income or duration - the holder could be is- 
sued a licence far in excess of his actual financial capabilities. 
A few months after the Reviewing Committee submitted its 
recommendations (February 1977), the Minister of Commerce declared 
that nil-value licences could be issued to registered importers 
(who were the de facto beneficiaries anyway, i. e. no longer for 
Mugtaribeen only) who will in turn finance such imports, "... by co- 
llecting the savings of the Mugtaribeen abroad. " The Ministerial 
decision was also in favour of more specific " Igtrab Certificates ", 
and duly, instructions were sent to the Sudanese Embassies in the 
countries concerned. 
6.7 Evaluation. 
As we have seen in the previous sections, the import 
regime prevailing during the period under consideration, was hi- 
ghly restrictive and varied. Although tariffs were also imposed, 
these tended to be largely for revenue purposes, and licencing 
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was effectively the main method of allocation across importers 
and commodities. A number of reasons were advanced to rationa- 
lize such a complex regime. Thus, while the FEBC was establis- 
hed to 6upervize and allocate the available foreign exchange 
between different users and uses, the " New Systems " were also 
introduced to serve certain purposes. For instance, Barter was 
intended to serve as an export promotion device, Suppliers cre- 
dits were to be used for importing capital goods by the private 
sector and the nil-value was introduced to encourage Sudanese 
working abroad to repatriate their foreign exchange savings. 
A number of questions may now be posed, with regard 
to the effects of such a complex regime on the economy. Some of 
the more obvious questions are; What costs and benefits were as- 
sociated with the regime ? What were its income and distribution 
effects ? How did the level and composition of imports respond 
to the introduction of the " New Systems "? Was the regime co- 
nducive to efficient allocation of resources ? Did the different 
components of the regime serve the purpose they were originally 
introduced to achieve ? 
It will be remembered that the system stipulated that 
all export earnings should be surrendered at the official exchange 
rate which was unfavourable to exporters who could have sold their 
earnings for a much higher price in the black market. Importers, 
on the other hand, received a premium in being allowed to purchase 
foreign exchange at a price far below its scarcity value. This ob- 
vious disincentive to exports might have helped to draw resources 
away from this sector (export) to the commerce sector, where re- 
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turns were much higher. A manifestation of such inflow into the 
commerce sector could be indicated by the fact that during part 
of this period (1972 - 1975), the number of registered importers 
has grown ten times from 400 to 4,000.25 But even within the 
commerce sector, it was the established importers who appropria- 
ted most of the profits associated with licencing. 
The criteria laid down for the issuing of licences un- 
der the Annual Quota system and the CGC was most conducive to this. 
As section (6.5.3) shows, licences for Quota items were allocated 
on a grading system basis, that gave established importers greater 
and increasing shares of the Quota. In addition, they stood a ch- 
ance of buying the shares of tie'nall licence holders. While it 
might be correct to argue that in order to ensure the availability 
of commodities it was necessary to issue established importers with 
larger shares, it should also be remembered that whenever there is 
a Quota, there are potential profits to be reaped, and such a sys- 
tem channels those profits to the most established. Although imp- 
orting commodities under the CGC requires no particular experience, 
as is the case with Quota items, in previous record of actual imp- 
orts tended to ensure the applicant a larger licence value. More- 
over, the grading system under the Quota was not used under the CGC, 
rather, the decisions were taken through a memoranda proceedure, 
that depended very much on the value judgement of the inspector in 
charge, with regard to the seriousness or otherwise of each indivi- 
dual importer. 
The system of issuing licences under the Quota and Con- 
sultation Group of Commodities, therefore strongly suggests that 
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potential licence profits were reaped more by established import- 
ers, thus increasing the already (suspect) skewed income distrib- 
ution. The income distribution issue apart, granting licences in 
proportion to the shares of importing done in some previous repr- 
esentative period, tended to assure relatively inefficient impor- 
ters their historic shares of the market, while restraining others, 
(new) who could have expanded by virtue of greater efficiency, or 
smaller profit margins. 
Under the main import regime, (i. e. imports against pay- 
ments) commodities are classified into the three above mentioned 
categories, Open General Licence, the Quota system and the Consul- 
tation Group of Commodities. A look at Table (6.2) reveals that a 
significant change has occured over the period, with regard to the 
relative shares of the different categories; thus the relative share. 
of OGL, which amounted to only 15.7 % of the 1972/73 private sector 
imports (commercial) rose to 32.2 % by 1976/77 and that of the CGC 
fell from 57.1 ö to 27.4 % in the same period (i. e. fell by thirty 
percentage points). The Quota items share, registered a positive 
change of more than 10 percentage points to 37.4 % in 1976/77. 
Since the Open General Licence and Quota lists are con- 
sidered to be the more important, this might suggest that licences 
were guided towards allocating current foreign exchange available 
away from non-essentials. But this is not the case. OGL items in 
the above Table do not include as essentials industrial sector im- 
ports, since a separate budget for these exists, and thus the res- 
ulting pattern observed (Table ä. 2) does not show a shift towards 
or a preference to investment goods. This could be explained by the 
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fact that in absolute terms, foreign exchange actually, earmarked 
for private sector imports, over the last two years of the period 
1972/73 - 1976/77, has increased by less than the rate of increase 
inforeign exchange earnings. What happened, therefore, seems to be 
that the debt service and other government imports including imp- 
orts for wheat and sugar, etc., have taken higher shares, and (the- 
refore) the budget for the private sector in general, has fallen in 
relative terms. But since the foreign exchange allocated for OGL 
was not cut proportionally (i. e. most cuts on CGC), they assumed a 
higher percentage from a smaller budget. 
The " New Systems " affected the composition of imports 
considerably. Throughout the period, import lists under such a sys- 
tem, were allowed to expand to include new categories. The share of 
the new systems in the value of issued licences has increased from 
19 % to 36.8 % between 1972/73 - 1976/77. The bulk of this amount, 
as would be expected, was in consumer goods. Thus, while the share 
of consumer goods in imports made against payments was-?. 7: 8 % in 
1972/73, this share was 34.9 % out of total value of the licences 
issued for that year, indicating that most of the " New Systems " 
imports were of the consumer goods type. In fact, for that year, 
68 % of licences issued under the " New Systems " were for consumer 
goods. This pattern, however, has changed towards the end of the 
period. The share of consumer goods has risen to 40.7 % in payments 
imports by 1976/77 (see Table6.1) and to 42.1 % out of total imports 
for the same year. At the same time, the share of capital goods in 
imports made against current foreign exchange proceeds has fallen 
from 36.7 % in 1972/73 to 28.6 % in 1976/77 (and from 34.4 % in to- 
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TABLE 6.1 COMMERCIAL LICENCES ISSUED BY THE IMPORT ADMINISTRATION, 
MINISTRY OF COI-EERCE 1972/1973 - 1976/1977. 
Payments 
: m. r 
Nil-Value 
£m. 
Barter 
£m. 
Suppliers TOTAL Credits 
F. M. £m. % 
1972/73 C 28.9 (27.8) 12.9 3.8 - 45.6 (34.9) 
1 38.6 (36.4) 1.1 .2 .2 40.1 (30.7) 
K 38.8 (36.7) 3.8 .6 1.9 45.1 (34.4) 
TOTAL 106.3 17.8 4.6 2.1 130.8 
1973/74 C 42.9 (34.8) 24.6 5.7 .1 73.3 (44.8) 
I 45.8 (37.1) .9 .8 .9 48.4 (29.6) 
K 34.6 (28.1) 3.7 .3 3.3 41.9 (25.6) 
TOTAL 123.3 29.2 6.8 4.3 163.6 
1974/75 c 52.1 (38.5) 13.6 7.2 .8 73.7 (41.8) 
I 43.5 (32.2) 2.3 1.1 3.5 50.4 (28.6) 
K 39.6 (29.3) 4.2 .9 7.6 52.3 (29.7) 
TOTAL 135.2 20.1 9.1 11.9 176.3 
1975/76 c 62.1 (41.9) 12.3 7.4 3.3 85.1 (40.8) 
I 44 (29.7) .6 1.8 12.6 59 (28.3) 
K 42.2 (28.4) 1.8 1.5 18.8 64.3 (30.8) 
TOTAL 148.3 14.7 10.8 34.7 208.5 
1976/77 C 69.2 (40.7) 25.4 10 8.2 112.8 (42.1) 
I 52.3 (30.7) 4.8 3.8 16.1 77 (28.8) 
K 48.6 (28.6) 5.6 2.4 20.9 . 77.5 (28.9) 
TOTAL 170.2 35.8 16.2 45.2 267.4 
Source; Statistical Section, Import Administration; 
Ministry of Commerce. 
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TABLE 6.2 Il4MRTS AGAINST PAYMENT s COMMERCIAL LICENCING 1972 - 1977. 
1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 
CCL £º. 13.9 
ö 15.7 
16.8 
16.5 
21.9 
21.2 
36.8 
34 
45.8 
35.2 
Quota gym. 24 31.5 32.7 42.1 48.7 
% 27.2 30.8 31.7 38.9 37.4 
CGC tea. 50.4 
% 57.7 
54 
52.7 
48.6 
47*1 
29.4 
27.1 
35.7 
27.4 
TOTAL 106.3 123.3 135.2 148.3 170.2 
Source; Statistical Section, Import Administration; 
Ministry of Commerce. 
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tal imports to 28.9 % by the end of the period). 
This change in the composition of licences issued over 
the five year period, indicates that more current foreign exchange 
earnings were being directed towards satisfying consumer goods, 
rather than capital goods. This, however, seems to be in direct 
contrast to the hypothesis that commodity lists for the " New Sys- 
tems " have been expanded to save current foreign exchange earnings 
for development purposes. One possible explanation is that, as the 
commodity lists expanded, less foreign exchange was earmarked for 
the private sector, so that the 40.7 % share of consumer goods is 
a share from an altogether smaller amount of foreign exchange allo- 
cated. Furthermore, this high share implies that the core of priv- 
ate sector foreign exchange budget was made for basic commodities, 
and that the cuts fell more on investment and capital goods imports, 
since thesetare thought to be provided for through suppliers credit 
arrangements. In fact, the share of investment and capital goods 
imports in licences issued under the " New Systems " more than do- 
ubled from 32 % to 6$. 6 % between the begining and the end of the 
period. 
The main objective in forming the Foreign Exchange Bud- 
get Committee, was to allocate, in an optimal manner, available 
foreign exchange amongst competing claims. Introduction of the 
" New Systems " and the squeezing out of many commodities from the 
foreign exchange budget allocations, similtaneous with the expans- 
ion of the " New Systems " list, were all in line with reducing 
the pressure on the balance of payments. Judging by the values of 
licences issued, the potential effect of all systems on the balance 
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of payments averaged nearly 20 % throughout the period. But such 
an impressive record, was not without cost. Although the balance 
of payment statements do not register any transfer of resources 
in exchange for a fifth of all imports, it would be naive to think 
that such a transfer has not actually taken place at all. 
With regard to barter trade, whether border- barter or 
town-barter, certain amounts of Sudanese products have actually 
been licenced for export, against which commodities allowed under 
the barter list were imported. Whether more, or less imports were 
made against specified amounts of licenced exports will never be 
known, as the Bank of Sudan does not trace different licences, and 
actual imports as appearing in Foreign Trade Statistics, do not 
show their sources of finance. Nil-value imports of the amounts 
licenced, could hardly be expected to have been covered by the sa- 
vings of Sudanese working abroad. In fact, when the nil-value sys- 
tem was shelved for re-appraisal (1973/74), the authorities seem 
to have had these suspicions in mind. In any case, nil-value imp- 
orts had to be financed either by "... cumulative savings of Sudan- 
ese working abroad. " or from other sources. These include overin- 
voicing (imports), underinvoicing (exports), smuggling of Sudanese 
currency for selling abroad (Saudi Arabia and Lebanon), unreported 
commissions, and physical smuggling of commodities across the bor- 
ders. As is obvious, no quantification is possible, and evidence 
of illegal transactions taking place, in one form or another, co- 
uld only be arrived at circumstantially. Assuming that such comm- 
odities could not all have been gifts, Sudanese resources must have 
been used to pay for them. Such a contention is supplemented by a 
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piece of evidence concerning sesame and groundnuts smuggling. 
26 
One study reports that : - 
"... According to figures released by the Oil Seeds 
Corporation, 25 % of the 1973/74 production of 
groundnuts and sesame was neither domestically 
used, nor exported. All indications are that a 
substantial proportion of this unaccounted for 
production has been smuggled. Using an average 
price (1974) of £192 per ton, for groundnuts and 
sesame, simple calculations show that Sudan lost 
£29.7m. in export earnings. "27 
Despite this, the introduction of the " New Systems " 
made available commodities for which the authorities were not able 
to earmark foreign exchange. On a number of occasions, the " near 
markets " of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States were frequently and 
immediatly used, to alleviate acute shortages in essential commod- 
ities (in 1975 batteries, bulbs and matches), by issuing licences 
under nil-value. 
With regard to the efficiency with which the regime of 
licencing was administered, there was also much to be desired. The 
licencing authorities lacked adequate staff and information to make 
wise priority decisions, and to implement efficiently, decisions 
reached. Adequate staff aside, the licencing system was expected 
to accomplish too many diverse goals, similtaneously, some of which 
might be better served by other instruments. In addition to keeping 
total imports in line with foreign exchange availability, the lic- 
encing authorities were attempting to (a) maintain fair and stable 
internal prices of imported goods, especially essential ones like 
food and medicine and (b) to facilitate the development of new in- 
dustries (through suppliers credits) and to permit full capacity 
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output and the expansion of existing industries by a partial or 
complete ban on imports. (c) to promote exports (town-barter) 
(d) to allow different regions a fair share of imports (border 
trade). In general, they wanted to ensure that most essential 
goods were imported in the proper quantities, at proper times 
(seasonal imports) for all regions, and at prices within the ret. 
ach of ordinary people. Similtaneous attainment of such a wide 
range of objectives, to say the least, was difficult. 
Moreover, there was a lack of timely data, so that nu- 
merous licencing decisions were often hastily made, or ill-advised. 
Certain imports were banned to protect domestic industry, only to 
discover that domestic production was totally inadequate, in qua- 
lity or quantity. Also, errors in judgement were often over-comp- 
ensated for, by a complete reversal of policy, e. g. allowing cer- 
tain commodities in the Open General Licence list one year, and 
removing them another year. 
Such changes in policy were quite disturbing to comm- 
ercial importers, who were naturally led to a speculative inven- 
tory policy, that often accentuated price movements. The unpred- 
ictable changes in lists of eligible imports, also created serious 
difficulties for the industrial producers, who could neither be 
certain if competitive imports would suddenly be allowed, nor sure 
about their luck in future foreign exchange allocations. The panic 
over short supplies, which led to frequent expansion of the diffe- 
rent import lists, partially solved the raw materials problem for 
industrialists, but equally allowed the protected market to be fl- 
ooded with competitive imports. 
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NOTES. 
Much of the information included in this Chapter appears here 
for the first time (i. e. not published before). It is a result 
of interviews, mostly with government officials, and a study 
of files (correspondence and memoranda) mainly at the Ministry 
of Commerce and Supply (Import Administration), Ministry of 
Industry and Mining (Department of Industry), and Ministry of 
Finance and National Economy (The Foreign Exchange Budget Com- 
mittee). 
1 January 1972, date of the Presidential Decree Number 27., acc- 
ording to which the Foreign Exchange Budget Committee (FEBC) 
was officially formed. 
2 Since March 1972, a 15 % subsidy was applied to all exports 
(except cotton and gum Arabic). 
3 Presidential Decree Number 27., January 27th. The Committee is 
chaired by the Minister of State at the Ministry of Finance, 
and includes, as members, the Deputy Under-Secretary (Commerce) 
for Imports, the head of the Exchange Control Section of the 
Bank of Sudan, and high level representatives for the Supply 
Section (Commerce), Department of Industry (Ministry of Industry 
and Mining), Budget Section (Ministr of Finance), and the Cus- 
toms Department (Ministry of Finance). 
4 Railway lines are single track for 4,757 kilometres only. Dur- 
ing the rainy season, floods frequently sweep away parts of the 
track, sometimes for more than a week, depending on seriousness 
of the flooding, and the proximity to maintenance stations. 
.5 Files of the FEBC Committee. 
6 The importance of bi-lateral trade agreements has declined in 
the 1970's, and most of those with Eastern European countries 
were terminated mutually. The only two remaining such agree- 
ments are with India and Egypt. 
7 In March 1975, values of such retained licences amounted to 
£26.9m., according to the estimates of the Exchange Control 
Section, Bank of Sudan. 
8A new system was introduced in 1972, which made the commercial 
banks forward 25 % of the proceeds of exports made through 
them to the Bank of Sudan, retaining 7.5 % to be used for imp- 
orts, and also obliged them to obtain short term facilities 
from abroad, thus relieving the central bank from the obliga- 
tion of furnishing commercial banks with the foreign exchange 
needs of their customers. 
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9 In a written answer to a Committee formed in May 1976, in- 
vestigating into the proceedure of issuing import licences, 
commercial banks stated that they also give priority to the 
Open General Licences. Evidence, however, does not support 
their claims, as interviews with bank employees revealed. 
10 Files of the FEBC. 
11 largely a moslem country, in Sudan, millions fast during 
Ramadan. Traditionally, breakfast (at sun-set) consists of 
different sweets which are imported from Syria, Egypt and 
other Oriental countries. 
12 There are six sub-sections within the Import Administration, 
these deal with :- 
(1) government purchases. 
(2) textiles and related commodities. 
(3) foodstuffs and medical equipment. 
(4) miscellaneous commodities (i)e 
mainly responsible for the processing of licences and 
intermediate goods e. g. tyres, building materials, also 
needs of the industry are licenced in the section, after 
the initial approval of the Ministry of Industry and Mi- 
ning. 
(5) miscellaneous (ii) processing licences for all other 
goods not within any of the above three(2,3,4, ) spec- 
ialized sub-sections. 
(6) follow-up sections, mainly charged with preparing stati- 
stical tables of licenced items, and to follow up the ex- 
ecution of the foreign exchange earmarked for commodities 
in both public and private sectors. 
13 When it is proved that a high percentage of issued licences 
are not utilized, and this is expected to affect the market, 
established importers are issued with new licences for the 
amount thought to be unutilized. 
14 Market Surveys are supplemented by information supplied by 
importers (a clause in the import form obliges them to do so) 
to the Import Administration, as to the quantity of commodi- 
ties actually released from customs. Sudan Railways are also 
consulted about the possibility of transporting the commodity, 
and the approximate time it is expected to take, to reach the 
main consuming areas. 
15 Officials in the different sub-sections failed to remember 
when the last consultation meeting was held; when interviewed 
by the author. 
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16 It is generally estimated that nearly , 
50 % of the licences 
issued by the import Administration (including those under 
nil-value, suppliers credits and barter systems), do not 
materialize as actual imports. They are either not franked 
by the Bank of Sudan, or the necessary approval of the co- 
mmercial bank to open letters of credit, is not obtained. 
17 Border trade exports include; Durra, Dates, Vegetable Oils, 
Onions, Melon Seed, Soap, Kakadeh, and imports include; Tea, 
Coffee, Second-Hand Lorries, Perfumes. Border trade used to 
constitute 82 % of total volume of trade with Ethiopia (197.5), 
53 % with Uganda and Zaire, and between 90 - 98 % for Central 
Africa and Chad. 
18 Press Notice 1,487. dated April 1975. 
19 According to Bank of Sudan figures, repayments of suppliers 
credits to mature at 1975/76 were £34.7m., and after June 
1977, £]24.8m. (Bank of Sudan Exchange Control Department). 
20 Unofficial estimates put the number, by 1976, at around 250,000. 
21 Other incentives are s- 
(1) exemption from custom duties of up to £1,500 worth of 
commodities per emigrant. 
(2) an encouragement exchange rate of S0 % over the official 
exchange rate. 
(3) residential plots paid for at below market price; payments 
to be made in foreign currencies. 
(4) re-transfer of original amounts remitted. 
(5) nil-value licences for commercial purposes. 
22 Announced by President Nimeiry in his monthly programme " Bet- 
ween the Leader and the People. " March 1974. 
23 Press Notice 1,394. dated April 1974. 
24 Import Administration, Ministry of Commerce and Supply, Corre- 
spondence, Volume 21. (genera) P-287- 
25 Importers Registar, Ministry of Commerce. 
26 These two products are major exports next only to cotton. They 
accounted for 29.6 % of all export earnings (£57.1m. ), in 1976. 
Bank of Sudan Annual Report, 1976; P. 98. 
27 ALI, A. A. " On Smuggling: Some Theoretical and Empirical Results. " 
Economic and Social Research Council Bulletin Number 42, August 
1976; P. 1. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
INDUSTRIAL POLICY. 
7. I. Introduction. 
Cottage industry in the form of shoe-making, 'takaki' 
cloth making, building materials etc., has existed in the Sudan 
for centuries. The story of modern manufacturing industry, however, 
is different. It effectively began after the second world war. But 
before that, and since the turn of the century, there existed sec- 
-ondary industries which were closely related to other economic 
activities. Thus, there were engineering workshops for repairs and 
maintenance, associated with the construction of Sudan Railways. 
Then after the establishment of the Gezira scheme in 1925, which 
produced cotton for export, a number of ginneries were set up in 
the 1930's. This in turn led to the establishment of a closely re- 
-lated industry, that of oil mills. Attempts to establish textile 
industries, however, failed at this stage. 
During the Second World War, industrial effort was directed 
towards war needs in the centres, and imports became less available 
in the colonies. The effect of this situation on the War Supply 
Department in Sudan was to set up an Industries Investigation Committee 
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to; " advise the Supply Department on the projects to be encouraged 
as possible and feasible. " (Imam (1973) P. 10). As a result,, a number 
of industries were encouraged and duly started. These included soap, 
confectioneries, more oilmills, biscuitst and perfumes. Most of these, 
however, quickly collapsed after the end of the war, and the resumption 
of imports. 
The swift decision by the first National Government in 
1954, to encourage industry was therefore understandable in the 
circumstances. In 1955 it issued its first policy document, which 
showed the determination of the government to encourage private 
investment in industry, and the extent to which it was prepared to 
assist such pioneers. In 1956, the authorities passed the Approved 
Enterprises (Concessions) Act (1956) making the necessary statutory 
climate for industrial investment. Industrialization at, the time, 
according to one Minister, was the only way, " if we want to build 
dignity and respect for this nation. " 
I 
Over and above the assistance extended to private industry 
in the form of exemptions from business profit tax and duties on raw 
materials and equipment, provision of land, transportation and 
electricity rates at preferential prices, the government took an 
active role in investing in infra-structure and in industries where 
it was thought the private sector was unable or unwilling e. g. sugar, 
milk and canning factories. The government also in 1962, established 
an Industrial Bank to extend medium and long-term loans to industry 
and in 1966, a separate Ministry for Industry and Mining was set up. 
-I9o- 
7.2. Industrial Policy Objectives. 
When the first National Government took over in 1954, 
the industrial sector was virtually non-existant, (7. I. )above. 
Successive governments since then were committed to industrialization 
as a central objective, within an overall development programme. 
Industrialization, when first contemplated, was seen as a vehicle 
to close the gap more quickly with the advanced countries, but over 
time the emphasis was changed from industrialization per se, to a 
relatively more purposeful and selective industrialization, with 
the emphasis on industries that utilize local raw materials, employ 
more labour, and save more foreign exchange. As with many LDCs, the 
drive to industrialize did not result in any profound changes, 
particularly with regard to the use of local raw materials, which 
are still exported unprocessed, with regard to the labour force 
which is still largely unemployed, and with regard to the saving of 
foreign exchange where there is hardly any positive impact. But 
more about the results of the industrial policy later (Chapters 
Eight and Nine). 
During the past decade, and'-the decade before that, 
there were many documents which spelt out the intentions of different 
governments about industrialization. The first such document was the 
1955 " Policy Towards the Encouragement of Local and Foreign Capital 
in the Field of Industry. " 
2 The objective of the document was to 
specify the assistance that the government was willing to extend to 
would-be industrialists. In order to qualify for the concessions and 
government assistance embodied in the policy document, the project 
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would have to be approved by an Advisory Committee according to 
"..... any criteria which it considered appropriate. " 
3 Then to show 
its goodwill, and to complement its announced policy, the government 
of the time went on to stress that; 
".... The field of industry was to be left 
to private capital to venture and that 
no discrimination would be made against 
foreign enterprises. " 
(Fadlalla (1973) P. 13) 
The different Industrial Encouragement Acts that followed the first 
policy document (1956; 1967; 1972) 
4 
were the main policy instruments 
(see 7.3. below). They included (vague) criteria for project selec- 
tion and provided detailed lists of the concessions' that accompanied 
any approved enterprise (both fiscal and non-fiscal). The Acts, how- 
-ever, as would be expected, did not include any targets to be achi- 
eved by different lines of industry. This was left to the plans. 
The Ten Year Plan (TYP) in order to achieve one of its 
objectives, that of " diversifying the economy and broadening of 
its economic base ", allocated 13 % of its gross total investment 
(£76.3m. ) to manufacturing industry, and a comparable sum to invest- 
ment in infra-structural services, the absence of which may hinder 
the growth of industry more than lack of incentives, fiscal or other- 
-wise. 
5 During the plan period, the government policy was not only 
to encourage the private sector through direct incentives and through 
heavy investment in infra-structure, but also to take an active role 
in the process of industrialization. Thus the above mentioned sum was 
to be the public investment where: - 
".... private capital was either shy or not forthcoming, 
or where private enterprises were inactive and know- 
-ledge was lacking. " 
(Fadlalla (1973) P. 13) 
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This was the begining of huge government investments in industry, 
which although providing employment in some depressed regions, and 
helped towards processing some of the local raw materials, was never- 
-theless, not as successful (cost-wise) as it was meant to be. 
The FYP in order to achieve its target of 7.6 % growth 
rate in the economy, set out to increase industrial volume by $7.4 % 
during the plan period. More important, it specified how this was 
going to be achieved, and the pattern of industrialization. Thus the 
plan provided for :- 
".... an increase in industrial production volume 
and the introduction of new types of industrial 
products to meet domestic requirements and re- 
-duce imports of various commodities. " (FYP P. I55) 
The explicit function to be performed by the industrial strategy was, 
therefore, to import-substitute. This was even more clearly put when 
the FYP was revised. Thus, the Interim Action Programmes 
6 (1973 - 1977) 
which replaced the Plan, stressed first and foremost, the import - 
substitution orientation of the industrial strategy. Under the pro- 
-grammes, the objectives of the industrial sector were to bee- 
(I) Self sufficiency in 75 % of imported consumer goods, in 
particular, sugar, textiles, xheatflour, cigarettes and 
canned food. 
(2) Establishment of projects that utilize local raw mat- 
-erials, and absorb more of the labour force. 
The import-substituting nature of the industrial strategy was in 
fact recommended throughout the mid-sixties, especially in Erkawit 
Conferences on Industry in Sudari (1966), on Self-Sufficiency (1967), 
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and on Planning (1969). Although the results of such strategy, as 
will be seen, are not all that encouraging, it continued to be 
adopted in preference to an export orientated strategy of industr- 
-ialization, thus the forthcoming Six Year Plan 
(1977/78 - 1982/83) 
sets itself to develop industry as s- 
"... a sector complementary to agriculture, giving 
priority to agro - industries, and import substitutes. " 
(Economic Survey 1976/77; P. 25k. ) 
That industrial development was almost totally geared 
towards import-substitution and neglectful of exports was emphasized 
by many observers. Thus a joint IIA - UNDP mission concluded that i-- 
"... Industrial development has been mainly concen- 
-trated on the processing of agricultural products 
............ so far it has been almost exclusively directed to import-substitution and providing for 
home needs. " 
(ILO/UNDP 1976; P. 5.5) 
A year earlier, an IBRD mission commented on the neglect of export 
incentives in the different Industrial Acts s- 
"... The Investment Act provides no incentive for exports, 
other than the drawbacks on import duties paid on raw 
materials used in the production of exports. Since these 
are very low (IC%) the incentive is not very important. " 
(IBRD 1974; P. 2I) 
In this Chapter, and the next two, we will discuss the effects of 
such a policy and the industrial pattern that resulted from it. This, 
however, necessiates first, the discussion of industrial policy in- 
-strwnents employed during this period. 
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7.3. Industrial Policy Instruments. 
Ever since the first policy document on industrial 
investment was released (1955), industrial expansion was, and con- 
-tinues to be regulated and guided by the Industrial Encouragement 
Acts that were passed every now and then by the authorities. These 
Acts, understandably, tried to regulate entry into industry by 
specifying criteria which must be passed before the necessary ind- 
-ustrial licence was granted. 
Once the licence was granted, the approved enterprise 
became eligible for some or all of the concessions and assistance 
stipulated in the Acts. These promotional Acts, therefore, were the 
tools through which the authorities were hoping to shape the future 
pattern of industrial expansion in the Sudan. The two main features 
of these Acts which deserve special attention were; (a) the eligi- 
-bility criteria and (b) the incentives (both fiscal and non-fiscal) 
embodied in them. 
(a) Eligibility Criteria. 
The Approved Enterprises (Concessions) Act (1956) and 
its successors (1967; 1972) all provided for the establishment of 
a Technical Advisory Committee, (TAC), 
7 
whose function was to inspect 
the submitted applications, and pass its recommendations to the Min- 
ister of Industry and Mining, who may either accept or veto such 
recommendations. Such a Committee was also suggested by the 1955 
policy document, which recommended that the Committee should follow 
- 195 - 
"... any criteria which it considered appropriate. " 
8 
For instance, 
the Committee, according to the policy document, could apply such 
tests (criteria) as :- 
(I) The industrial enterprise seeking assistance from the 
State, must be " beneficial to the public interest. " 
(2) It (the enterprise) must have had a favourable prospect 
of successful development. 
(3) Its functions must not already be adequately covered 
within the country. 
(4) Initial assistance is shown to be necessary. 
9 (5) It has adequate capital and efficient management. 
It is doubtful whether such criteria could provide for 
a sound industrial strategy. They show, however, that the government 
of the time wanted to start industrialization ' with anything ', 
since the country needed ' everything '. The above ' tests' for 
instance, did not define ' public interest '. But it could easily 
be interpreted that as domestic industry was virtually non-existent 
then, any proposed industrial project would be'beneficial to the 
public interest'. This, indeed, seemed to be the case, and the del- 
-iberations of the TAC in its first ten years, show that rarely has 
an application been rejected. 
IC Furthermore, the " success " of the 
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approved enterprise could have different interpretations. Thus the 
success of an enterprise could be interpreted in terms of its use 
of local raw materials, absorption of the local labour force, or 
in terms of high profitability for the entrepreneur, irrespective 
of the quality of the product, or the price at which it was sold. 
These same " criteria ", however, were reproduced (with 
minor alterations) in the 1956, and all subsequent Acts. The 1967 
Act, in order to be more precise with regard to " public interest ", 
replaced that criterion such that now the Enterprise must s- 
(a) be of Defence or strategic importance. 
(b) utilize local raw materials. 
(c) employ directly or indirectly a large number of Sudanese. 
(d) make a partial or full import-substitution, or assist 
partially or fully in the exportation and saving of 
'reasonable sums' of foreign exchange. 
(e) assist in increasing national income. 
II 
Although these were a considerable improvement over the criteria 
in the previous Act, they fall far short of describing a well planned 
industrial strategy. None of the above criteria were specific in 
quantative terms, thus the criteria speak of projects that will 
employ "a large number of employees ", or save " reasonable sums 
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of foreign exchange. One criterion, "increasing national income", 
could at best rank equal in terms of vagueness with that of "public 
interest". (How much increase and at what cost ?) 
In the 1972 Act, the same criteria were reproduced 
(except for the saving of foreign exchange which was dropped) 
together with two new conditionss- 
(I) The enterprise should be able to contribute to economic 
co-operation with Arab and African countries. 
(2) The enterprise was to be located in rural areas. 
It is instructive to note that despite the loose nature of the 
criteria to be satisfied; in order to qualify for the concessions 
and the State assistance prescribed in the Acts, the enterprise 
was expected to pass any one of the above criteria. Effectively, 
all enterprises that were approved, ended up by being accorded the 
same amount of assistance s- 
"... The mission found no firm that has not received 
the full tax break. " 
(mRD 1974; P. 20) 
fib) Incentives to Industry. 
The successive Industrial Encouragement Acts, as men- 
tioned earlier, had two elements; The first was a set of criteria 
to be satisfied (any one of them) before a licence was issued, and 
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the second was the assistance a licencee could expect from the 
state. The Minister of Industry and Mining, according to the 
recommendations of the TAC, "may grant such an enterprise all 
or some of the concessions..... as he may deem suitable. " 
32 The 
list of concessions, itself, was impressive throughout. The 1955 
policy document stipulated that approved enterprises were entitled 
to relief from Business Profits Tax (BPT), for up to five years. 
During the period of relief, and for the purpose of assessing the 
Business Profit Tax the following were allowed s- 
(a) Depreciation at double rates. 
(b) Profits to be taxed at half rate after exempting the 
first S %. 
(c) Dividends to be exempted from tax. 
(d) Losses accruing during the relief period were to be 
treated as if they were incurred in the last year of 
the period. 
The policy document also provided for other incentives. 
Thus the enterprise can have s- 
(i) Reduced duties on equipment and raw materials. 
(ii) A suitable plot of land at a nominal price. 
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(iii) Assured government orders. 
(iv) Protective duties on competitive imports. 
(v) Finished goods to be moved on Sudan Railways at pre- 
-ferential rates. 
Moreover, *the above list, according to the document was to be 
treated only as "informative rather than exhaustive. " 
13 Little 
wonder, therefore, when a Sudanese scholar found that the govern- 
-ment policy towards private industry was the main reason for 33 % 
of his interviewees to enter into industry. 
14 All the above conc- 
-essions were provided for by the successive Acts, with the Acts 
becoming more generous through time. Thus, while the 1956 Act 
retained the same incentives, the 1967 Act reproduced the same list, 
and added a few more. According to this Act, depreciation could now 
be calculated at three times the usual rate, (if the firm operates 
three shifts) plus total exemption from Business Profits Tax in the 
first five years. 
15 
The 1972 Act superseded the 1967 Act, and provided for 
even more generous treatment. With regard to the tax holiday, the 
Act provides that, "... in exceptional cases, the Minister may extend 
the concession period to more than five years. " 
16 Furthermore, mach- 
-inery, spare parts, and raw materials, which previously had reduced 
import duties, are now fully exempt from duties for five years, unless 
".... in very special cases when the concession period may be extended. "' 
The Act also empowered the Minister of Industry to place a complete 
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ban on competing imports and exportable inputs (raw materials), and 
to reduce rates of electric power and local rates to the enterprises. 
Many observers would therefore agree with the IID/UNDP 
mission when they concluded that s- 
"... It is the judgement of the Mission that the 
fiscal concessions made to encourage industry are 
now too generous. " 
(Uo/UNDP 1976; P"57) 
The true generousity of the incentives could be appreciated even 
more if it is mown that :- 
"... The bulk of the concessions mentioned in the Acts 
have been automatically granted to every enterprise 
which came to be classified as an approved "enterprise. " 
(Awad 1970; P- 183) 
As we have seen in (7.2. (a) above), it was not particularly diffi- 
-cult to get the status of an'approved enterprise. ' The criteria 
to be passed were so broad that only with difficulty could one 
find a project which does not satisfy at least one of them. Perhaps 
a more rational policy would place priorities on such criteria, 
broad as it was. Thus it could reasonably be expected that the TAC 
put weights on the different criteria, and the degree to which the 
project satisfactorily passes each of them. Projects that pass the 
maximum number of criteria would be given priority over those which 
pass less, and so will projects that pass the different criteria 
better than others. But the licencing proceedure followed by the 
TAC was nothing of the sort, and was thus least conducive to effi- 
ciency. 
In fact, the incentive structure provided by the Acts, 
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and the way those incentives were granted could even be considered 
to be positively encouraging to inefficient industries. The long 
list of incentives was not only granted to every 'approved enter- 
prise' automatically, but s- 
"... most of the concessions granted to industries are 
often on a continuous basis, and are not limited to 
the early years of industry life or the pioneer firms. " 
(Awad 1970; P. 189) 
Accordingly, the beneficiaries would not only be those firms which 
need assistance in their infancy, but also other inefficient firms 
which can not survive without such incentives, no matter how long 
they had been in business. The proceedure of granting incentives 
allows such firms to co-exist beside the efficient ones, and compete 
with them on an equal basis for the scarce resources of foreign ex- 
change, capital and skilled labour. The whole wisdom of granting 
such concessions on such terms, should be judged against the fact 
that, fiscal (and non-fiscal) incentives alone, however generous, 
can not improve an investment climate that has become unattractive 
due to political and economic instability or inadequate infrastruc- 
tural facilities. 
7.4 Industrial Pattern and Growth. 
Although the share of manufacturing industry in GDP was 
until 1976, on the boundaries of 9% (see Table 1), it has reached 
its present level by registering a steady rate of growth from the 
share of less than 1% which it assumed in 1955/56. One could still 
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TABLE 7.1 THE SHARE OF MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY IN GDP (1 966/67 - 1975/76 
(£Sm. ) 
GDP Manufac- 
turing % 
(£m. ) 
A Industry B B/A (ui) 
1966/67 1060 47.8 4.5 
1967/68 1125 52.8 4.7 
1968/69 1193 55 4.6 
1969/70 1143 65 5.7 
1970/71 1199 67.4 5.6 
1971/72 1241 73.7 5.9 
1972/73 1307 79.4 6.1 
1973/74 1375 107.2 7.8 
1974/75 1511 138.3 9.2 
1975/76 1777 167 9.4 
Source; Ministry of Finance and National Economy 
Economic Survey 1975/76; P. 15. 
- 203 - 
argue, however, that in the light of the assistance extended to it 
by the state, the picture should have been much brighter. In this 
section, we will examine briefly the industrial pattern that re- 
-suited from the massive government action during the past period. 
It was the government-policy, at first, not to get 
directly involved in industry. By the begining of the Ten Year Plan, 
however, this stand was changed, and the government established a 
number of firms, either because of their strategic importance, or 
in order to alleviate regional unemployment. In 1970, the authorities 
nationalized a large number of industries, and together with the 
previous government investment, the public sector share in Industry 
rose considerably. Thus, by 1970/71, as Table (47.2. ) shows, the 
share of the public sector in manufacturing stood at 27 % of total 
number of establishments. The contribution of the public sector with 
regard to total value added (33 %) and total employment (51 %) was 
more than twice its share in the number of establishments. This is 
mainly due to the fact that public sector investments tended. to be 
concentrated on relatively large-scale enterprises. The commitment 
of the public sector is shown by the fact that in 1970/71, its 
investment in industry was , 
59 % of total investment, compared to 
2% in ,r 
(1955/56). This investment, however, is not evenly distri- 
-buted among all branches of manufacturing industry. Because one 
of the main motives behind government involvement in industry, was 
the regional distribution of industry, we find that the public sector 
investment is mainly concentrated on two industries, those of food 
and beverages, and textiles and leather. In fact, 80% of capital 
invested in the food industry, and 88.8 % of capital invested in 
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textiles rests with the public sector establishments. 
Despite the government efforts to distribute industrial 
units among the different provinces by direct participation and 
through more promises of concessions to such units, the regional 
distribution that emerged from the industrial surveys is typical of 
many LDCs. One province, the province of Khartoum houses between 
73 - 80 % of all establishments in the country, which contribute 
more than 77 % of total value added in all industry (see Table 7.4. ), 
and employs more than 65 % of the industrial labour force. Such a 
high degree of concentration is hardly surprising. In a country of 
one million square miles, and one of the least' developed in the 
world, the main complaint, as would be expected, concerns the 
inadequacy (or absence) of infrastructural services. As the pattern 
of development in the majority of LDCs is the unequal distribution 
of such services between the capital and the regions, Khartoum is 
relatively better endowed, with regard to such services. 
Apart from the question of infrastructure, there are 
other factors which contribute to the location of industries in 
Khartoum. As it is the political and administrative centre, it 
provides rapid access to the government departments concerned, in 
particular the Ministry of Industry, and the Bank of Sudan, where 
foreign exchange is licenced and franked. This in turn, solves the 
problem of availability of imported raw materials (see Table 7.5. ) 
on which many industries depend. The province also represents 
around 30 % of the urban population, with three times the average 
per capita income, thus making it the main consumption market for 
the products of the manufacturing industry. The probability of 
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TABLE 7.5. THE RATIO OF I} RIED RAW MATERIAL TO TOTAL RAW 
MATERIAL CONSUMED BY THE DOMESTIC MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY IN 
THE SUDAN 1972/73. 
£5'000 
(A) (B) (C) Ratio 
Local Imp- B/C 
Raw Mat- orted Total % 
erials 
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 9151 5716 14867 38.5 
Textiles & Leather 5220 2580 7800 33.1 
Wood & Wood products 213 81 295 27.8 
Paper & Printing 229 2185 2414 90.6 
Chemicals 1094 6401 7995 80.1 
Non-Metallic products 87 55 142 38.8 
Metallic products(basic 
metal) 153 1097 1250 87.8 
Fabricated Metal Ind'ry 659 2365 3024 78.3 
Other Industry - 62 62 100 
av. 
TOTAL 17307 20542 37849 54.2 
Sources Industrial Survey 1972/73 
Table (9-2) P. 74. 
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recruiting skilled labour is also higher in Khartoum, than in the 
regions. 
As the results of the Industrial Surveys show (Table 3). 
the manufacturing sector of Sudan is dominated by two industries, 
foods, beverages and tobacco, and textiles and leather. The food in- 
-dustry contributed 33 % to total value added and 40 % to employment 
(in 1968), thus making the industry slightly capital intensive. This 
is perhaps due mainly to the fact that many establishments in this 
sector, belonged to the public sector, and this tended to use relat- 
ively sophisticated machinery. The presence of some public sector 
establishments was also a burden on the sector with regard to value 
added, thus the Guneid factory which employed I, 500 workers, had a 
negative contribution to total value added (- 2.3. %) and its losses 
in 1968 were more than one million pounds. The second most important 
industry was textile and leather, with a share of 26 % in total em- 
-ployment and 20 % in VAD in 1968. The relatively smaller share of 
this sector indicates that perhaps not enough effort was used to en- 
-courage such a potentially viable industry, bearing in mind that the 
main export of Sudan is raw cotton. But the leading position of these 
two industries conforms to the general pattern exhibited in all such 
attempts by LDCs, where the first phase of industrialization was not 
only to produce consumer goods, but in particular those related to 
basic needs, such as feeding and clothing. 
With regard to end-use classification, almost all indus- 
tries could be classified as consumer good industries, with the ex- 
ception of such small industries as cement, plastics, glass products 
and petroleum oil refining. Needless to say, the absence of interme- 
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-diate and capital goods industries would neccessarily mean that the 
weak industrial base laid down will continue to depend on imports of 
such goods for a long time to come. This makes the manufacturing in- 
-dustry all the more vulnerable, considering its high dependance on 
imported raw materials (Table 7.5. ) and the shortage of foreign ex - 
-change experienced in the last few years. This is not helped by the 
fact that the manufacturing industry is overwhelmingly import-subst- 
-ituting, and it is not expected to contribute to foreign exchange 
earnings through exports of manufacturing, judging by the current 
share of I% of such exports. 
N 
7.5. Conclusions. 
Memories of the Second World War were still fresh in the 
mind, when the first National Government took over in Sudan. Indust- 
-rialization seemed to be the correct strategy of development to ad- 
-opt, both in war and peace. Accordingly, unlimited assistance was 
extended to would-be industrialists. The criteria on which such ass- 
-istance was granted was very broad, and so loose as to approach me- 
-aninglessness. It seemed that instead of developing and following 
an investment criteria in industry that will ensure the highest poss- 
-ible social rate of return, governments of the time have allowed 
their predjudices to lead them to allow and encourage investments 
that may not have the highest rates of return. 
As we have seen in the previous sections, the criteria 
which an applicant has to satisfy in order to qualify for state ass- 
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istance were broad and unquantifiable. This, however, should not 
blur the fact that, in general (7.3. a), they aimed for an industry 
that (among other things) would roughly use more local (rather than 
foreign) raw materials, absorb more of the local labour force and 
save foreign exchange. "The incentive structure which was to help 
such an industry to develop and display such a pattern included an 
amalgamation of different components. In particular, the role played 
by high tariffs(and bans) on competing imports and preferential tar- 
iffs on machinery and materials seems to be considerable. One study 
(Nimeiri 1974), estimates that the loss in governments revenue due to 
duty exemptions on machinery, spare parts and raw materials was 
four times the loss attributed to exemptions from business profits 
tax and reduced prices of land combined. Whether the industrial pat- 
tern that emerges as a result of the combined effects of these meas- 
ures, will reflect the resource base of the economy, remains to be 
seen. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
PROTECTION OF SUDANESE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY : ESTIMATES'OF 
EFFECTIVE RATES OF PROTECTION AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS. 
8.1 Introduction. 
Protective measures in the form of tariffs and quart- 1. 
ative import restrictions (QR) are widely practiced, especially in 
less developed countries. They are resorted to, either to foster 
higher growth rates. for the economy through industrialization, or 
to allow the minimum possible imports to alleviate balance of pay- 
ments difficulties. In both cases, industrialization, whether int- 
ended for import substitution or for exports, helps solve unemplo- 
yment and under-employment difficulties in these countries. The 
more rapidly the industrial sector grows, the better the possibil- 
ities of faster absorption of the growing labour force. In fact, 
industry need not only grow rapidly, but also be efficient in the 
use of scarce factors if it is to achieve such objectives, and this 
requires the incentive structure to be efficiency conscious. More 
often than not, however, protection to industry is provided on an 
open-end basis. No time limit is set for an industry to grow out of 
infancy, hence no incentive is provided for industry to reduce co- 
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sts or improve quality. The domestic market itself is soon satis- 
fied, and with its initial small size, no economies of scale are 
expected to be exploited. To prevent domestic monopolies (or for 
equity purposes) more licences are granted to cover the same area; 
once a firm comes into existence it shares (automatically) the al- 
ready strained foreign exchange budget allocated to industry. Less 
foreign exchange will be available to all firms, hence excess cap- 
acity results and, with it the locked-in scarce resources. The two 
main reasons to industrialize are then less satisfied as both less 
labour is employed, and industry (import-substitution) grows at a 
slower rate. 
Sudan is no exception from other less developed count- 
ries. In fact, it appears to be a text book example of one, with 
four fifths of its population depending on agriculture and related 
activities, more than half of its foreign exchange is provided by 
one major primary export (cotton) and 75 % of its population in 
rural areas. 
In what follows, our concern is to examine-the protec- 
tive structure in the Sudan that has resulted from the application 
of various instruments (Chapters Four and Seven), both to increase 
the rate of growth of the economy - mainly through import substit- 
ution and to help reduce claims on foreign exchange earnings. To 
this end, we will first spell out the methodology through which 
effective rates of protection (the tool we intend to use in the 
analysis) is calculated. This involves stating explicitly the for- 
mulae used for calculation and the data used and its sources. 
With the government policy towards industry (Chapter 
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Seven) in mind, we proceed to examine such questions as whether the 
protective structure as represented by estimates of effective rates 
of protection (ERP) harbours any biases between industries or sect- 
ors. Whether within the manufacturing sector itself there has been 
any discrepancy in incentives accorded to major (two-digit) groups 
e. g. food, textiles, chemicals, or within these groups (four-digit 
level). Moreover, an insight into the industrial pattern resulting 
from the protective structure will be gained if some characteristics 
of the highly protected industries are examined. 
An intertemporal comparison between the two sets of ERP 
(1968/69 and 1972/73) will reveal the direction of change in prote- 
ction (i. e. towards more or less protection), the direction of re- 
source shifts in practice and whether this lends support to ERP 
theory predictions. 
8.2 Formulae and Data: 
8.2.1 Formulae. 
With regard to the economy in general, Sudan is a small 
country for both its exports and imports. Concerning manufacturing 
industry in particular, a recent study (Ali 1977) shows that the 
elasticity of substitution between capital and labour in Sudanese 
manufacturing industry is approximately unity. For the two most im- 
portant industry groups, food and textiles, it is (0.7063 and 1.085 
respectively. )Accordingly, we neither expect world prices to change 
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if protection measures are abolished, nor that considerable change 
in the input mix will occur between protection and free trade sit- 
uations. Two sets of effective rates of protection are estimated 
on the basis of different treatments for non-traded inputs. These 
are mown as the Corden Method and the Balassa Method (1.2.4 above). 
Recall that the former groups non-tradeables with the value added 
in the activity protected on the assumption that they are grouped 
with primary factors to produce the value added product. Thus, they 
are identical to primary factors and both are protected as. a result 
of protection to the using industry. The latter method assumes that 
non-tradeables are available for the using industry at infinitely 
elastic supplies (like tradeables). Thus non-tradeables are assumed 
to receive zero-protection. The difference between the two is that 
the latter overstates (and the former understates) effective rates 
of protection by assuming that all incentives provided by the pro- 
tective regime is spent in bidding for primary factors ( thus ign- 
oring any increased expenditure on non-tradeables). (Both are calc- 
ulated and the results dhould serve to show how the way non-traded f 
inputs are treated affects the results). 
I 
v-V VI 
ERP (gj) a-1 
VV 
i. e. the percentage increase in the domestic value added over world 
value added; where primes refer to the protected situation. 
The formulae used for computation are :- 
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(1) CORDEN METHOD (gAj) 
1-Ea,. -EEa b. 
Aýin n3 
gj 
=-1 
E a.. EE anj bin 
1i in 
1+t. 1+ t1 1+ ti 
(2) BALASSA METHOD (gB) 
ýB 
1-E aid -n and 
Ja -1 
Ea.. EEa b 
'. 
EEa b 
vn 1i 1J in ný in vn nj 
1+t1+ ti 1+ ti 
where 
tj 
realized average tariff rate on commodity bundle 'j'. 
ti 
realized duty rate (adjusted for levies on domestic inputs) 
on commodity bundle 'i'. 
ai3, anj are domestic value input co-efficients of traded and non- 
traded inputs. 
bin'bvn are value co-efficients of direct and indirect, material 
inputs and value added in non-tradeables,. and 
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As we are estimating effective rates of protection 
from a domestic input-output table, value added at world prices 
is derived by deflating the standardized (basic price) producer 
price of unity by the nominal rate of protection. Costs of direct 
and indirect traded inputs are deflated by the estimated realized 
tariff, or inflated by export duties, as the case may be. This is 
because with export duties exportables used as inputs are avail- 
able at lower prices than those prevailing internationally, and 
their abolition will lead to higher input prices for users in the 
free trade situation. Under the Balassa method, the last term 
(direct and indirect value added in non-tradeables) receives zero 
protection, and thus is not deflated, but tariffs on material 
inputs used for producing non-tradeables are assumed to increase 
the cost of these inputs to users, and for this reason are defla- 
ted by realized input tariffs. 
8.2.2 Data 
In what follows,, we describe how nominal tariffs are 
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arrived at, and the sources of data used in computation. 
(a) Industrial Survey 1968/69. 
A mission from the International Development Centre of 
Arab States (IDCAS), on request from the Sudanese government, car- 
ried out a" full survey " for Sudanese manufacturing industry, for 
the fiscal year 1968/69. Due to the large area of the country, and 
the fact that around 80 % of manufacturing industry is concentrated 
in Khartoum, the " full survey " only covered establishments empl- 
oying 25 or more in Greater Khartoum, and all establishments empl- 
oying 100 or more in the rural areas. A sample was taken of those 
employing less than 100 in rural areas and less than 25 in Khartoum. 
The Survey Report and supplements provide information on values of 
output and value added at factor cost, total costs of production 
broken down to traded and non-traded inputs; the traded inputs in 
turn are divided into domestic and foreign. For each establishment 
identified by an ISIC industry code and an establishment code the 
Survey provides for each item of the main products and main inputs 
quantities and values, stocks at the begining and stocks at the end. 
b) Industrial Survey 1972 
This Survey was carried out by the Department of Stat- 
istics (results published towards the end of 1976). The Survey co- 
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vered all establishments employing 25 or more in Greater Khartoum. 
It did not cover establishments outside Khartoum (for financial 
reasons) but was still highly representative, due to the concent- 
ration of most of the manufacturing industry in the capital. As a 
result, major industries were omitted, notably cement and sugar 
i ryes, which are situated outside the capital. This Survey 
provides similar information to the 1968/69 Survey. 
(c) Input-Output Table. 
An input-output table for the Sudan was completed in 
1977,2 and its construction was based mainly on the 1970/71 In- 
dustrial Survey. The census provides data-on input structures for 
43 manufacturing activities. Out of this, the table contains cost 
structures on 31 activities. This was made necessary because the 
number of responsive firms in some activities was very low. For 
this reason, the table aggregated a number of activities under one 
four-digit groups e. g. leather products (3231) with footwear (3240), 
textile and clothing with other textiles (3214,3212), wood products 
(3312) with wooden furniture (3320). The table is presented at pro- 
ducer prices (basic prices)(net of taxes and subsidies) so that no 
further adjustment is needed for the purposes of computing ERP. ERPs 
are computed for all four-digit classifications given by the table, 
with the exception of the bakery industry - a. nlessentially non- 
traded sector. 
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(d) Nominal Tariffs. 
There are usually two sources for nominal tariffs. One 
could resort to the Tariff Schedule published by the Department of 
Customs, where such tariffs could be considered as potential rather 
than actual; or use the other source, the Foreign Trade Statistics 
published monthly and annually by the Department of Statistics, its 
data origin being the customs returns. The latter approximates the 
height of duties more realistically, and accordingly no use is made 
of statutory rates as they appear in the Tariff Schedule. 
With regard to duties on'inpnts; there is another source. 
Industrial Surveys provide information on duties paid by different 
industries for raw materials used. Thus the average duty paid by 
all firms should ideally serve as the appropriate duty on inputs 
used; and although firms report duties at factory gate prices (i. e 
inclusive of transportation costsP one should be able to arrive at 
the actual duty paid by deflating/a flat rate of 15 % generally 
considered to approximate the transportation margin (from Port Sudan 
to Khartoum). This, however, is used only for the purposes of cross- 
checking average realized tariffs. The reason for this is that in a 
number of cases, reported rates were lower than realized tariffs and 
this is mainly due to, the fact that a number of firms fail to report 
them separately from the cost of raw materials, in which case the 
numerator of the ratio of paid duties to costs of raw materials is 
smaller than it should have been. 
For nominal tariffs on final products, two methods were 
followed; (a) realized tariffs: As mentioned above, these are 
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given in Foreign Trade Statistics. The entries of this publication 
are given at the SITC revised seven-digit level, while products of 
manufacturing industry are reported on a more aggregated level 
(four-digit). Each item of domestic production is matched with the 
appropriate SITC equivalent, but sometimes output is not specified 
in sufficient detail to allow such matching, and in such cases 
broader groups (two-digit) were used. To arrive at the average ta- 
riff, a weighted average Of realized tariffs on competing imports 
is computed using Sudan's own imports as weights. In all cases for 
1972/73, these rates were adjusted upwards by the exchange tax (15 %) 
and downwards by different rates of production taxes on certain sp- 
ecific products. The latter are available from the Department of 
Customs and where these are levied on specific rate bases, the app- 
ropriate ad valorem rates were computed and substituted for them. 
When the only form of trade restriction is the tariff, 
the above proceedure will be followed and will be sufficient; but 
when quotas or complete bans are in operation, tariffs levied serve 
mainly revenue purposes, while the binding price will be the quota 
rather than the tariff inclusive price. In such circumstances, the 
nominal (implicit) tariff is shown by the difference between the 
relevant domestic and border prices (domestic price minus border 
price over the border price). During 1968/69 the trade regime was 
rather liberal and only (16) items were put under quota. This pic- 
ture has changed considerably during 1972/73 where (36) items were 
totally banned and (6) items were on the quota list (see appendix)- 
Moreover, during the latter period other items which were not ban- 
ned or put under quota and which fall under the " Consultation 
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Group of Commodities " have a rough ceiling on the amount of for- 
eign exchange spent on them; and although this amount is based on 
the average value of imports of the past five years plus the exp- 
ected rate of increase of consuming each item, in a number of them 
there were acute shortages indicating that demand exceeded supply 
and the market clearing price was well above the tariff inclusive 
price. We have thus carried out price comparisons for all those 
items under quota or altogether banned, plus a large number (where- 
ver possible) of other items for 1972/73. Border prices (CIF/Fl7B) 
are available from Foreign Trade Statistics and are then adjusted 
by 15 % transport margin (Port Sudan - Khartoum), For the banned 
competing imports where CIF prices are not available, we adopted 
the standard method of substituting for them the CIF prices of the 
nearest port. The nearest port which lies on the other side of the 
Red Sea and is equidistant from the main suppliers is Jeddah (Saudi 
Arabia). Jeddah CIF prices are available from (Thsaiat El Tigara 
El Kharijia Wizarat El Iktisad; Foreign Trade Statistics, Ministry 
of Economic Planning, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, pub., Monthly and Annu- 
ally). The relevant domestic prices are the ex-factory prices set 
by the Ministry of Industry and Mining. These prices are set for 
each establishment separately depending on the cost estimates pro- 
vided by the establishments, with little check (if any) on such in- 
formation from the Ministry officials. Therefore they differ for the 
same item in the different establishments. All ex-factory prices af- 
ter being set by the Minist? y, are typed and distributed to the dep- 
artment of Price Control ( Ministry of Commerce and Supply) and local 
authorities, together with copies to the firms concerned. 
3 
To reach 
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a representative average ex-factory price, therefore, we have to con- 
sider the maximum possible number of such prices, but in most cases, 
weighted average proceedure is followed with the weight given to the 
top 2-5 producers. In a number of cases we found that prices chan- 
ged during the same year, such changes are taken into consideration 
only when they pertain to leading producers. 
On balance we could say that Nominal Rates of Protection 
(NRP) for 1968/69 were based more on realized tariffs than on price 
comparisons, while those for 1972/% were biased the other way round. 
In general, the methods of computing nominal (implicit) rates whether 
from realized tariffs, or from price comparisons were rather crude and 
generally the quality of data left much to be desired. Moreover, the 
input-output table itself is highly aggregative in its classification. 
In a number of industries two or more four-digit groups are amalgama- 
ted and represented by the same set of co-efficients (examples given 
above), thus the level of classification " encompasses combinations 
not perfectly homogenous " as concedod, by Egaily (1977) himself. 'Fur- 
thermore, matching of different products as between domestic and im- 
ported was not always perfect, the thing that made it necessary to 
use higher levels of aggregation. Errors are also bound to occur for 
other reasons e. g. when quality differences are not taken care of. 
All in all, the results of, and implications from such data, should 
naturally be taken only as indicative and with extreme care (if not 
scepticism). Nevertheless, given the quality of data, enough care 
has been taken so that errors resulting from the multiplicity of so- 
urces (from reporting to averaging) should only affect estimates mi- 
nimally. 
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8.3 Results. 
8.3.1 Negative Value Added at World Prices. 
The phenomenon of negative value added at world prices, 
when first encountered in empirical studies, was dismissed as a 
" nonsense " result (Grubel and Johnson 1967), since it implies that 
the final produce is better imported than produced locally. Frequent 
occurences, however, led to the development of theoretical and prac- 
tical explanations (1.2.3 above). 
Negative value added obtains for five branches in Sudan- 
ese manufacturing industry in 1968/69 (ERP 1) (dairy products, flour 
mills, other food industries, cigarettes and tobacco, and spinning and 
weaving) and three of these continue to exhibit negative value added 
in 1972/73 (ERP 11) (dairy products, flour mills and other food ind- 
ustries). One possible explanation is that the results are due to er- 
rors in observation. While this may be true, considering the nature 
of the data on the input output table on the one hand, and the comp- 
utation of nominal rates of protection on the other hand; it is still 
believed that there may well be genuine cases involving waste of re- 
sources. 
Both tobacco and textiles appear with positive value added 
in 1972/73 (i. e. 11), indicating that an attempt towards more effic- 
ient production has been made. For textiles, the apparent comparative 
advantage is obvious. Cotton is exported (by Sudan) raw, and is 
the main export. Textile manufacturing is a natural candidate for im- 
port substitution and future export. In the initial period, however, 
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8.1. a EFFECTIVE RATES OF PROTECTION 1968/69 (ERP 1). 
Input 
Output ERP 1 
Class- DESCRIPTION , iNRP ifica- AB 
tion. 
1112 Wheat 12 14 16 
1121 Groundnuts 0 -2 -3 
1122 Sesame -5 -7 -8 
1141 Cotton -10 -14 -1.5 
1211 Livestock Products -13 -19 -20 
1311 Forestry Products -1 -1 -1 
2111 Mining & Quarrying 35 35 36 
3111 Fruit Canning 66 134 836 
3112 Dairy Products 76 97 
3114 Flour Mills 43 393 
3116 Sugar Refining 1.7 0 0 
3117 Sweets & Confectionery 89 120 213 
3118 Vegetable Oils 15 6 17 
3119 Other Food 75 193 
3121 Distilling & Rectifying 286 462 2800 
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TABLE 8.1. a. cont.. 
Input 
Output ERP 1 
Class- DESCRIPTION NRP ifica- AB 
tion. 
3122 Breweries & Malt 75 79 147 
3123 Soft Drinks 88 121 164 
3131 Cigarettes & Tobacco 367 2241 
3211 Spinning & Weaving 89 306 
3212 Knitting Mills 71 63 142 
3214 Ropes & Twines 23 16 21 
3221 Products of Tanneries 38 60 97 
3223 Footwear 72 101 324 
3312 Wood & Furniture 58 98 667 
3411 . per & Printing 
23 21 26 
3511 Basic Chemicals 15 19 Y96 
3513 Paints 38 34 57 
3515 Soap & Washing Compounds 127 335 2430 
3516 Other Chemicals 39 42 80 
3521 Petroleum Products 74 95 108 
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TABLE 8.1. a cont., 
Input 
Output 
Class- 
Class- 
tion. 
DESCRIPTION NRP 
ERP 1 
A B 
3531 Rubber Products 44 46 69 
3611 Glass Products 57 67 362 
3612 Building Materials 28 25 39 
3613 Other Non-metals 38 43 46 
3711 Basic Metal Industry 40 45 58 
3811 Fabricated Metal industry 74 85 179 
ERP (A) - Corden Method. 
(B) = Balassa Method. 
indicates NVAD. 
Source; see text. 
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TABLE 8.1. b EFFECTIVE RATES OF PROTECTION 1972/73 (ERP II). 
input ERP II 
Output 
Class- DESCRIPTION NRP 
ifica- AB 
tion. 
1112 Wheat 29 38 41 
1121 Groundnuts -14 -21 -22 
1122 Sesame -18 -23 -24 
1141 cotton -26 -34 -36 
1211 Livestock Products -3 -6 -7 
1311 Forestry Products -20 -20 -21 
2111 Mining & Quarrying 51 51 53 
3111 Fruit fanning 31 53 114 
3112 Dairy Products 121 179 ýf- 
3114 Flour Mills 19 29 -ýE 
3116 Sugar -5 -56 -60 
3117 Sweets & Confectionery 73 88 139 
3118 Vegetable Oils -4 -62 -87 
3119 Other Food 96 267 ýE- 
3121 Distilling & Rectifying 296 433 2052 
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TABLE 8.1. b cont. 
Input 
Output 
Class- 
ifica- 
tion. 
LESCRIPTION NRP 
ERP 
A 
II 
B 
3122 Breweries & Malt -5 -59 -68 
3123 Soft Drinks 97 143 308 
3131 Cigarettes & Tobacco 227 582 2366 
3211 Spinning & Weaving 47 84 1219 
3212 Knitting Mills 85 119 1550 
3214 Ropes & Twines 49 56 16 
3221 Products of Tanneries 38 52 81 
3223 Footwear 59 76 184 
33) 2 Wood & Furniture 45 67 337 
3411 Paper & Printing 46 46 64 
3532 Basic Chemicals 17 12 16 
3513 Paints 82 119 561 
3515 Soap & Washing Compounds -13 -11 -16 
3516 Other Chemicals 45 48 96 
3521 Petroleum Products 116 173., 208 
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TABLE 8.1. b cont., 
input ERP II Output 
Class- DESCRIPTDDN NRP 
ifica- AB tion 
3,531 Rubber Products 46 47 70 
3611 Glass Products 27 25 66 
3612 Building materials -7 -82 -87 
3613 Other Non-metal 66 71 78 
3711 Basic Metal Industry 41 47 70 
3811 Fabricated Metal industry 66 76 146 
indicates NVAD. 
Source; See Text. 
0 
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yarn has to be imported. Thus cotton is exported raw, imported as 
yarn to be made into grey cloth (Dammoria and Wilaya) to satisfy 
the home market. This proceedure strongly suggests that the high 
transport cost (inland) on raw cotton which is bulky and heavy, and 
yarn imports which are now more expensive than the equivalent exp- 
orted raw cotton, this led to a small or negative value added for 
the final stage of fabrication (clothing), indicating that instead 
of yarn imports the country is better off 'if cotton fabrics were 
imported instead. 
Another reason is the high overhead costs. When the two 
main factories started production, management, engineers and all the 
skilled labour force was foreign. The cost of employing this high 
proportion of expatriate personnel, according to some officials at 
the factories, was the main cause of the heavy losses in the initial 
period. 
Cigarettes are manufactured with a 93 % import content 
in (1). Attempts to grow first class quality tobacco (Virginia type) 
domestically have been going on in the Jebel Merra region for over 
fifteen years. The small value added (3 %) that this industry shows 
in (11), suggests that it was less efficient in 1968/69 (1) but im- 
proved over time. The other three industries which appear in both 
estimates to be net losers of foreign exchange, are, dairy products, 
flour mills, and other food industries. 
Other food industries, like cigarette manufacturing, are 
engaged in final stage processing. Two main products of this indus- 
try are tea packing and coffee%. grinding. All raw materials for these 
products are imported. It may be expected that this indeed would be 
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would be inefficient in such a range of products, whose inputs are 
mainly imported, and which are possibly processed more cheaply, by 
specialized manufacturers in developed countries. What is not to 
be expected, however, is its continued protection. This may be due 
to unintended protection. The majority of Sudanese families are 
accustomed to buying coffee beans and unpacked tea, both of which 
are imported in this farm (and for this end) solely, by two para- 
statal organizations, which consider it uneconomic to place orders 
for packed tea and ground coffee. To satisfy the small demand for 
these products, their industries seem to have been helped by this 
form of ban, and by the fact that they can readily aquire the nec- 
essary raw materials from the organizations like ordinary customers. 
Another final stage processing industry is flour milling. 
The sole activity is milling mostly (62 %) imported wheat. As domes- 
tic production of wheat expands, the industry should show higher va- 
lue added in world values. This was expected to happen by 197273, 
but higher production has been hampered_by difficulties in introdu- 
cing wheat growing to tenants of the Gezira scheme and the Girba 
area, to whom - as traditional farmers - this was a new product, 
which they are reluctant to accept. 
For dairy products, there is good reason to believe that 
they are also operating with negative value added. They are also all- 
owed to continue production under protection. The industry is govern- 
ment owned. The main factory is the Babanousa milk factory establish- 
ed in 1962. Cattle population around Babanousa is approximately two 
million head, which was thought to be more than enough to warrant the 
location of a factory. This is now quoted as one of the most famous 
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examples where no feasibility study was carried out beforehand. 
Apart from contributing to the employment in a rural area, it was 
hoped that soon it could satisfy domestic demand, and start expor- 
ting. Ten years later, capacity utilized never exceeded 14 % of 
installed capacity, and only for five months a year. 
4 
The main re- 
ason for the failure of the factory to live up to expectations, was 
the lack of response from the cattle owners, who preferred to leave 
- the milk for the calves, rather than sell it to the factory. Still, 
the factory was not closed down for socio-political reasons. It was 
one of the few industrial establishments in the under-privileged 
western part of the country, and provided some employment opportuni- 
ties. 
8.3.2 Inter-Sectoral Variations. 
A weighted average of effective rates of protection shows 
that agriculture is negatively protected at(-1.4 %) in 1968/69 (I), 
which changed to a higher rate of negative protection of (-15.3 %) 
in 1972/73 (II), while manufacturing industry was favourably treated 
by a protected rate of 93 % and 43 % in (I) and (II) respectively. 
This pattern is not surprising. Indeed, it is natural, and conforms 
to the norm in many less developed countries for which effective ra- 
tes of protection have been computed (Balassa 1971). For the Sudan, 
this might be in compliance with the economic policy objectives of 
diversification, broadening of economic structure and attaching a 
greater role to industry, to substitute imports and help to absorb 
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the growing labour force. What could not be evaluated with certainity, 
however, is whether inter-sectoral differential incentives should be of 
this magnitude (between 20 - 100 times more) to achieve'stated object- 
ives. Low and negative effective rates of protection in the agricultu- 
ral sector were mainly the result of the high taxes and other levies on 
exports which are agricultural in nature. Also of considerable importa- 
nce are tariffs (however low) on agricultural imports such as fertiliz- 
e , sacks etc. On the other hand, only low duties are levied*on compet- 
itive imports, because these are mainly foodstuffs. 
Although between I and II, a relative change did occur in 
the structure of incentives provided for investment in both sectors, the 
direction of change did not favour agriculture. Indeed, the change has 
been for the worse for agriculture in general, and exports in particular. 
8.3.3 Inter-Industry Variations. 
By far the highest (in 1968/69) effective rates of prot- 
ection are in the food industry. The industry mean effective rate 
of protection (165 %) exceeded the next by S0 %. The second and thi- 
rd are chemicals (110 p), and textiles (109 %). Non-metal industry is 
the least protected with 34 , %. Thus within the manufacturing sec- 
tor differential incentives are accorded to broad industry groups 
(two-digit). Not only are they different, but the subsidy (through 
protection) conferred on the food industry is five times that on 
non-metal. The extent to which resources are attracted e. g. to food 
rather than construction materials (non-metal) as indicated by eff- 
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ectve rates of protection is immense, and indicates the degree to 
which some industries are favoured, or alternatively, other indu- 
stries are discriminated against. Escalation of effective rates of 
protection therefore shows itself, even on this highly aggregated 
level, that nominal and effective rates of protection are lower on 
intermediate and capital goods, and higher on consumer goods, or 
processing at higher stages of fabrication. 
If the weighted average of effective rates of protection 
is considered, instead of the mean of effective rates inter-industry 
variations seem less, and the protection to food industry (127 %) is 
just 25 % more than that of textiles (107 %), while textiles itself, 
which seem to have the same effective rates of protection as that of 
the chemical industry, is now nearly 2$ % more protected than chemi- 
cals (88 %). Non-metal is plainly the least protected (45 %) with 
less than a third the rate on food, and half the nearest industry to 
it, chemicals. 
The inter-industry pattern is less varied in 197273 (11), 
which show some effort towards reducing the differentials. The mean 
estimate (11) effective rates of protection shows the same ranking 
for major industry groups as that of (1), with the gap widening to- 
wards more discrimination against construction materials. In fact, 
when the weighted average of effective rates of protection is taken 
(weighted by derived value added at world prices) as the measure to 
reflect the true picture of protection, construction materials app- 
ear to be negatively protected (taxed) at (-12 %). The narrowed gap 
of differential incentives changes the ranking whereby the textile 
industry now becomes the most protected (76 %) followed by chemicals 
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(46 %) and then food and beverages (39 0). The. change in ranking 
and the apparently low rate on food, is mainly brought about by 
the negative protection to sugar (-56 %), vegetable oils (-62 %) 
and beer (- 59 %). As 
-these 
industries (particularly sugar and oil) 
are either actually export, or potentially export industries, it 
is quite unlikely that their negative rates were planned, and the- 
refore one is tempted to suggest that the overall lower rate on 
the food industry, which resulted in relatively higher rates for 
both textiles and chemicals is not a consciously taken step to 
treat favourably the latter two as compared with food and bevera- 
ges. 
While the mean (91 %) is a poor measure, the weighted 
average does not provide a good average either. Although it shows 
that the overall average of effective rates of protection has risen 
for textiles and chemicals, it conceals significant features. It 
overestimates effective rates of protection for the latter two, while 
on a more disaggregated level within the textile industry three out 
of five sub groupd.: (four-digit level) received less protection in 
1972/73 than they did in 196869 (see Table 8.1. a,. and b ). 
8. x1,4 Variations Over Time and Within Major Industrial Groups. 
With regard to changes in incentives provided during the 
period under investigation, out of twenty six industries for which 
effective rates of protection were estimated for 1968/69 (1), 16 
(60 %) were subject to lower protection in 1972/73 (11) than they 
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were four years earlier. 
Within the food beverages and tobacco industries, all 
but. two of the sub groups comprising the industry had lower rates 
in the latter estimate (11). Among these are the sugar and the ve- 
getable oils industries. These two not only became less protected 
as time went on, but were in fact taxed, (having a negative rate) 
by 1972/73. Negative effective rates of protection resulted from 
low tariffs on the final products, cou led with production taxes 
(sugar) and export duties (vegetable oils). The two are actual 
(vegetable oils), or potential (sugar) foreign exchange earners. 
The vegetable oil industry processes locally produced cotton seed, 
groundnuts and sesame seed, and since 1968/69 it was exporting 
50 % of its produce, in the form of oil, oilcake and meal. 
5 Su- 
gar was singled out in the foreign trade policy (among other pr- 
oducts) for self-sufficiency and future exports. 
Although the mean is low for this industry group in 
ERP 11 than in ERP 1, variability of effective rates of protection 
within the industry is still high, displaying the same pattern of 
variation between incentives (exhibited in 1) within the industry. 
With regard to the textile and leather industry, eff- 
ective rates of protection do show discrepancies between the two 
sets of estimates. The weighted average is lower in ERP 11 than 
in 1, (76,107 respectively). For both sets, rates vary widely 
within the industry. They range from 15 % on other textiles to 
306 % on spinning and weaving in 1, and from . 
52 % on leather tan- 
ning to 119 % on knitting mills in 11. Thus, although the overall 
level is lower in 11 than in 1, the degree of variation is not much 
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reduced, indicating, perhaps, that little effort was made to re- 
duce differentials in incentives between subsectors. Moreover, the 
overall reduction changed the rankings within the textile and lea- 
ther industry, and disfavoured most of the leather industry, one of 
two exporting industries within the whole manufacturing sector. 
Effective rates of protection for'the chemical industry, 
in general, rose by more than average between 1 and 11. Within the 
chemical industry those for paints and petroleum products rose the 
most. Variations existed in 1 and continued through 11. They ranged 
from 335 % on soap, to 34 % on paints in 1, and from 173 % cm, petr- 
oleum products to - 11 % on soap in 11. Higher rates on petroleum 
products are mostly for revenue purposes, while the sharp fall in 
the soap. rate from a subsidy to a tax, is due to higher production 
taxes on both inputs (vegetable oils) and soap. 
The non-metal industry is, overall, the least protected 
industry. Within the industry, cement is the most disfavoured in 
the manufacturing industry in general. It ranked low in 1968/69 and 
was receiving a negative rate in 1972/73. Rankings also changed wi- 
thin this group for glass products, which were protected by more 
than 50 % compared with other non-metals, and by more than twice 
that of cement. In ERP 11, glass products were less protected than 
other non-metals, which now have an ERP of 71 %. 
In general, there exists not only inter-sectoral fav- 
ouritism, but discriminatory treatment is found intra-industry as 
well. The pattern of protection between major industry groups and 
within: them, as portrayed by the two sets, does not fit into a con- 
sistent programme of import substitution, whereby certain incentives 
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are provided for some industries and not for others. 
8.3.5 End-Use Variations. 
Effective rates of protection vary between consumer 
goods and intermediate goods. In 196869 and judging by the wei- 
ghted average of effective rates of protection, consumer goods in- 
dustries are protected more than three times as much as intermed- 
iate goods (1$7 %, 43 % respectively) (Table 8.2), while in'1]., 
this is reduced to around 30 % (49 %, 37 p). 
6 
The sharp fall in 
relative protection is due to the presence of industries with neg- 
ative effective rates of protection in the consumer goods industry 
group, rather than to deliberate action of encouraging production 
of intermediate goods. 
The above averages, however, conceal considerable var- 
iations within the two end-use groups, with ranges of (462,644) 
for consumer goods in 1968/69 and 1972/73 respectively, and a range 
of (82,255) for intermediate goods in the same years. This shows a 
familiar pattern, as in their desire to encourage industry, most 
countries levy low tariffs on machinery and raw materials, and hi- 
gher duties on processed or semi-finished products. Thus (uninten- 
tionally) production of final goods is found more attractive for 
potential investors, than production of intermediate goods. 
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TABLE 8.2 ErECT IVE RATES OF PROTECTION s END-USE CLASSIFICATION. 
Input 
Output 
Class- 
ifica- 
tion. 
DESCRIPTION 
CONSUMER 
ERP 1A 
1968/69 
GOODS 
ERP 11 
1972/73 
3111 Fruit Canning 134 53 
3112 Dairy Products 97 179 
3114 Flour Mills 393 29 
3116 Sugar 0 -, 56 
3117 Sweets & Confectionery 120 88 
3118 Vegetable Oils 6 -62 
3119 Other Food 193 267 
3121 Distilling & Rectifying 462 433 
3122 Breweries & Malt 79 -59 
3123 Soft Drinks 121 143 
3131 Cigarettes & Tobacco 2241 
, 
582 
3211 Spinning & Weaving 306 84 
3212 Knitting Mills 63 119 
3223 Footwear 101 76 
3411 per & Printing 21 46 
3515 Soap 335 -11 
3516 Other Chemicals 42 48 
MEAN 157 115 
RANGE 462* 644 
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TABLE 8.2 cont., 
Input INTERMEDIATE GOODS Output 
Class- DESCRIPTION ERP 1 ERP ]. l ifica- 
tion 1968/69 1972/73 
3124 Ropes & Twine 16 
, 
56 
3221 Products of Tanneries 60 52 
3312 Wood & Wooden Furniture 98 67 
3511 Basic Chemicals 19 12 
3513 Paints 34 119 
3521 Petroleum Products 95 173 
3531 Rubber Products 46 47 
3611 Glass Products 67 25 
3612 Building Materials 25 -82 
3613 Other Non-Metals 43 71 
3711 Basic Metal 40 47 
3811 Fabricated Metal 85 76 
MEAN 57 55 
RANGE 82 255 
excluding the extreme ERP of cigarettes 
and tobacco. 
Source; See Text (as Table 8.1. a and b). 
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8.3.6 ERP and Resource Shifts Through Time. 
In the previous sections, we have seen that the pattern 
of protection accorded to domestic industry as reflected in the sc- 
ales of NRP and ERP leaves mich to be desired. It suggests that 
protection was extended indiscriminately to all industries and at 
varying degrees. Moreover, this pattern does not show a consistent 
attitude (policy) towards the development of domestic industry by 
way of providing differential incentives to industry according to 
certain priorities. The fact that there is a protective system in 
existence,. which does not treat all industries uniformly, means that 
the system creates an atmosphere for some industries to attract more 
resources than others. In particular, the theory of ERP suggests that 
within a certain protective system, it is expected that resources wo- 
uld be pulled towards those activities with relatively high ERP. In 
this section, we propse to test the ability of ERP to predict such 
resource shifts. 
Empirical studies undertaken for other countries have 
thus so far concerned themselves with the analysis of the patterns 
of protection at a point in time, and their implications for the ec- 
onomies concerned. Our calculation of ERP for two points in time al- 
lows us to investigate the relationship between ERP and resource mo- 
vements through time. We thus seek to provide evidence on the relat- 
ionships between (a) the levels of NRP and ERP for the two points in 
(1968/69; 1972/73) and levels of capital, labour and output, (b) the 
changes in NRP and ERP through time and the corresponding movements 
in resources (as represented by A K, A L, A Q),. (c) the observed 
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shifts in resources and the levels of historic incentives provided 
to different industries represented by scales of NRP and ERP. Such 
evidence will provide us with the necessary data to judge the claim 
that scales of ERP are good predictors of future resource shifts. 
Moreover, we will be able to contest or substantiate the conclusion 
made by Cohen (1969) that " one knows a lot but not everything from 
a scale of NRP " indicating that the extra information gained through 
computing ERP might not warrant the resources spent in computing such 
a scale. 
Data and Methods 
As proxies for resource shifts, we have chosen employment 
figures, invested capital and values of real output for the two years 
under consideration. 
There are a number of conceptual difficulties associated 
with the above variables. With regard to labour, the presence of ex- 
cess supply of unskilled labour at the prevailing fixed minimum wage 
allows any industry to expand most of its labour force (of unskilled 
labour) without very much effect, on labour already absorbed in ind- 
ustry. In such a situation the movement of labour between industries 
may be negligible. The effect of' some industries having more to sp- 
end by way of payment on factors could show itself by the higher wa- 
ges they are willing to pay the skilled labour, and therefore a bet- 
ter indicator might be the movement of skilled labour. But as diffe- 
rent industries need different skill-ratios independant of their ab- 
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ility to pay skilled labour this will also be unrepresentative; and 
accordingly we chose the number of (all) employees (L) to be an in- 
dicator of labour movements. With regard to capital also we had to 
make a choice between fixed assets or invested capital where the 
latter includes working capital in addition to fixed assets. The 
choice of the latter is dictated by the fact that due to special 
problems facing the Sudanese manufacturing industry with regard to 
availability of raw materials (both local and imported) and their 
transportation from Port Sudan or production centres, firms have to 
keep inventories of raw materials that vary between three months to 
six months supply or more. The value of inventory holdings is per- 
haps indicative of the returns to investment in that industry, and 
therefore we elected to include this form of capital on our capital 
variable (K). The real output variable (Q) is introduced as a fur- 
ther indicator of factor movements (since movement of factors would 
normally mean more output). Industrial Surveys 1968/69 - 1972/73 
provide data on employment figures, invested capital and output at 
both factor cost and market prices; and the NRP and ERP are the'ra- 
tes given above (section 8.15). 
We have utilized both regression analysis and non-para- 
metric techniques. The latter is first suggested by Guisinger (1970) 
as an appropriate method to test the association between ERP and fa- 
ctor movements. Non-parametric techniques (e. g. chi-square, Fisher's 
exact probability test and Spearmans rank correlation co-efficient) 
are uniformly less powerful than parametric tests (e. g. t, F, ) if 
the data satisfies the assumptions about the population from which 
the samples are drawn. But if the data could only be arranged in no- 
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minal or ordinal manner, or the sample is very small or the pop- 
ulation from which the sample is drawn is highly aggregated such 
that the assumption about normality is not satisfied then non-pa- 
rametric techniques are the appropriate tests (Siegel 19$6). The 
data in our hands is not of first class quality, the conceptual 
difficulties with the variables used make strict ranking less me- 
aningful. Moreover, the input output table on which ERP calcula- 
tions are based is highly aggregative in nature as mentioned ab- 
ove (8.2.2). This, together with the presence of extremely high 
protection rates in the form of negative value added might make it 
more meaningful to divide the levels of the variables under cons- 
ideration or their percentage changes into categories (e. g. high, 
medium, low) and then apply non-parametric tests on them. Although 
the nature of the data strongly suggests that the use of non-para- 
metric tests might be the more appropriate technique, use of other 
methods might not be altogether uninstructive. 
Results. 
i) Regression Results. 
Our purpose in carrying the regression is to test the 
hypothesis that NRP (1968/69) ERP (1968/69) and/or changes in NRP 
and ERP between 1968/69 - 1972/73 are important factors in the ex- 
planation of factor shifts (AK, A L, 0 Q) in this period. The 
inclusion of IN NRP, A ERP, as independant variables is obvious, 
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but we included the 1968/69 NRP and ERP as proxies for historic 
rates on the assumption that reaction to different incentives 
takes place with an unknown lag. 
Neither the changes in NRP or ERP nor the historic 
levels of these rates is significant in the explanation of the 
observed different rates of change in capital and labour. With re- 
gard to changes in real output, -however, the results are different, 
and interesting. Both the rates of change in NRP and ERP( ý. NRP, 
ERP) are insignificant, and so are the results when 
ý. Q is 
regressed on ERP (1968)(hereafter ERPt_1) or on A. ERP and 
ERP (1968) together as the following two equations show :- 
0 
AQ= 
"525 + . 066 ERPt-1 R2 = . 051 
(1) 
(1.626) (1.041) 
Q= "55 + . 043 
A ERP + . 066 ERP t-1 R2 = . 058 
(2) 
(1.63) (. 359) (1.015) 
But when Q is regressed on the historic level of NRP1 (i. e. 
NRP 1968), the latter is significant at the 1% level and of the 
correct positive sign as seen from (3) below :- 
dQ-. 109 + . 924 NRPt-1 R2 - . 321 
(3) 
(-. 31) (3.075) 
Addition of NRP which is an insignificant explanatory variable 
by itself, does not add much to the explanatory power of the equa- 
tion (2 %) as in (4) but the significance of NRPt-1 is retained :- 
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-. 11 + . 317 
A NRP + . 962 NRPt-1 
2- 
. 339 (4) (-. 309) (. 732) (3.121) 
Thus, although the overall explanatory power of the equations is low 
(R2 = . 321 and . 34) indicating that omitted variables are perhaps 
more important in explaining the growth of output in different indu- 
stries than the historic levels of NRP, still, the results show that 
the latter is an important variable whose omission would reduce the 
explanatory'power of the equations considerably, even if all other 
relevant variables are included. The rationale behind the importance 
of past levels of protection in influencing investment decisions in 
the Sudanese manufacturing industry is not difficult to see. To the 
predominately agricultural Sudanese economy, manufacturing is a new 
activity and investment in it is seen as more risky than in agricul- 
tural schemes. Moreover, in both the agricultural and the commercial 
sectors the predominant type of business is family business, which 
is more risk-averse than other forms of ownership, and tended to in- 
vest in real estate, gold, or to keep its excess money in deposit 
accounts or (until recently) in cash. Furthermore, the concept of 
entrepreneurship itself, is of recent origin in the Sudan, (perhaps 
in a number of LDCs) in as far as it means " making money ", since 
this directly opposes such concepts as generosity, which is rooted 
deep in the inherited Arab culture. Thus, to be a pioneer, or be 
inventive in " making money " is not in the culture of a Moslem ag- 
ricultural and nomadic society, and may be looked down upon as a 
form of thriftiness or even deception. Whatever the reason, it is 
observed that the business behaviour of Sudanese entrepreneurs is 
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most uninventive and there are a number of famous examples whereby 
" everybody " rushed to invest only after some success story came 
to light.? 
Accordingly, there is good, reason to believe that in- 
vestors move to certain industries only after they hear that others 
have made substantial profits there. Thus their investment decisions 
are not taken with that point in time's data and future prospects 
only, but with others informed " guess " or good knowledge of the 
profitability in certain industries. In fact, the general lack of 
data makes feasibility studies redundant or unreliable and good ad- 
vice might be a reasonable substitute. In the circumstances, one 
would expect shifts in capital to be more associated with protection 
(profitability) than changes in outputs, but there is no readily av- 
ailable explanation for this apparent puzzle. 
It is thus understandable to expect factor movements to 
be assoEiated with past rates rather than current movements in those 
rates. What is less understandable and more interesting, perhaps, is 
the association shown to exist between factor movements and past no- 
minal rather than effective rates. If one accepts the suggestion that 
investors move more towards those industries where some other invest- 
ors have already taken the risk (and nothing went wrong) and got re- 
warded, rather than new industries, then there is no reason why this 
should not be shown more by ERP than NRP, as the ERP theory correctly 
shows. A more acceptable thesis, perhaps, would be that most investors 
at the present stage of development of the Sudanese manufacturing in- 
dustry are new to industry (i. e. they made their money in the commerce 
or agricultural sectors) and therefore they are more likely to be de- 
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ceived by the height of nominal tariffs as the true indicator of 
possible profitability, rather than the hidden ERP which requires 
inside knowledge about the process of production, the availability 
of raw materials and the different levies on them, which consider- 
ably reduces the apparently high NRP. 
Whatever the reason, the finding that resource move- 
ments are more associated with past nominal rather than ERP, and 
even if this turns out to be strongly linked with the initial st- 
ages of development of manufacturing industry, where the sense of 
businessmanship is developing, and information is lacking, still 
this puts the predictive ability of ERP into doubt. This could imply 
that in an investment community, where investment decisions are not 
likely to be based on known and acceptable criteria (as for example 
suggested by feasibility studies) and where the manufacturing sec- 
tor itself is developing, and its main supply of entrepreneurs is 
drawn from sectors new to industry, a scale of ERP might cease to 
be a correct indicator of where investment is most likely going to 
take place. This conclusion, however, could only be tentative, due 
to the quality of data on dependent variables and the highly agg- 
regative input-output tables from which ERP are computed. 
iii) Non-parametric Tests. 
In this part we seek to test the association between 
levels of NRP, ERP in 1968/69 - 1972/73, percentage changes in these 
rates, and levels of capital, labour and output and changes in these 
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variables. The ojective of this exercise is to see to what extent 
the protective system accorded to Sudanese manufacturing industry 
in the past is responsible for the observed pattern of industria- 
lization. Thus again we are testing for the ability of ERP to pr- 
edict the direction movement of resources. 
In order to perform the non-parametric tests for the 
null hypothesis of independance between protection rates (and their 
rates of change) and factors ( and their rates of change) over time 
we divided each of the variables into two groups of " high " and 
" low ", first by the median values and for an alternative by ar- 
bitrarily set limits to test-for the sensitivity of the results to 
different judgements about what constitutes the upper and the lower 
range for each variable. The results, however, are invariant to ch- 
oice of group boundaries. 
Because of the small sample of 26 industries a3 by 3 
contingency table for the chi-square test was not possible, and ac- 
cordingly, we constructed a2 by 2 contingency table for both tests, 
the chi-square and the Fisher's Enact Probability Test. As the chi- 
square is inappropriate where the expected frequency of one of the 
cells of the contingency table is less than 5, we did not proceed 
with the test when such a result obtained. In addition to the chi- 
square and Fisher's Exact Tests, we also included the degree of as- 
sociation as depicted by the parametric measure, the Pearsons' (sim- 
ple) correalation co-efficient. 
The results are shown in Tables (8.3. a), (8.3. b), (8.3. c. ). 
Omitted from the results shown are the association between the le- 
vels of NRP, ERP and levels of K, L, and Q. in 1968/69, where the 
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TABLE 8.3. a FACTOR MOVEMENTS CORRELATED WITH PERCENTAGE CHANGES 
IN NRP AND ERP BETWEEN 1968/69 - 1972/73. 
NRP ERP 
Pearson's 2 
r 
Fisher's 
Exact 
Test 
Pearson's 
r 
Fisher's 
Exact 
Test 
K -. 27 1.87 . 22 . 05 4.81 . 07 
L -. 19 - . 26 -. 06 1.64 . 19 
Q . 04 1.64 . 29 o8 .. 58 z8 
*-0 and K** indicate significance at 3ö and 7% 
respectively. 
TABLE 8.3. b FACTOR CHANGES OVER 1968/69 - 1972/73 CORRELATED WITH 
LEVELS OF PROTECTION (ERP, NRP) OF THE PAST (1968/69) 
NRPt-1 (1) ERPt-1 
Pearson's z Fisher's Pearson's . Fisher's 
r Exact r Exact 
Test Jrl_ Test 
x . 01 - . 32 
L -. 02 - . 32 
Q . 56 1.02 . 29 
-. 04 - . 31 
-01 1.05 . 31 
"23 - . 29 
(1) NRPt_1p ERPt-1 (2) = NRP (1968), ERP (1968) 
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TABLE 8.3. c LEVEL OF RESOURCES CORRELATED WITH LEVELS OF PROTECTION 
(NRP, ERP) IN 1972/73. 
NRP ERP 
Pearson's Fisher's Pearson's Fisher's 
Exact Exact 
r Test r 
jC Test 
K -. 27 6.85 . 22 -. 14 1.78 . 26 
L -. 05 - . 26 -. 12 - . 22 
Q -. 31 - . 32 -. 06 - . 32 
Indicates significance at 1 %. 
Source; Tables (8 (a)(b)(c)) are own computations 
From Tables 8.1. a and 8.1. b. and data on 
K, L, Q. 
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null hypothesis could not be rejected; and although the hypothesis 
of independance between A K, AL, AQ and NRPt-1, ERPt-1 could 
also not be rejected, the Table (8.3. b) is included because of the 
disappointment that such a result carries. In the previous subsec- 
tion it was shown that the variation of at least one variable ( 
LQ) representing movements in resources could be partly explained 
by the level of the NRP in the past. This result, however, could 
not be confirmed through use of non-parametric tests. The simple 
correalation co-efficient (. 56), however, goes some way to re-in- 
force such a result. It could still be argued that the quality of 
data might be responsible for the above result or its non-confirm- 
ation through the use of non-parametric tests. In both cases it is 
most unfortunate. 
Out of the remaining (. 5+) tests, the null hypothesis of 
independence could be rejected only in three cases. In Table (8.3. a) 
both the chi-square and Fisher's exact test show at the 5% and 7% 
levels of significance respectively, the changes in capital are as- 
sociated with the changes in ERP. In Table (8.3. c) the NRP in 1972/ 
73 is shown by the chi-square to be associated with the level of ca- 
pital for that year at 1% level. Therefore on the evidence of these 
results (and the regression results) there seems to be no grounds 
for a clear preference between NRP and ERP or between t NRP and 
t ERP as to which rate conveys the correct signal for investors 
and thus could be used to predict their investment intentions. It is 
interesting that the results show that protection rates (nominal or 
effective) are significantly associated with the decision to invest, 
indicating how effectively they could be used as instruments for dir- 
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ecting investment towards certain industries and discouraging re- 
source movements from others. But as far'- as these particular re- 
sults are concerned, the superiority of ERP over NRP in predicting 
resource shifts could not be established. Indeed, at this point 
one mignt well find oneself in agreement with Cohen (1969), " that 
one learns a lot - but not everything - by looking at the rankings 
of industries by nominal tariffs. " The rank correalation coeffic- 
ient between NRP and ERP is . 92 and . 91 for 1968/69 and 1972/73 
respectively, and for their changes is (. 87), and if the inconclu- 
sive results reported above are anything to go by, and if Sudan is 
a typical less developed country (which it is), LDCs might not be- 
nefit much from resources spent in calculating ERP as compared with 
information gained from a scale of ERP. 
8.3.7 Characteristics of Highly Protected Industries. 
We have seen earlier (Chapter Seven), that the Sudanese 
government took an active part in industrialization. This, was done 
not only through industrial investment Promotion Acts, but also th- 
rough direct government participation in areas where the private 
sector was unwilling or unable to operate. It is then reasonable to 
say that since the government was clear about its objectives concer- 
ning industrial growth, then one would expect that the sum-total of 
the effects of the, instruments applied would not result in a much 
different pattern of industrialization, from that envisaged by the 
government. 
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TABLE 8.4. a CHARACTERISTICS OF HIGHLY PROTECTED INDUSTRIES 1968/69. 
Input 
Output F. AI 1w&S1M. Cý 
1 
ERP Class- DESCRIPTION E T. C. 
ifica- (A) 
tion. £s £s % 
3111 Fruit Canning 1187 208 26 134 
3112 Dairy Products 7624 202 65 97 
3114 Flour Mills 5889 479 62 393 
3117 Sweets & Confectionery 734 218 59 12C 
3119 Other Food Industry 993 144 63 193 
3121 Distilling&Rectifying 848 484 60 462 
3131 Cigarettes & Tobacco 1609 456 90 2241 
3211 Spinning & Weaving 1705 285 17 306 
3223 Footwear 987 350 92 101 
3515 Soap 1085 265 33 335 
AVERAGE OF MANUFACT- 
URING INDUSTRY 1390 277 47 
1 F. A. - Fixed Assets W&S- Wages and Salaries 
M. C. - Import Content T. C. - Total Cost. E - Employment. 
indicates NVAD at world price. 
Source; Table 8.1. a and Industrial Survey (1968/69) Vol. II, 
Supplement 1. 
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TABLE 8.4. b CHARACTERISTICS OF HIGHLY PROTECTED INIWJSTRIES 1972/73. 
Input 
Output 
Class- DESCRIPTION 
ifica- 
tion. 
F. A. 
Es 
W& 
E 
&S 
M. C/ 
T. C. 
% 
ERP 
(A) 
3112 Dairy Products n. a. n. a. n. a. 179 
3114 Flour Mills 4790 494 48 129 
3119 Other Food Industry 1830 306 56 267 
3121 Distilling, Rectifying 2240 680 27 433 
3123 Soft Drinks 930 408 45 143 
3131 Cigarettes & Tobacco 1530 653 93 582 
3212 Knitting Mills 530 216 34 119 
3513 Paints 1250 653 86 119 
3521 Petroleum Products n. a. n. a. n. a. 173 
AVERAGE OF MANUFACT- 
URING INDUSTRIES 1326 352 38 
n. a. - not available 
Source; Table 8.1. b and Industrial Survey 1972/73. 
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With this in mind, we will now proceed to examine some 
characteristics exhibited by the highly protected industries, 
8 
the 
characteristics being dictated by data availability. Following the 
proceedure adopted in the previous section (non-parametric tests) 
we constructed contingency tables to test the association between 
ERP and these characteristics (capital labour ratio, skill ratio 
and import content). All values are insignificant, suggesting that 
high effective rates of protection are not particularly associated 
with any of the characteristics chosen. However, similar results 
may not obtain for a different set of characteristics. 
Although significant correalation seems not to exist 
between effective rates of protection and these characteristics, 
it is still worthwhile to examine the highly protected industries 
with regard to the above characteristics, and against the backgro- 
und of government policy. 
Though no time limit could be set with exactness, for 
an industry to be considered infant, we may consider the gestation 
period provided by investment acts for tax holidays to be a reas- 
onable lower limit. An upper limit of infancy age could be set ar- 
bitrarily at about ten years. Against these loose limits, we find 
that more than 50 % of industries highly protected in 1972/73 were 
also among the highly protected industries in 1968/69 (see Table 
8.4). In fact all of them were established in the late 1950's or 
early 1960's. In that instance, by 1972/73 more than half the most 
protected industries have been enjoying protection for nearly fif- 
teen years. 
Drawing on the experience of less developed countries, 
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the number of industries protected should have increased during 
time, this is mainly because protection is provided on an open-- 
end basis, as most countries cannot afford to pursue any degree 
of liberalization with regard to foreign trade transactions, as 
their foreign exchange situation would not permit. 
When protection policies are pursued not only to fo- 
ster growth through industrialization, but also for balance of 
payments purposes, it might not be reasonable to evaluate them 
by appealing to the infant industry argument. As long as foreign 
exchange continues to be in short supply for these LDCs, it is 
not expected that protection be lifted from either those indust- 
ries which have long been established, or from those which prove 
to be efficient and competitive. Protection, in fact, continues 
for both types as long as they satisfy domestic demand, with con- 
sequent considerable opportunity costs. 
Of the 26 industry groups for which data on chosen 
characteristics are available, 40 % can be considered highly pro- 
tected (i. e. > 100 ö ERP). In 1968/69,50 % of the highly protec- 
ted industries had negative value added (Balassa method), and a 
third of those were in the same situation in 1972/73. Thus 30 % 
of industries exhibiting negative value added in 1968/69 contin- 
ued to lose foreign exchange in 1972/73 (i. e. did not improve), 
as negative value added suggests that value of inputs is more 
than that of the final product, in which case the establishments 
exhibiting such phenomena should cease production. Appearance of 
this phenomenon (NVAD) on this scale shows that the protective 
system does shelter some extreme inefficiencies. 
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Factor intensity is represented both by import content 
in the cost of production, and the capital - labour ratio. In both 
1 and 11, just under 50 % of those industries with the highest ef- 
fective rates of protection were also among the top ten industries, 
with the highest import content. In some cases, the ratio of foreign 
exchange to total cost is over 90 % (e. g. cigarettes). One would 
have expected the pattern to result in more protected industries 
using local raw materials than others. It can hardly be inferred, 
then, that government policy concerning industry was realized. With 
regard to capital intensity, less than a third (in each set) of 
highly protected industries are also among the most capital inten- 
sive. However, for 1972/73 more than half of the highly protected 
industries are more capital intensive than the overall average of 
manufacturing industry. Thus one could only barely agree with Ali 
(1977) that :- 
... for all industries the capital labour ratio has increased as a result of government policy. " 
(Ali 1977; P. 132) 
A notable observation is that among the most protected 
industries 7 and 6 industries-in 1968/69,1972/73 respectively are 
from the major two-digit group food and beverage industry. All but 
three sub-groups (beer, sugar and oil) of the food industry are 
among the most protected industries. Thus within the manufacturing 
sector, protection is not only geared towards favouring consumer 
goods as such, but within that broad division, the food and bever- 
age industry is favoured most. This could be explained in terms of 
the relative importance of this industry, with regard to the manu- 
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facturing sector as a whole. Historically this has been the one 
with the highest number of establishments, and also the top in- 
dustry with regard to value of production and investment. Thus 
the large number of entrepreneurs involved would make a strong 
pressure group to maintain protection. 
-om the above, discussion, one could conclude that 
characteristics exhibited by the highly protected industries are 
not exactly the ones the government is thought to have preferred. 
Industries with the highest incentives are not those that are la- 
bour intensive and/or those which use more domestic raw materials 
than foreign. It thus seems that industrial licencing together 
with protection policies, did not guide domestic resources so as 
to favour ventures that reduce unemployment and underemployment, 
and contribute to the processing of local raw mate±ials, thereby 
increasing its contribution to foreign exchange earnings. Indeed, 
the few lines that process and export domestic raw materials (na- 
mely, vegetable oils and the tanning industry), appear to be dis- 
criminated against by the protective system. 
8.4 summary: 
(1) Arithmetic means and weighted averages of effective 
rates of protection, seem to be poor indices for reflecting all 
the features of the protective system. Still these, together with 
standard deviations show that effective rates of protection are 
quite varied for both sets (1 and 11) of estimates. 
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(2) In general, the pattern has shown the familiar pattern 
of escalation of tariffs from low on intermediate to high on final 
consumer goods. Moreover, production for the home market was highly 
encouraged compared with exporting, as indicated by the protection 
on tanning and the negative rates on vegetable oils. 
(3) The system sheltered final stage processing and accor- 
ded such industries high protection, even though in a number of 
cases, negative value added at world prices was obtained. 
(4) One of the important features of the estimates is the 
existance of substantial differences (in effective rates of prot- 
ection) among sectors and subsectors, and between end-uses. The 
extent of high variability between rates of protection could not 
be wholly attributed to deliberate action on the part of the auth- 
orities, rather, historical factors might have strongly affected 
this pattern. 
(5) Although protection rates appear to be (closely) ass- 
ociated with resource movements over time, ERP are shown to be no 
more important than NRP in predicting such movements. 
(6) Considering the characteristics exhibited by highly 
protected industries, the least that could be said is that they 
do not strictly fall in line with the criteria set for project 
selection, put forward in different Investment Acts. 
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NOTES. 
1 EL HASSAN, A. M. (ed. ) "Introduction to Sudan Economy " University 
of Khartoum Press 1976, Page 5. 
2 EL EGAILY, M. A. " The Construction of an Inter-Industry Table 
for the Sudan 1970/71 " Unpublished 1h. D. Thesis University 
College of Wales (Aberystwyth) 1977. 
3 Recently they started to become available in the form of leaflets 
- one for each factory - distributed to local council authorities, 
and other interested bodies, to help control prices. They are pub- 
lished by the Prices Control Section of the Ministry of Commerce 
and Supply. 
4 RASHEED, S. " The Expansion of Public Industry in the Sudan 
Economic and Social Research Council Bulletin, Number 28;. February 
1976; P. 9. 
5 Industrial Survey 196869, Supplement (A) Section VI P. 1. 
6 Classification into end-use categories is rather crude, due to the 
early stage of development in the manufacturing industry. No Indu- 
stry that could be classified as producing capital goods exists. 
Some industries which are known to produce consumer durables (e. g. 
refrigerators) are classified with intermediate goods industry, 
due to amalgamation of such sub-industry groups with others, e. g. 
refrigerators are amalgamated with fabricated metal (3812). 
7 In manufacturing, these include vegetable oils, macaroni; in 
real estate " The Khartoum New Extension where Foreign Embassies 
paid high rents. for the first developers ", and in transport, 
pick-ups converted to serve as minibuses. 
8 High protection is arbitarily defined. In this situation we have 
taken 100 % Effective Rates of Protection and over to represent 
1. 
_.. 
high protection. In most developed countries, for which similar 
studies were undertaken " high effective rates of protection " 
could be substantially lower, due to overall lower rates of pro- 
tection. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
DOMESTIC RESOURCE COSTS OF SUDANESE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY. 
9.1 Introduction. 
As we saw earlier, the develolment of Sudanese manufac- 
turing industry was not particularly rapid. The cottage industry 
and the maintenance workshops that started at the turn of the ce- 
ntury were not encouraged by the colonial administration until the 
second world war when imports fell below domestic demand. But even 
those industries which were encouraged during the war (vegetable 
oils, soap, etc. ) failed to receive further encouragement when the 
war was over and international trade began to catch up with its 
pre-war levels. 
The negative attitude of the colonial rulers towards 
industry, together with the lack of an indigenous entrepreneural 
tradition and the rural, nomadic nature of the country contributed 
to the slow development through the generally cautious attitude 
towards risk taking in such circumstances. Positive encouragement 
was thus left to the first national government (1954). In 1956, 
the new government passed an Act summarizing its policy on indust- 
rialization which included generous concessions to private industry, 
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ranging from tax holidays and duty exemptions to technical and 
financial help. Shortly afterwards, this was followed by the 
government itself taking an active role in areas where the pri- 
vate sector was unable or unwilling to invest (see Chapter Seven). 
Thus one could say that the Sudanese manufacturing in- 
dustry (overwhelmingly import substituting) did not develop spon- 
taneously, rather it was artificially created through the conces- 
sions extended to it by the government. The import substitution 
industry thus developed, has the inherent ills associated with 
import substitution in other LDCs. Specifically, protection dis- 
torts relative prices of inputs and outputs and leads to ineffi- 
ciences in resource allocation that entail a cost to the economy 
as a whole (2.1 above). This happens because inter-sectoral and 
inter-industry specialization (according to comparative advantage=) 
is interferred with, and as a result, resources will move from 
low cost to high cost industries thus resulting in what can be 
thought of as an excess DRC of saving or earning foreign exchange. 
In this Chapter, we will investigate this broad hypothesis of in- 
efficiency inherent in the protective system prevailing in Sudan 
during this period. To carry out this investigation, we compute 
the DRCs (at market price) for a sample of the Sudanese manufact- 
uring industry in the year (1968/69) and use them as efficiency 
criteria for the performance of firms in that year. 
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9.2 Formula and Data. 
p 
(i) Formula :- 
Let us define the DRC of a dollar saved through import 
substitution of commodity 'j' as equal to the direct and indirect 
cost (of domestic resources) incurred in supplying it domestically, 
divided by the difference between the CIF price of 'j' and the fo- 
reign exchange cost of direct and indirect imported inputs. For 
computations of DRCs, the following formula is adopted :- 
i Fij Pf +i Did Pa +i Nib Pn -a (Pi Qj) 
DRC 
_1+ 
tdm 
P.. 
i 
where; 
F, D, N, are the amounts of primary factors, domestic trade- 
able and non-tradeable inputs respectively iised in 
the production of 'j'. 
Pf'Pd' n are the market prices. 
tdm the total levy on traded inputs (duties and excise 
taxes). 
mij CIF value of imported inputs per unit of 'j'. 
Pi CIF price of ' j'. 
- 268 - 
Qj 
quantity of 'j' produced by firm during the year. 
CL the transport margin from Port Sudan to Khartoum. 
Precisely what the formula says, is that in order to 
estimate the domestic cost of a dollar, the cost data of firms 
is adjusted for duties and excise taxes paid on traded inputs and 
for the domestic component of the cost to import equivalent prod- 
ucts, which is mainly the transport cost. This is particularly 
important because of both the long distance (700Km. ) and the dif- 
ficulty of beating the long queue. Recall from Chapter Two, that 
in a scale of DRCs if DRCx is lower than DRC7, then this suggests 
that it will be beneficial to the economy to expand production in 
activity 'x', but the same thing could not be said about activity 
'y', whose expansion could only be considered if there are strong 
reasons to believe that costs will decrease in time. Furthermore, 
efficiency of firms is examined through comparing DRCs with the 
appropriate exchange rate. Firms whose DRC exceeds the exchange 
rate (adjusted for overvaluation) are considered inefficient, si- 
nce it means that such firms use resources whose contribution to 
the economy will be much higher in alternative uses. Such a comp- 
arison will be carried out in the next section (9.3). 
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(ii) Data. 
To compute DRCs all costs involved have to be broken 
into foreign and domestic components. This information is prov- 
ided in the published reports of the industrial survey for 1968/ 
69 and the cost structures published therein are sufficiently 
broken down to allow such computation. Before that, however, some 
adjustments have to be made. Basically the computation involves 
comparison between the costs (domestic and foreign) incurred by 
the firm under consideration in producing a certain amount of 
its product, and the costs (domestic and foreign) to the Sudan, 
incurred in importing the same volume of production. There are 
two components (domestic and foreign) with regard to producing 
domestically, in the form of domestic and import contents and 
also with regard to imports. The domestic cost involved in the 
latter is the transportation cost from Port Sudan to Khartoum, 
where almost all firms engaged in producing import substitutes 
are established, and most consumption of such imports takes pla- 
ce. The rationale for this is obvious. Assume that the CIF value 
of a certain volume of imports at Port Sudan is £1000; and the, 
ex-factory value of the same volume (assuming same quality) at 
Khartoum is £1,100; knowing that the average transport cost is 
1$ % of CIF value (distance 700Km. ), it will be erroneous to con- 
clude that it is more expensive to import substitute such a comm- 
odity, since the equivalent value of the imported commodity (ino- 
lusive of transport cost) is £1,150 in Khartoum. To reflect the 
situation correctly, adjustment for transportation costs must the- 
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refore be made before DRCs could be computed. This is the main 
adjustment to the data in our hands. 
Apart from adjusting CIF values for inland freight, 
reported costs must also be adjusted for transfer payments like 
taxes and tariffs. These are of course, costs to the producer but 
are only transfers from consumers to the government. Traded inputs 
must therefore be deflated by the combined levy of duties and ex- 
cise taxes. 
The sample chosen is not statistically random, rather 
it could be considered as a purposive (or even compulsory) sample. 
Before deciding on the size of the sample, we had to make sure 
that all establishments from which the samples were chosen were 
suitable for the purposes of DRC computations. This proved to be 
most difficult, especially with regard to the CIF value of domes- 
tic outputs. CIF prices are readily available from Foreign Trade 
Statistics (FTS), but final products are reported in different 
units by different firms, some of which do not match the standard 
units appearing in FTS. Thus, while FTS (guided by U. N. S1TC cla- 
ssifications) give perfumes in litres, household utensils in kilos, 
and most other commodities in tons, some domestic firms do not give 
such information in weights or volumes, but in units most commonly 
understood, and in which such products are sold to wholesalers and 
retailers e. g. 1,000 kartona (packing container), 100 dozen bottles, 
10 sacks etc., conversion ratios for which are not specified in the 
Report. In other cases, (e. g. ready made clothes) it was found that 
units reported by domestic manufacturers (shirts, trousers in doz- 
ens) made sense more than those reported in FTS (kilos) because a 
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kilo could make perhaps only one pair of trousers, but might make 
two or three shirts. A further difficulty in reporting, occurs 
with regard to those products that are reported domestically in 
units (e. g. furniture, reported as 'x'; chairs, 'y', dining rooms, 
etc. ) and in FTS in value only, or for those products which are 
reported in value only in both (e. g. plastic products). 
When all such difficulties had been taken into consid- 
eration, the number of firms dropped significantly. A further co- 
nsideration, was to represent as many of the remaining industries 
as possible. Accordingly, all those industries which have only one 
or two firms remaining had those firms chosen, and for other ind- 
ustries with a larger number of firms, half of them were chosen. 
Altogether, the sample was about 20 % of the number of firms sur- 
veyed. It must be pointed out at this stage, that the method ado- 
pted to select the sample might bias the sample towards bigger 
establishments, including government firms, who tend to keep bet- 
ter records and conform to standard units. A different type of 
bias is also introduced through quality differences. Thus Sudan- 
ese-made toothpaste, soap, biscuits etc. if exported, may not fe- 
tch the CIF prices which are used to evaluate them for purposes 
of DRC computations, and therefore the DRCs computed may underes- 
timate actual DRCs. 
9.3 DRC Estimates : Gemeral Remarks. 
Estimates of DRCs for the sample chosen are shown in 
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TABLE 9.1 ESTIMATES OF DRCs 1968/1969. 
ISIC FIRM DESCRIPTION DRC 
£/A 
3112 Milk Cream, Dry . 31 
3113 Tomato, Peeled 1.23 
3113 mates 1.57 
3115 Vegetable Oils (1) . 27 
3115 Vegetable Oils (2) . 22 
3115 Vegetable Oils (3) . 29 
3115 Vegetable Oils (4) . 23 
3116 Wheat Flour 1.31 
3118 Sugar (1) 1.41 
3118 Sugar (2) z6 
3119 Sweets (1) . 26 
3119 Sweets (2) . 40 
3119 Sweets (3) . 33 
3121 Macaroni (1) . 48 
3121 Macaroni (2) . 08 
3121 Onion Dehydration 2.56 
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TABLE 9.1 cont., 
ISIC FIRM DESCRIPTION DRC 
£M 
X131 Sherry 
3133 Beer 
3140 Cigarettes 
(31) DRC MEAN 
3211 Textiles 
3211 Textiles 
3213 Underwear 
3213 Underwear 
3231 Leather Tanning 
3240 Footwear 
(32) DRC MEAN 
3411 Kraft Paper 
3521 Paints 
(1) 
(2) 
(1) 
(2) 
1.49 
. 6o 
3.54 
. 93 
. 33 
0 28 
. 18 
. 28 
"55 
. 29 
. 3o 
2.71 
3523 Soap (1) . 19 
3.523 Soap (2) . 19 
3523 Soap (3) . 20 
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TABLE 9.1 cont. 
ISIC FIRM DESCRIPTION DREIgr 
3529 Matches 
3529 laundry Blue 
3529 Glue . 23 
3530 Petroleum Products . 21 
(35) DRC MEAN . 20 
3620 Glass Products . 16 
3692 Cement . 22 
3831 Car Batteries 4.36 
3833 Refrigerators (1) 
3833 Refrigerators (2) 
Indicates Negative Value Added 
at World Price. 
Source; See text. 
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Table (9. A) and although some industries are not represented at all, 
and others are only represented by one firm which might well be in 
its early years (infant), one thing is strikingly clear, and this is 
the fact that there are wide variations in DRCs both between indust- 
ries, and between firms in the same industry where there are two or 
more firms. Variability between the two extremes increases by a fac- 
tor of (5500) from (. 08 to 4.4 £S/1$). This huge factor does not take 
into consideration the 5- cases where the international value of 
the amounts produced by those firms is actually below the foreign 
exchange costs incurred in producing their products. Put differently, 
these firms are net losers of foreign exchange, 
1 
and the country 
could have imported products of greater amounts and possibly better 
quality for the same amount of foreign exchange these firms used. 
Negative value added shown by these firms is most likely to be gen- 
uine and not due to any reporting errors. Three of the five firms 
belong to the chemical industry and the other two are assembly firms, 
(refrigerators). In both groups value added (if positive) will be 
extremely small since all inputs are imported in semi-finished form. 
In particular, due to the long distance between Sudan and the main-* 
suppliers, the cost of transporting unassembled refrigerators might 
well exceed that of the final product. 
Because the sample does not give equal (or proportional) 
representation to all industries, it is not meaningful to pass jud- 
gement as to which are the most inefficient industries (i. e. with 
the highest DRCs). Moreover, the presence of extreme values (in the 
form of negative value added) makes it even more difficult to carry 
out inter- industry comparisons, when such values could not be given 
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weight in mean calculations. This could be illustrated by consid- 
ering the three most represented industries in the sample, food 
and beverages, textiles and leather, and chemicals, whose unweig- 
hted mean DRCs are (. 93), (. 30), (. 20), respectively. At first, 
this might suggest that the chemical industry is the most effici- 
ent of the three, as its DRC is less than a quarter of that of 
food, but when it is known that three out of the eight firms in 
the industry have negative DRCs, this hypothesis could easily be 
rejected. Thus, although it is inappropriate in the circumstances 
to draw inferences across industries, this could not be said when 
inter-firm relations are considered. When two or more firms prod- 
ucing identical products have widely different DRCs, the only po- 
ssible explanation is that some are more efficient than others, 
and the presence of the latter involves costs which could have 
been avoided. 
Let us further examine this aspect of efficiency by 
comparing DRCs to the exchange rate prevailing in the Sudan in 
1968/69. The Sudanese official exchange rate is fixed to the dol- 
lar at £1 -%2.87156 (or alternatively $1- £S . 348764). Due to 
the control measures, however, this rate is overvalued. The ext- 
ent of overvaluation is estimated by Kadri (1975) to be 29 % and 
26 % for 1968 and 1969 respectively, 
2 
which makes an average 
realistic exchange rate of $1= LA 4,67 (i. e. for 27.5 % overval- 
uation). It will be recalled that DRCs represent the rate at which 
the sample firms transform. domestic resources into international 
values; accordingly, a firm whose DRC is higher than the adjusted 
exchange rate (DRC > . 44) will be considered inefficient because 
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the resources it uses would have higher contribution (in terms 
of foreign exchange saving) if used by firms with lower DRCs. 
The results of the comparison between DRCs and the adjusted ex- 
change rate are given in Table (9. A. 1). According to the results, 
nearly half of the firms in the sample are inefficient foreign 
exchange savers (43.6 %). Moreover, the mean DRC for these inef- 
ficient firms (1.825) is nearly three times the sample mean (. 799) 
and more than five times the adjusted exchange rate. The results 
also indicate that low capacity utilization (50.8 %) character- 
izes the high cost firms. 
To indicate the extent of the cost to the Sudanese ec- 
onomy, which is caused by such misallocation, consider the follo- 
wing hypothetical example. Assume that the government wants to 
save (import substitute) 10 million dollars worth of goods at the 
least possible cost to domestic resources. Assume further that 
costs in the low DRC group will remain constant (e. g. through use 
of unutilized capacity). To substitute imports worth $ 10 million, 
the economy needs only to divert £2.4 million worth of resources 
to the low DRC group of industries (whose mean DRC - . 24). But to 
import-substitute the same worth of goods from the high DRC group 
the economy needs to forgo £18.3m., or nearly eight times more. 
Put differently, if the £18.3m. were to be spent in the first gr- 
oup, it would import substitute goods worth $ 76.25m., or more 
than half of Sudan imports in 1968. 
If the existence of two or more firms producing the 
same products at different DRCs implies inefficiency, it might be 
logical to ask how or why they are allowed to co-exist ? Such a 
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TABLE 9.1. a EFFICIENCY OF FIRMS IN THE SAMPLE. 
Efficient Inefficient ALL 
DRC < . 
44 DRC > . 
44 SAMPLE 
Mean DRC " 238 1.825 "799 
Mean % of capacity 
utilization 65.2 % 50.8% 60.3 % 
from the sample 
(number of firms) . 
56.4% 43.58 %- 
Source; Table 9.1; and Ministry of Industry 
and Mining. 
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question is logical, because when costs are different one expects 
the low cost firm to be able to drive the high cost one out of 
business. This assumes that the low cost producer - if he so des- 
ires - could expand to satisfy the market with his low cost prod- 
uce. This is not the case, however, for at least two reasons. Fi- 
rst, foreign exchange (as we saw in Chapter Six) is allocated not 
according to efficiency, but on an equal shares basis depending 
on installed capacity. Secondly, the guidelines for approving new 
industrial licences and/or capacity extension licences stipulate 
thä. t such applications should not be approved if the industry in 
question has excess capacity, or its installed capacity just sat- 
isfies expected demand. Thus low cost firms could not expand unl- 
ess high cost firms have utilized their capacity. If the limiting 
factor is foreign exchange then the two types of producers (effi- 
cient and inefficient) will co-exist because each will produce 
according to his share of the foreign exchange and not according 
to demand conditions or capacity considerations or efficiency. 
9.4 Regression Analysis of DRC Variations. 
9.4.1 Hypotheses. 
As the estimates show, there are wide variations in 
the computed DRCs within industries and between major industrial 
groups. A question may now be posed; namely, how could such lar- 
ge variations be explained ? One way of providing an answer to 
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such a question is by testing some hypotheses that might contri- 
bute to our understanding of the observed variations. Such tests 
will be carried out by the use of linear and non-linear (log tr- 
ansformation) regression analysis. In this-subsection we will 
state the hypotheses and in the subsequent sub section we will 
present and discuss the regression results. 
(i) Efficiency in input use: 
From (9.3) above, it was obvious that costs did not 
only differ between different firms producing different products, 
but also amongst firms producing similar (or even identical) pro- 
ducts. All firms using modern technology in Sudan could safely be 
assumed to import their mechanical equipment from abroad as there 
is no capital goods industry in the Sudan. In such circumstances, 
differences in costs such as those observed above could be attri- 
buted to the fact that some firms are more efficient in using that 
equipment than others. Put differently, for the same output diff- 
erent firms use different input mixes, with the less efficient 
firms using more of all factors (less output for the same amount 
of factor inputs). 
Assume that international marginal rates of transform- 
ation could be represented by foreign prices (for small countries). 
Now a firm that intends to compete internationally must produce the 
commodity concerned, with costs not exceeding those prevailing in- 
ternationally. This implies that if it uses more of some factorsi. 
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it must use less of others or it will be driven out of the market. 
But this is a general rule that applies to all firms, whether they 
want to compete internationally or not. Thus we can expect that 
firms that use relatively more capital or labour per unit of out- 
put will have higher DRC. Accordingly, we can formulate and test 
the hypotheses that DRCs will be positively correlated with factor/ 
KL 
output ratios ( IVA 
' 
NA 
). 
(ii) Factor Intensity. 
If a country has a comparative advantage in producing 
a certain commodity, it is implied that it produces such a comm- 
odity at a relatively low cost compared to other countries. Var- 
iations in DRC imply that different commodities are produced at 
different costs, or alternatively, the country produces some co- 
mmodities more efficiently than others. Standard trade theory 
suggests that countries which are relatively more endowed with a 
particular factor (e. g. capital) than others are likely to have 
low costs and hence comparative advantage in capital intensive 
industries. If the predictions of the model are correct, the im- 
plications for LDCs are obvious. LDCs are generally considered 
to be labour-surplus economies, hence their comparative advanta- 
ge should lie with activities that use labour-intensive techniq- 
ues, or, 
"... if the same production functions exist in all 
countries and if capital is scarce relative to 
labour in a LDC, comparative advantage in the 
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latter can be identified by low capital-labour 
ratios. " 
(Chenery 1965; P. 133) 
Thus according to the theory one would expect that 
DRCs to be lowest in activities that require relatively low ca- 
pital labour ratios. 
The abundance and scarcity of factors of production 
is not as neat as is implied from trade theory. Unlike the model 
(which uses two factors), in the real world (in this case LDCs in 
particular) there are a number of factors of production. In LDCs 
not only capital is scarce, but also skilled labour, foreign ex- 
change and sometimes land. Accordingly, it might not be appropr- 
iate to test for the validity of the predictions of the trade 
model 
3 (under the circumstances); it is still tempting, however, 
to do so, using the information on the factors available to us. 
For the capital/labour ratio we have information on two variants, 
fixed assets per worker and value of mechanical equipment per wo- 
rker. For the skill co-efficient the only available proxy is the 
average wage per worker. For the latter, an objection could be 
raised on the grounds that different wages might reflect the eff- 
ect of geographical location, but as 80 % of 1968/69 data pertain 
to the Khartoum area, we could safely dismiss such an objection 
if raised. We are thus in a position to test the hypotheses that 
firms with a low capital/labour ratio and/or low skill co-effici- 
ent have low DRCs. 
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Iiii) Capacity Under-utilization. 
It is generally known that the small markets of LDCs 
do not allow the construction of industrial units which are ec- 
onomically viable. This is true, of course, for some, but not 
for all industries. It could be implied that if an industry falls 
within the former category but is allowed to operate in a LDC, 
it will be relatively inefficient, because the market will set a 
limit on its production. In Sudan (as in many LDCs), it is not 
only the market that sets the ceiling for production, but also, 
and more likely, the capacity utilization is limited by shortages 
of raw materials, technical skilld and foreign exchange. 
In particular the shortage of foreign exchange, which 
led in-the first place to much tighter controls on trade and pay- 
ments, and the way the foreign exchange budget is administered, 
helps both to create excess capacity and to hamper full capacity 
utilization. Foreign exchange is distributed by the officials of 
the Ministry of Industry on pro rata basis according to installed 
capacity. Thus the criterion is not efficiency conscious, rather 
it enhances inefficiency by guaranteeing inefficient firms already 
in existence equal shares together with efficient firms. Under 
such circumstances, both efficient and inefficient firms will st- 
rive to increase their shares out of the foreign exchange budget. 
The efficient firm which wants to reap profits by expanding pro- 
duction and utilizing its installed capacity, could do so only 
through buying the limiting factor (foreign exchange) from the 
black (free) market at a high premium. If, however, he could have 
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more capacity installed, he could get a larger amount of foreign 
exchange at the subsidized (overvalued) rate, a rate that is cl- 
early preferable to that of the black market. Although not all 
applicants for new capacity will suceed, a significant number of 
them certainly do, and new entrants could always beat the system 
by applying for a large capacity from the beginning. 
But foreign exchange shortage and its allocation are 
not the only factors responsible for excess capacity; there are 
also other reasons for capacity under-utilization. Prominent am- 
ong these is the shortage of domestically produced raw materials. 
There is evidence that some firms using local raw materials are 
operating at less than , 
50 % of installed capacity (e. g. vegetable 
oils) because such materials (groundnuts, sesame, cotton seed) 
are also exported raw. Such evidence on capacity under-utilizat- 
ion makes it natural to test the hypotheses that high DRC are 
strongly associated with capacity under-utilization. 
(iv) Ownership. 
What is to be tested here is simply whether government 
enterprises are operating on lower cost schedules than private 
firms. This is a particularly interesting aspect for Sudan (and 
other LDCs) since the government takes an active role in industry. 
It is argued that in LDCs the development of a private or capita- 
list class does not take place spontaneously and slowly as its 
counterpart in developed Western economies. Rather, it is either 
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encouraged by the governments, or by the circumstances, where the 
settlers moved out and the nationals stepped into their shoes. Mo- 
reover, the private sector in these countries is risk-averse, uni- 
nventive in the sense of importing, and engaging only in already 
tested fields, and has little concern for lowering costs because 
of the monopoly or quasi-monopoly situation it is in. 
Furthermore, it is no longer tenable to leave the eco- 
nomy to develop on its own, and therefore national governments 
have taken it as their job to plan and lead the economy to attain 
high growth rates which are thought to be otherwise unattainable. 
The financially weak private sector is not expected to invest in 
all fields which the government think of as high priority, and 
thus in order to achieve plan targets, reliance must be put on the 
public rather than the private sector. 
9.4.2 Regression Results. 
Estimates of domestic resource costs (DRCs) are regre- 
ssed on a number of explanatory variables (see hypotheses above). 
Regression equations took two forms; the arithmetic and the addi- 
tive (loglinear forms), these are s- 
DRC = a1+a2K/IVA +a3 L/IVA +a4 K/L 
+a W/L +a6 Cap +a7 Own 
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K -L K 
log DRC -ß1+ ß2 log +ß3 log +ß log 
IVA IVA L 
w 
+ ß5 log +ß6 log Cap 
L 
where 
DRC Domestic Resource Cost. 
K Capital employed per Sudanese F. of international value 
IVA 
added. 
L Number of workers employed per Sudanese £ of interna- 
IVA tional value added. 
K Capital per worker (Capital - labour ratio). 
L 
W Skill co-efficient; the wage bill divided by the num- 
L ber of employees. 
Cap Percentage of utilized capacity. 
Own A dummy variable for ownership; where a firm is cons- 
idered under public ownership (0) if the government 
holds 51 % of its assets; otherwise it is considered 
privately owned (1). 
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There is no a priori reason why one particular form 
should provide a better fit than the other, therefore regress- 
ion results for both forms are reported in Tables (92) and 3ý). 
The results are based on thirty-four observations, having omi- 
tted DRCs whose value is negative (DRC is not well behaved when 
international value added is negative) and one more observation 
which pertains to the petroleum products, where independant va- 
riables are of extreme values and found to affect the means of 
such variables considerably. With regard to the independant va- 
riables themselves, we used two variables for each of 
K 
and 
LL 
. For the first, the alternatives were fixed assets divided 
IVA 
by the number of employees and value of mechanical equipment 
divided by employees. For the second, the two alternatives were 
the work-force divided by international value added, and the 
wage bill divided by international VAD. In both cases, the chan- 
ge between alternatives did not indicate any preference for ei- 
ther of the alternatives and the reported results are according- 
ly based on only one alternative each, the fixed assets (for 
_) 
L 
and the number of employees (rather than wage bill)( 
L ). 
IVA 
We hypothesized that inefficiency in factor use may 
explain some of the variability observed in our estimates of DRC. 
A look at the Tables does show that the co-efficient of capital 
used per £ of value added is indeed significant in all equations 
estimated, suggesting that in less developed countries, it is not 
unlikely for capital (equipment) to be over-used (mis-used) thr- 
ough shortage of skilled maintenance workers and/or more frequent 
breaks' stoppages etc. For the same reason, shortages of foreign 
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exchange for spare parts may also make it necessary to have more 
machinery than is actually needed, thus raising the 
K 
ratio. 
K NA This positive association between DRC, and could not be 
IVA 
sustained with regard to labour. The co-efficient of 
L has 
NA 
the wrong sign in all of the arithmetic forms and is insignifi- 
cant (although not negative) in the log. forms. 
There is no obvious reason why the 
L 
ratio should 
IVA 
not figure in explaining DRC variability especially after the 
possibility that the two might be multicollinear could not be 
substantiated (rab a . 31). But although the results make clear 
that K is a significant explanatory variable, it could not be 
IVA 
said that only inefficiency in factor use could explain large va- 
riations observed in DRCs. Indeed, estimates for equations using 
only 
K, L 
yielded a very poor fit (R 
2- 
. 336). IVA IVA 
The evidence on factor intensity does not conform to 
arthe predictions of the trade model that a LDC like Sudan should 
have comparative advantage (low DRCs) in industries that use la- 
bour intensive techniques. The results for the capital labour 
ratio parameter are either insignificant or have the wrong (neg- 
ative) sign, which amounts to saying that it does not really ma- 
tter (costwise), whether Sudanese manufacturing industries use 
capital intensive or labour intensive techniques. But the same 
conclusion could not be reached with regard to the other scarce 
factor, skilled labour. The skill co-efficient is significant at 
the 1% level in both forms and for all combinations of explana- 
tory variables. This latter result may have captured the effects 
of intensive use of both scarce factors, capital and skill. Ind- 
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eed, if we consider capital to consist only of mechanical equip- 
ment which has to be manned by skilled labour, then capital-int- 
ensive techniques by necessity become skill intensive. Accordin- 
gly, the significant results pertaining to the skill co-efficient 
could be interpreted more broadly to enable us to reject the hy- 
pothescis that intensive use of scarce factors does not affect 
the structure of costs in the Sudanese manufacturing industry. 
Tests for under-utilization of capacity and ownership 
as explanatory variables show that both factors are highly sign- 
ificant. In fact, the explanatory power of the estimated equat- 
ions is considerably reduced (from R2 a . 
58 to . 46 Table 9b) when 
these variables are omitted. As we saw in (9.4.1) above, creation 
of excess capacity is inherent in the control system adopted. Ra- 
tioning of foreign exchange is effected not on efficient use of 
foreign exchange (or other factors), but on methods thought to be 
fair " to everyone, meaning that it is based on historical sh- 
ares, which are themselves based on capacity installed. But cap- 
acity installed, even if it is not meant to be fully used, pushes 
costs up. Thus it is not a surprising result, rather it is the ex- 
pected result that the co-efficient of capacity be significantly 
non-zero and of the anticipated negative sign (high DRCs associ- 
ated with low rates of capacity utilization). 
There is no--meason, however, to expect such a result 
with regard to the ownership dummy. In fact it is reasonable to 
expect the rejection of the null hypothesis that publicly owned 
enterprises are not significantly more inefficient than privately 
owned firms. Indeed, in the face of an economic strategy that puts 
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high hopes on the public sector to play a significant part, and 
therefore of the'facilities expected to be extended to it ( in 
terms of personnel and foreign exchange), one might even expect 
publicly owned enterprises to be more efficient than private'en- 
terprises, thus supporting the dictum that private sector in LDCs 
is different from (did not develop naturally) its counterpart in 
developed countries, and therefore incapable of leading the econ- 
omies of LDCs, on their potential optimal paths. From this point 
of view, these results are rather unfortunate. The ownership co- 
efficient is significant at the 95 % confidence level, and the re- 
sult indicates that costs are inversly related to private ownership 
in the sample of firms considered; in the sense that a relatively sm- 
all number of high cost firms is expected to be found in a sample 
that contains relatively more privately owned firms. 
This result is alarming in view of the fact that in 
most LDCs governments (public sector) have the additional respo- 
nsibility of creating jobs in activities and regions where the 
private sector is unwilling or unable to play a part. Inadequacy 
or lack of infra-structure and/or entrepreneural talent (and fi- 
nancial ability) have led governments in LDCs not to nationalize 
key industries like developed countries, but to seek help to es- 
tablish and ran such industries which are of strategic importance 
to development e. g. construction materials (cement, steel), min- 
ing, large agricultural projects (including dams). The evidence 
provided by these regression results to the effect that the pri- 
vata sector stands a better chance in utilizing domestic resour- 
ces more efficiently than the public sector, can not go unchalle- 
nged, however. The sample which provided this seemingly paradox- 
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ical result (depending on the way one looks at it), is sufficie- 
ntly biased to produce such a paradox. 
Recall that the sample is purposive rather than random, 
which is the ideal as statistics text books would suggest but pr- 
actically difficult to come by in certain areas of research. Fi- 
rms are chosen because among other reasons, they produce mainly 
one product for which the CIF price could be reliably computed. 
This aspect particularly characterizes public sector firms (e. g. 
sugar, onion dehydration, fruit canning, powdered milk, dates) 
who, moreover, have better and more reliable accounts, both with 
regard to costs and capacity utilization. Private sector firms 
tended to be of smaller size and producing a variety of products 
(household utensils, perfumery, chemical products) and their re- 
cords of capacity installed and capacity utilized are often sub- 
ject to doubt. The sample used actually contain more than 70 % of 
public sector firms, but only a small percentage of private sector 
manufacturing firms. It might-be remembered that public sector fi- 
rms are located in particular regions for political reasons, and 
are kept running not because they are making profits, but because 
they contribute to alleviating regional unemployment (Kassala on- 
ion dehydration factory, in Eastern Sudan, Karima date factory in 
the North, Babanousa in Western Sudan, and Wau canning factory in 
the South). In fact, in a five year period, six government owned 
factories, which are still kept running, incurred losses of £7.3 
million, while the total capital invested is £13.6m. 
4 
Under such 
circumstances, the sample results are bound to be biased and the 
confidence with which such results are to be adopted as represen- 
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tative must take into consideration the circumstances surronding 
the sample. 
Finally, consider the elasticity of the domestic res- 
ource cost with regard to different factors of production inclu- 
ded. This is given by the co-efficients of the log estimates. Re- 
producing equations (1) and (3) from Table (9.3). 
log DRC = 3.984 + . 227 log KA VA + . 133 log L/IVA (3.366) (1.75) (1.163) 
-. 064 log K/L + 1.711 log W/L -. 567 log Cap R2 - . 753 
(-. 327) (4.570) (-2.234) 
log DRC = 1.397 + . 263 log K/ NA + . 163 log 1/ NA (2.897) (2.776) (1.114) 
+ 1.4,62 log W/L R2 a . 689 (3.962) 
As the equations show, DRCs appear to be more sensitive to use of 
capital (per unit of international value added) than to labour. 
This might indicate that, in Sudan, more use of capital is not 
readily accompanied by the necessary supply of skilled workers 
that can handle the increase in capital equipment and/or the for- 
eign exchange necessary for the supply of needed parts. Of course, 
other totally different factors could be responsible for such re- 
sults. 
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9.5 Factors Contributing to Observed Inefficiency. 
Although no attempt has been made to test the infancy 
hypothesis, one could still argue that observed differences in 
DRCs could be assumed to have persisted in the past, and will co- 
ntinue to do so in the foreseeable future, unless a structural 
change occurs, concerning trade policies now prevailing. 
S Wide 
variations in costs could therefore be traced back to the " soc- 
iology " of the production process in the Sudan. Generally spea- 
king, under a system of Quantative restrictions the market system 
is made redundant and its functions in allocation and distribut- 
ion are carried out through administrative regulations. For ins- 
tance, under a'properly functioning market system, the market 
rewards efficient producers with higher profits (through expans- 
ion and more sales), and penalizes inefficient firms (through ' 
losses incurred) and such firms can either lower their costs (ra- 
ise their productivity) or quit the market. There is, therefore, 
a direct relationship between efficiency and profitability. A 
question may now be posed with regard to Sudan; Does the profit- 
ability of a firm depend on its efficiency ? 
As we saw in the Chapters on Industrial Policy, Import 
Policy and Commercial Policy Tools, there are a number of factors 
that bear on the production process in the manufacturing sector. 
First, not every application for a new industrial establishment . 
will be successfully approved because more licences approved mean 
more claims on foreign exchange resources. Therefore, a success- 
ful applicant, more often than not finds himself in a monopoly or 
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quasi-monopoly situation. Secondly, a successful applicant will 
have to compete with others old and new, for a share in the li- 
mited foreign exchange budget designated for the manufacturing 
industry. It is the nature of manufacturing sectors which engage 
predominantly in import substituting activities to be heavily 
dependant on foreign equipment and materials, (and hence on for- 
eign exchange available). In such circumstances, the binding co- 
nstraint on profitability is not the ability (or inability) to 
sell, but the ability or otherwise, to secure continuous (and 
maximum) production; since due to restrictions on imports any am- 
ount of output could be sold profitably. Put differently, instead 
of profitability being a direct function of how efficiently the 
firm operates, it seems that it depends on factors other than ef- 
ficiency. Accordingly, one could safely say that (in the Sudan) 
more and continuous 
6 
production ensures profitability. ' 
To reap profits it is not enough (or even necessary) 
that a producer should work hard to achieve technical efficiency. 
A producer will be better off (in terms of profits) if he directs 
his managerial talents towards getting the necessary licences, 
rather than towards improving efficiency or the quality of his 
products. This is because the producer who is more successful in 
getting licences of greater value and/or in getting licences more 
quickly than his fellow producers will have higher or quicker pr- 
ofits. Once a quota in the foreign exchange budget is secured, 
production (sales) and hence profits are assured. 
7 
There is therefore, all the temptation for the entre- 
preneural attention to be devoted to those factors that determine 
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profitability; aquiring industrial (investment)'8 licence and en- 
suring a continuous flow of the raw materials needed. If the pro- 
ducer succeeds in his efforts, he is expected to reap substantial 
profits, if he does not succeed, or he is unwilling to compete in 
those markets (for licence) his costs are expected to rise sharp- 
ly for a number of reasons. If the firm depends on foreign mater- 
ials and equipment, -as most firms do, then lack (or shortages) of 
foreign exchange will result in closure of the plant and disrupt- 
ion of production. If the foreign exchange needed is primarily for 
raw materials, the plant could still close down, or the producer 
buys, at a high premium, foreign exchange and/or the materials th- 
emselves from the black " free " market (he could also use infer- 
ior or improper materials). 
The struggle against factory close-downs or disruption 
of production is not confined to the foreign exchange (licence) 
market alone. To avoid close-downs, the producer has to avoid de- 
lays in material or spare part deliveries. Under extreme urgency, 
a producer might be granted permission to air-freight his spare 
parts or materials; but the usual thing is for materials and equ- 
ipment to arrive at Port Sudan. Sudan Railways is notoriously in- 
efficient and as one IBRD report observes that :- 
"... Sudan Railway's recent annual reports, in recor- 
ding the proportion of trains arriving on time 
as varying between 3% and 74, regularly refer 
to effects of engine failures, engineering works, 
sandstorms and heavy rains.... the railways, it is 
true, has to cope with these problems. But then 
these can not be blamed for daily experience of 
late running. " 
(IBRD 1972; Vol. 1V; Chapter 3. P. 8) 
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The traffic is particularly heavy on the Khartoum - Port Sudan line. 
(while this line (Khartoum - Port Sudan) accounts for only 17 % of 
the total network, it carries 60 % of the freight traffic). To avoid 
delays, producers also have to compete for the limited rail capacity, 
and to do so successfully, a reasonably high premium is expected to 
be paid. 
9 
One last problem is the market for domestically produced 
inputs. It could be argued that manufacturing industry in LDCs should 
start as an agro-industry i. e. processing agricultural and livestock 
materials which are relatively more abundant in LDCs. Industries of 
this type are in for trouble if their domestic raw material is also 
an exportable in its raw state. This is relevant for e. g. the veget- 
able oil industry (also soap, and cake and meal). These industries 
process cotton seed, groundnuts and sesame, and these products rank 
second only to cotton in the export list (see Chapter Five). Manufac- 
turers therefore have to compete with exporters for the limited amo- 
unts of export surpluses. If foreign prices (expected ) are high, ex- 
porters will outbid manufacturers or compel them to buy at prohibit- 
ively high prices (and high costs). Similar difficulties in aquiring 
domestically produced raw materials might arise if such products are 
affected by low rainfall or locusts. In fact, even when there are no 
supply shortages, domestic manufacturers still face a problem, whether 
they are buying such materials from the public sector (e. g. cotton, 
cotton seed) or private growers (groundnuts, sesame). They are requ- 
ired to buy (and store) all the amounts they require during the year 
in one lot, and pay for it in cash. 
10 While it is true that private 
suppliers might not be in a financial position to extend payment con- 
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cessions similar to those provided by foreign suppliers, the main 
reason is that there is no shortage of buyers for such export ma- 
terials, which makes it a sellers market. 
While technical inefficiency might be a strong factor 
in explaining cost difference, effects of such factors as mentioned 
above should not be under-estimated. If they are at all important 
then the indication is that some structural measures addressing 
themselves to easing transport bottlenecks# increasing supply of 
domestically produced materials are needed to go hand in hand with 
some degree of trade liberalization. The best way to economize on 
foreign exchange is perhaps to increase its supply through expand- 
ing those activities which best earn it, rather than allow indust- 
ries to grow indiscriminately in the hope of saving it. In the lat- 
ter case, and certainly in the case of Sudan, one could not suggest 
that all restrictions should be removed immediatly. With foreign ex- 
change earnings falling far behind the bare import requirements, 
only gradual relaxation of controls can be advocated. 
9.6i Summary. 
(1) Estimates of DRCs vary widely between industries and between fi- 
rms in the same industry. When such estimates are compared to a 
cut-off exchange rate (i. e. official exchange rate adjusted for 
overvaluation) results suggest that nearly half at the firms in 
the sample are inefficient foreign exchange savers. 
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2 High DRCs (according to tests carried out) may be due to fac- 
tors such as inefficiency in input use and capacity underuti- 
lization, but factors like ownership and factor intensity may 
also be responsible. 
3 The effect of yet other factors such as availability of foreign 
exchange, the way it is allocated between firms, and the poor 
infrastructural services, should not, however, be underestimated. 
NOTES. 
1 STEEL, W. F. " Import Substitution and Excess Capacity in Ghana 
OEP 1972; pp. 212 - 240 for similar results. 
2 KADRI, A. " Sudan Exchange Rate : Estimates of Change in its 
Effective Exchange Rate " Economic and Social Research Council 
Bulletin Number 13. February 1974 Khartoum P. 24, Table 8. 
3 The test is carried in the broad context of the implications 
(commonsense) of the model and is not intended, of course, as a 
test for its validity. 
4 RASHEED, S. " The Experience'of Public Industrialization in 
Sudan " ESRC Bulletin Number 28. August 1976; P. 8. 
5 This is not to say that the only reason for inefficiency is trade 
policy. 
6 Not all industries are, however, without unsold produce. Thus in 
1968 unsold produce as a percentage of all production was 8% in 
confectionery, 9% in canning, 17 % in onion dehydration and 25 % 
in glass products. One ready explanation with regard for canning 
and onion is that they are new products to the Sudanese consumer 
and needed time to establish themselves. 
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7 Profits are obtained not only through using Foreign Exchange 
to produce (and sell) more, but also through the short cut of 
selling imported materials or the licence itself (at a prem- 
ium) the thing that is frequently practiced and more profit- 
able in Sudan. It is said that one publicly owned firm sold 
most of its foreign exchange quota, realized profits in its 
balance sheet while it utilized less than 30 % of its capacity 
that year. 
8 This is shown to be less of an obstacle than it should be; see 
Awad (1970) Op. Cit. P. 188. 
9 Road transport (untarmac - ed) is approximately seven times 
more expensive than railways. IBRD 1972; P. 9. 
" Economic Development and Prospects of Sudan " Volume 4, 
Annex 3- The Transport Sector P. 9 IBRD East African Depart- 
ment, June 1972. 
10 AWAD, M. H. " Government Policy towards Private Industry in Sudan" 
L' Egypte Contempraire April 1970; P. 197. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
During the period under consideration, a complex comm- 
ercial policy system was in operation (Chapter Flour). The balance 
of the system was strongly in favour of production for the home 
market, as against exports. One predictable result of such a sys- 
tem was for domestic manufacturing to replace imports rapidly, and 
for exports to show some stagnation. But while domestic producers 
did increase their share of the local market, and were able to re- 
place, wholly or partially, some imports, exports (on aggregate) 
did not stagnate, thanks to the favourable trend in international 
price movements (traditional exports). With regard to manufactured 
exports, however, the system might have slowed down the realization 
of their potential, but since the manufacturing sector was in its 
first phase of development, little would have been expected from it 
by way of exports, anyway. 
Industrialization was seen not only as desirable, but 
also as a necessary part of an overall development strategy (7.2). 
Thus, although the measures taken were prompted by foreign exchange 
shortages, they. were similtaneously intended as promotion measures 
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to achieve industrialization targets. In fact, these measures by 
themselves were seen as far from adequate considering the stage of 
development of the Sudanese economy in general, and that of its 
manufacturing sector in particular. Accordingly, generous concess- 
ions were extended to the sector, and the state itself took an ac- 
tive role in investing in some areas (7.3)" 
Government intervention was a welcome step in the cir- 
cumstances. In many LDCs, there are areas where often only direct 
public investment is the practical solution e. g. projects with long 
pay-out periods and infrastructures. Perhaps State intervention in 
the above areas was even less than optimal due to the scarcity of 
resources at the disposal of the government, compared to the needs 
of a country at the Sudan's stage of development. What was not as 
welcome, however, were the massive protective measures provided by 
the system. 
It might be the case that (in order) for domestic man- 
ufacturing industry to develop and become competitive, it has to be 
protected in the initial stages. Indeed, this seems to be the patt- 
ern in most countries, developed and less developed. But while pro- 
tection is recognized to be a powerful instrument to create domestic 
manufacturing industry, it is not useful in making it efficient. In 
fact, the experience of many'LDCs (Balassa 1971) suggest that the 
high profits accruing to the protected industries do not serve as an 
incentive to minimize costs. Instead, they seem to reduce the search 
for better production methods, better organization and improved qua- 
lity (Bergsman 1970); and without suggesting that industrialists of 
the LDCs do not attempt to maximize profits, the indication is that 
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protection gains, instead of being realized in the form of higher 
profits, they tended to be absorbed by higher costs (i. e. " Quiet- 
life " effects (Bergsman 1970) or " live and let live " Balassa 
1971). 
The effects of the protective system on domestic man- 
ufacturing industry in the Sudan, have been discussed in detail in 
Chapters Eight and Nine. The most important features of such effe- 
cts were as follows. First, there has been considerable inequality 
in the intersectoral and interindustrial structure of*protection. 
Not only has the system discriminated against the agricultural se- 
ctor, in favour of manufacturing, but within the manufacturing se- 
ctor itself average ERPs differed considerably between broad indu- 
strial groups (2-digit level) and within these groups (4-digit le- 
vels). Moreover, they varied, and high ERPs seem to have been con- 
ferred indiscriminately between the different activities. In evid- 
ence of this, the two sets of ERP computed (for 1968169 and 1972/73, 
show that protection continued for a number of industries for which 
negative value added at world prices obtained throughout the period, 
with little attempt (if any) to discourage such industries. In cont- 
rast, there were a number of other activities which were effectively 
taxed by the system (ERP < 0) and which were actual or potential fo- 
reign exchange earners. 
Since two sets of ERP are computed at two different poi- 
nts in time, and since both sets are shown to exhibit wide variations, 
one is led to the conclusion that this diversity in rates is evidence 
of a lack of a consistent set of criteria in setting tariff rates. Mo- 
reover, the policy followed, seems to have paid little attention to 
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the costs involved in such indiscriminate protection to industry. 
Thus, apart from the dynamic costs (P. above), misallocation 
costs are also involved. Observed variations in ERP between act- 
ivities and industries strongly suggest that resources were enc- 
ouraged to move to certain sectors or industries without these 
being optimal destinations for such resources. 
Secondly, apart from protection being conferred ind- 
iscriminately upon different activities, it has been shown that 
(8.3.7) characteristics exhibited by the highly protected industr- 
ies differed considerably from what was expected by the planners. 
This is not to say that the criteria (for desired ventures) set in 
the different Investment Acts were (clear) or unambiguous. Far from 
being so (7.3. a), but in general, the intention was to encourage 
industries that would save foreign exchange and/or employ more Sud- 
anese labour and/or use local raw materials (7.3. a). By contrast, 
the pattern of industry that emerged is both import-intensive and 
capital intensive (8.3.7). 
Thirdly, an important characteristic of manufacturing 
industry seems to be the presence of high cost firms (9.3). The 
domestic resource cost of saving a unit of foreign exchange in 
some firms (DRC) is found to be several times the average cost. 
Despite this, protection permitted the profitable operation of 
such firms, whereas their elimination (resource transfer) might 
have resulted in considerable gains to the country. Moreover, ind- 
ustry is not only characterized by high cost firms, but also DRCs 
tended to vary considerably between industries and between firms 
in the same industry. While inferences about proportionally large 
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welfare losses from the first type of DRC variations (among indus- 
tries) may not be correct (e. g. expanding output in low DRC indus- 
tries may run into increasing costs), the second type (inter-firm 
variations - which are also as wide as those between industries) 
strongly suggest that the pattern of investment allocations was less 
than optimal. Attempts to explain such variations, show significant 
relationships between high DRCs and low capacity utilization rates 
and between high DRCs and high factor - output ratios (inefficiency 
in input use). Account, however, must also be taken of the way for- 
eign exchange is allocated between claimants and the underdeveloped 
nature of infrastructural services. 
One would perhaps be surprised if the barrage of commer- 
cial policy measures in operation at the time had resulted in a dif- 
ferent set of features. Industrialization, as mentioned earlier, was 
first thought of and pursued as an integral part of a development 
strategy. For this purpose, generous concessions were made to manuf- 
acturers and all industries were encouraged indiscriminately, (lack 
of selectivity in this early period might have led to the establish- 
ment of some high cost industries). With the concessions, protection 
was also accorded in the form of tariffs on competing imports. Through 
time, however, more imports were put on the tariff schedule, some were 
banned altogether, and others had their duties raised (tariffs are 
important for government revenue). The nature of both the industrial 
strategy and the protective measures seem to have undergone some 
change. 
Import substitution, which was pursued as a deliberate 
development policy, has changed to one basically necessiated by bal- 
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ance of payments difficulties and commercial policy changed from 
one geared to protection to one more poncerned with conserving 
foreign exchange (6.2). As foreign exchange shortages became more 
severe, any imported product, once it was fully replaced by domes- 
tic production is either banned, or a high duty is placed on it 
such that the sheltered market for the import-substituting indus- 
try continued to exist, thus providing little incentive for firm- 
competition and cost reduction. Moreover, foreign exchange is ra- 
tioned and the methods according to which foreign exchange has 
been allocated did not pay attention to the efficiency with which 
different firms used resources. A typical method was to allocate 
foreign exchange according to installed capacity, which gave inef- 
ficient firms equal rights with other firms to a share in the for- 
eign exchange budget (instead of penalizing them), and encouraged 
investment in added capacity. 
The main emphasis of the policy for most of the period 
was on saving rather than earning foreign exchange. Thus, it was 
only in the latter years that an exchange tax/subsidy scheme was 
introduced (4.2.3), to adjust downwards the exchange rate and red- 
uce the disincentive of the overvalued currency against exports. 
The only other attempt at export promotion was a small duty rebate 
on imports used for manufactured exports. 
All in all, the structure of protection is shown to be 
biased towards foreign exchange saving rather than earning, and co- 
stly judging by the variability of the incentives it conferred on 
different lines of production (8.3). If such structure is allowed 
to continue, one may expect more inefficient manufacturing indust- 
ýý 
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ries and more shortages in the foreign exchange it intended to save. 
This may happen because as the foreign exchange budget becomes more 
strained, less foreign exchange will be made available for non-ess- 
entials (and hence more protection for them). Import substitution 
for this category will become more profitable (and hence stepped up) 
especially under a continuously protected home market. More resour- 
ces will be transferred towards import-substitution and against ex- 
ports (as ERP theory predicts) thus leading to less foreign exchange 
earnings and hence to more import substitution (as more non-essent- 
ials are cut as a result). It seems therefore, that some corrective 
measures are called for. 
Perhaps tie first emphasis should be on the fact that 
earning foreign exchange is at least as equally important as saving 
it. One of the first priorities, therefore, should be the removal 
of the bias against both agriculture and export sectors by waiving 
duties on agricultural inputs and the different levies on exports. 
While this will at first reduce government revenue, which depends 
largely on indirect taxes, in time exports might be expected to re- 
spond favourably, thus leading to an increase in imports, tariff re- 
venue and hence government revenue. Some positive ways of promoting 
exports should also be considered. If the present import substitu- 
ting manufacturing industry is to go beyond the small Sudanese mar- 
ket and earn (rather than save) foreign exchange, something more 
than the present rebate for manufactured exports is needed (e. g a 
share in the foreign exchange earned). With regard to traditional 
exports, a direct subsidy might be difficult to raise, and there- 
fore it may be reasonable to keep and extend the present exchange 
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tax/subsidy scheme. While this will act as an incentive to exporters 
(town-barter is a welcome step in this direction), it will help make 
imports dearer and reduce the bias towards capital intensive and im- 
port intensive manufacturing. 
The losses involved in providing differential (and per- 
haps indiscriminate) incentives were indicated earlier. One necessary 
measure, therefore, is to equalize incentives for all industries that 
could be judged to have passed infancy. Growing-up of industries 
could be ensured (or at least attempted) if incentives are provided 
on a declining (and strict) time-scale, so that producers can plan in 
full knowledge of the expected future changes in the system, and could 
therefore be expected to improve their operations, or face the conse- 
quences (disappear). Government revenue depends heavily on import du- 
ties and it may not be feasible to reduce protection (in time) through 
lower tariffs. The protective effect of high tariffs could, however, 
be manipulated through appropriate production taxes and/or more exp- 
ensive inputs. Protection through import bans could also be tackled. 
If the argument for bans is to eliminate claims on official foreign 
exchange from those particular imports for which domestic substitutes 
are available, licences (for-limited amounts) could be issued on nil- 
value terms or to exporters (allowing them a small share in the for- 
eign exchange prodeeds of their exports) as an incentive by way of a 
measure inducement. This will remove the status of continuous protec- 
tion from the domestic market, add to the government revenue (such 
imports not being exempt from tariffs), while at the same time not 
laying claims on the foreign exchange budget. 
Finally, industrial policy and the way foreign exchange 
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is allocated also have much to do with the observed performance of 
manufacturing industry. Thus, foreign exchange should be guided not 
by installed capacity which gives historical rights to inefficient 
firms equal to efficient ones, but by criteria which will take ef- 
ficiency in resource use into consideration. Criteria for project 
selection, despite frequent changes, remain vague and is thought to 
have been partially responsible for characteristics exhibited by the 
manufacturing industry. A change in industrial policy which gives 
concessions according to a time-scale (as advocated above) and ma- 
kes the criteria for project selection more meaningful, and attaches 
weights to different criteria, such that more assistance is given 
only to those that best satisfy the criteria,, is necessary if the 
present pattern of industry is to change. 
it is perhaps worthwhile to stress that the results 
from which the above policy implications are drawn, should be tre- 
ated with extreme care. Apart from the conceptual problems associ. 
ated with the measures used (see Chapters One and Two, above), em- 
pirical difficulties pertaining to the quality of data (as indica- 
ted in Chapters Six, Eight and Nine) also make such caution neces- 
ary. It is hoped that the insight gained, concerning the nature of 
the difficulties involved, will facilitate future directions and 
improvements in the study. 
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APPENDIX TABLE (A) IMPLICIT TAXATION OF GUM ARABIC 
(£S/m. t. ) 
1974/75 75/76 76/77 
1 Producer Price 406.3 200.3 200.3 
2 Gibana (local tax) 4.56 4.56 .. 
4.56 
3 Provincial Fees 11.13 11.13 11.13 
4 Commission of Agent (local merchant) 9.6 8.9 8.9 
5 Transport & Handling 77.8 61.95 61.95 
6 Port Sudan. Delivery Price 509.3 286.98 286.89 
7 Royalties 34.7 34.7 34.7 
8 Export Tax 35.7 25.12 23.7 
9 Development Tax 35.7 25.12 23.7 
10 Price Stabilization Fund(£1/karton) 22.26 22.26 22.26 
11 Currency Devaluation Levy 1.0 1.0 1.0 
12 Health Check 1.0 . 
1.0 1.0 
13 Gum-Arabic Company Profits 24.9 17.6 16.6 
14 Commission for Agent(seller abroad) 14.3 10.1 9.5 
15 Port Handling, Storage, Insurance, etc. 35.3 78.7 S4.6 
16 Port Sudan FOB 714.3 5oz. 4 474.1 
17 E1 Obeid Export Parity Price 601.2 361.8 357.4 
18 Proceedure Price(line 1) as a% of 
Export Parity Price (17) 68 % 55 % 56 % 
19 Implicit Tax Rate 32 % 45 % 44 %ý 
The Export Parity Price - FOB price(16)less real costs(transport, han- dling etc. 5,15), while tie producer price is the auction price. the differ- 
ence: between the two(19) is due o all levies on expo s. 
Source; Gum Arabic Company. 
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APPENDIX TABLE (B) IMPORTS LINDER THE " NEW SYSTEMS " 
NOVEMBER 1976. 
(i) The Barter Scheme. 
1 Spices. 
2 Sandalwood, St. Lucie's cherry, perfumes, and cosmetics. 
New television sets, radios and tape recorders. 
4 New commercial vehicles. 
5 Ready-made ladies' underwear and children wear. 
6 Toys and baby carriages 7. Haberdashery. 
8 Middle-sized and small batteries. 9. Tyres of all kinds. 
10 Fans. 11. Household gas cylinders. 
12 Electric household appliances 
13 Kitchen utensils and non-electric household appliances and utensils. 
14 Sports equipment. 15 Sanitary ware. 
16 Saj, zawi and palm fronds 17 Woodworking & metalwork tools. 
18 Building materials. 19 Raw materials for industry. 
20 Plywood. 21 Masonite. 
22 Formica. 23 Earthenware & china. 
24 Gas refrigerators. 2$ Cement. 
26 Apples & oranges. 27 Matches 
- 335- 
APPENDIX TABLE (R) cont., 
28 Gas cookers. 
30 Office supplies. 
29 Metal sheets (angles & flats) 
31 Electrical supplies. 
32 Tarpaulins. 
3k Glass & glass products. 
36 Photographic supplies. 
38 Yarn & thread. 
40 Rope & sisal. 
42 Carpets, mats & rugs. 
33 Window glass. 
35 Sunglasses. 
37 Clocks & Watches. 
39 Th11e, embroidery & ribbons 
41 Blankets. & sheets. 
43 Tarpaulin car covers. 
44 Clothing, excluding fully protected articles. 
45 Canned goods. 
47 Paper of all kinds. 
46 Tomato paste. 
(ii) Suptliers Credits. 
1 Waterproofed material. 
2 Commercial lorries of 6- 10 tons & pick-ups. 
3 Cycle & motorcycle tyres. 4 Agricultural implements & 
equipment. 
5 Various industrial raw materials & equipment. 
6 Diesel engines. 7 Televisions. radios & 
Tape recorders. 
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APPENDIX TABLE (B) cont., 
8 Electrical equipment. 9 Fans. 
10 Domestic electrical appliances. 11 Sanitary ware. 
12 Building materials other than of wood or iron. 
13 Woodworking and blacksmith equipment. 
14 Kitchen equipment. 
16 Canvas. 
18 Sports equipment. 
20 Metal sheets (angles & flats) 
22 Hardboard. 
24 Cement. 
(iii) The Nil Value Scheme. 
15 Butagas. 
17 Tractor tyres. 
19 Motor car tyres. 
21 Plywood. 
23 Plastic laminated sheets 
(Formica). 
1 Spices 
2 Sandalwood, mahaleb & perfume essences. 
3 Rope & string. 4 Window glass 
.5 
Barbed wire & mosquito mesh. 
6 Televisions, radios & tape recorders. 
7 Fans. 
0 
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APPENDIX TABLE (B) cont.. 
8 Electrical equipment, including lamps. 
9 Formica. 
10 Women's national dresses (Tobe and sari) which cost not less than 
£S5, CIF Port Sudan. 
11 Manufactured building materials. 
12 Ladies' underwear and children's clothing. 
13 New commercial vehicles. 14 Earthmoving vehicles. 
15 Toys & childrens pedal cars. 16 Tyres & tubes. 
17 Vehicle spare parts. 18 Pumps. 
19 Sewing machines 20 Perfumes & cosmetic prep- 
arations. 
21 Popular ornaments. 
23 Carpets & rugs. 
25 Floor coverings. 
27 Wigs & artificial hair. 
29 China, burnt clay. 
22 Haberdashery. 
24 Post-natal lying-in robes 
(Firak). 
26 Tulle, embroidery & ribbons. 
28 Dry cell batteries. 
30 Domestic equipment, non-electrical (Thermos flasks, charcoal irons etc) 
31 Domestic electrical appliances (other than refrigerators). 
32 Stationery. 33 Sanitary ware. 
34 Sunglasses. 3.5 Watches. 
36 Plastic products (with the exception of locally manufactured items) 
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APPENDIX TABLE (B) cont.. 
37 Photographic equipment. 
39 Wrapping paper. 
41 Dry cells (small & medium size). 
38 Sports equipment. 
4O Ballpoint pens. 
42 Metal sheets angles & flats. 
43 Plywood. 
45 Sewing threads. 
47 Domestic insecticides. 
49 Woollen knitwear. 
L4 Cement. 
4.6 Canned foodstuffs. 
48 Children's footwear (shoes) 
50 Textiles whose prices are not less than 40 Sudanese piastres per 
yard, CIF port of destination. 
51 Blankets & bedsheets. 
52 Local industrial requirements recommended by the Ministry of Ind- 
ustry. 
53 Tools & agricultural machinery. 54 Paper, all kinds. 
55 Glass products (except items locally manufactured). 
. 
56 Office equipment. 57 Spare parts, all kinds. 
58 Bicycles, all kinds. 
60 Publications. 
59 Lighting fittings. 
61 Colour televisions. 
62 Glass tea cups. 
64 Steel, all kinds. 
66 Tomato paste. 
63 Timber, all kinds. 
65 Other building materials. 
67 Matches. 
Source; Import Administration, Ministry of Commerce. 
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APPENDIX TABLE (G) PROTECTED PRODUCTS IN 1968/69 and 1972/73. 
(A) Products Protected by Quota (1968/69)" 
1 macaroni & Vermicelli 
,. 
3 Matches 
5 Shoes 
7 Household Utensils 
2 Biscuits 
4 Men's Socks 
6 Soap 
8 Beer 
9 Tanned Leather 10 Laundry Blue 
11 Textiles 12 Knitwear 
13 Air Coolers 14 Refrigerators 
15 Vegetable Oils 16 Stationery 
Source; Ministry of Industry and Mining. 
(B) Products Totally Protected (1972/73 )" 
1 Perfumes (not of high quality) 2 Sweets 
3 Biscuits 4 Soap 
5 laundry Blue 6 Household Utensils 
7 Steel Furniture 8 Batteries (for cars) 
9 Textiles(r. balan, Dammoria, Willaya) 10 Towels 
- 
3' 
APPENDIX TABLE (G) cont., 
11 Lanterns (from yarn) 
13 Air Coolers 
12 Chairs (from Bamboo) 
14 Knitwear (Underwear) 
15 Ready Made Clothes 
17 Vegetable Oils 
19 Refrigerators 
21 Packing & Packaging Materials 
23 Paints 
25 Zinc Sheets 
27 Shoes 
16 Plastic Sacks 
18 Stationery (Ink, Chalk) 
20 Tanned heather 
22 Zips (for Clothes & Cases) 
24 Plastic Products 
26 Ball-Pens (ordinary) 
28 Cement 
29 Beer 30 Sherry 
31 Alcohols (for Industry) 32 Men's Socks 
33 Tomato Paste (canned) 34 Matches 
35 Elastic & Cord 36 Macaroni & Vermicelli 
(c) Products Protected by Quota (1972/73 ). 
1 Particle Board 2 Sugar 
3 Cigarettes 4 Glass Products 
5 Juices (from Fruits) 6 Canned Fruits & Vegetables 
Source; "A Survey of the Industrial Sector of 
Sudan. " a Report by the IBRD December 1973 
PP. .5-6. 
-357- 
c"° 
CIN 
o\ co 0. tin m 
MN ul 
NNNNc r-q 
U) 
ca 
.r' 
, 
W^ 
W 
H 
co r-I c cr\ 
NN 
\O r-i ri Cat 
rl_ 
N 
Cam:. 
O0IN 
ca CQ co C\l \0 0 
v- 0cAN 0\ 13 A 
A 
co 
P. 
ö 
S 
ti (Yl ýl 
NNN0 
co nnn 
Cm '-, 
uv ; ýtl 
U4 
- En z 
fR ýn mm to 
QHOOoÖ 
a) o cis 
to -F' -- +) 
x-nwOb C) 
E°ý 
> ?ý> 
H 
pWý 
H 
rHl r-cr% 1 rý-I rß-1 ri 
HHH 
aW 1-4-1 rc v\ C\ C'1 ("'1 ('1 C"1 C"1 
- 358 - 
.o ;ý 
.- 
x 
H 
cv 
N 
Co 
c°ý 
CO 
rNi 
Co 
ö 
LI- 
N 
H 
Jgý 
c'1 
CD 
c\t 
N 
aD 
N 
N 
00 
cj 
M CO 
N 
CO 
N 
CO 
O 
Q 
N 
c'1 
[` _ZY 
mi 
ýp 
ul 
Co 
N 
Z r-i rl_ 
r-f O 
N 
2 
(> 
r. ý 
9 
N 
Co 
r-1 O. 0 
Co 
C. \o \o 
\O 
Cý 
'rl 
N 
H 
N 
N 
n N H 
N v H N 
Z 0 43 
mm 
w vý cn 
v2 
ra 
N 
43 (D 
cn 
N 
41 (D 
cn 
0 
o CJ2 
H 
Co 
H 
('l 
Co 
f-4 
r\ 
(> 
m 
C 
rý -I 
C'1 
rß -1 
(1 
N 
C\ 
H 
Ný 
C\ 
n 
N 
(ý1 
H 
cr, ý 
Cpl 
- 359 - 
*I 
n 
Ni 
rl 
Z 
H 
U 
to 
Ä 
w 
U 
H 
Ö 
,O 
Cß'1 
Vl q 
N 
co 
ti 
" 
cý1 - 
Co 00 C'4 
CD t-. 01 
?tr. r-1 
H c121 ýi -1: 114 
ao Co 0V0 CCo 
01% 090. 
Co ti 
9 
a' o ö i 
N g 
v N _ v 
m 
m m 
i., a) aD 
Ü H H 
ý ß 
r -I r -1 
ý cý cn c 
y 
a) b 
N 
o 
ýd 
ö 
NN 
f"1 C "N 
- 360 - 
x 
-t 
r" t 
Ni 
r-I 
Z 
H 
U 
H 
Cn 
r-i 
2m 
C\) 
cq \o \o 
r-i r-I H ri 
r- H 
rn r-1 cvo-% cc; v1 c\I r-f ti Vl% 
0 CVI% 
ý 
N 
N 
ON 
ý 
O 
N 
v 02 
3 43 
V2 
4 P4 
cd 
p' 
4) 
43 
r-4 
§ m 
ý 
NM 
uc"11 
(ýl C1 
H 
. e% 
- 361 - 
H 
O ý o 
Q` M 
O 
H 
0 
N 
cr% 
O' 
Co 
Co 
1111 
2 
o\ 
g 
H 
z p 
ý 
W 
U) Co 
N 
Ü 
'ä 
4 
O 
42 
H 
F2 A- 
Q% W 
M 
Co 
M 
CO 
M 
mý 
\o 
äi 
w0 E 
ri N 0 q 
y 
ti2 
N U Co 
. v Oý N 
Ü 
td N 
0 u 
[ý, 
r 
4-4 M 44 
O 
N 
ö e c24i 
r2 ;4 00 
g C 
`ý 0 ) 
9 
ü 
-S "w 
\o -fi 
lt 
C)\ 0 
-. i 
ý1 0 
Ü 
.i u1 
Co Co 
+) U U 
Ü 
H r J2 
tad 02 Id O 
Co . r4 G) r-4 'd g a k 11) 0 
mU 
O O X E 
U 0 (0 cd pI 
.F ^ 'd 
N 
Cl) s 9 A Ö Co 
0 
4-4 
O v 
43 P 
Ö 
^ Co . r4 0 i 
« -1 cd 
iJ 
H 
1! 
} 
N 
O'O 
H 
D2 0 
Iý 
8 
- 362 - 
APPENDIX TABLE (T) CAPACITY UTILIZATION IN A SAMPLE OF FIRMS 
1968/69. 
(%) 
isic FIRM DESCRIPTION CAPACITY. UTILIZATION (; b) 
3112 Milk Cream, Dry 14 
3113 Tomato, Peeled 84 
3113 Dates 10 
3115 Vegetable Oils (1) 
3115 Vegetable Oils (2) 
3115 Vegetable Oils (3) 
3115 Vegetable Oils (4) 
3116 Wheat Flour 
3118 Sugar (1) 
3118 Sugar (2) 
3119 Sweets (1) 
3119 Sweets (2) 
3119 Sweets (3) 
3121 Macaroni (1) 
3121 Macaroni (2) 
3121 Onion Dehydration 
3131 Sherry 
3133 Beer 
3140 Cigarettes 
87 
68 
72 
55 
80 
82 
94 
56 
53 
45 
47 
4o 
28 
61 
92 
40 
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APPENDIX TABLE (T) cont., 
3211 Textiles (1) 6' 
3211 Textiles (2) 84 
3213 Underwear (1) 90 
3213 Underwear (2) 81 
3231 Leather Tanning 4+ 
3240 Footwear 60 
3411 Kraft Paper 38 
3.521 Paints 35 
3523 soap '(1) 67 
3523 Soap (2) 70 
3523 soap (3) 81 
3529 Matches 41 
3529 Laundry Blue 32 
3529 Glue 53 
3530 Petroleum Products 84 
3620 Glass Products 50 
3692 Cement 74 
3831 Car Batteries 34 
3833 Refrigerators* 47 
3833 Refrigerators 64 
Source; Industrial Survey 1968/69 and Ministry of* 
Industry and Mining. 
